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This study is designed to examine the legal aspects of teacher 
certification in home schools in the United States. The following 
conclusions can be drawn based on a review of literature on the subject 
and an analysis of state statutes and court decisions. 
1. Courts recognize the authority of state legislatures to 
regulate who teaches in home schools. 
2. Statutes must be reasonable and administered in a nondis­
criminatory manner to withstand judicial challenges by 
parents. 
3. State statutes which are specific in their requirements fare 
better when challenged in courts. 
4. Courts are willing to declare nonspecific language in 
statutes unconstitutionally vague. N 
5. In the absence of statutory requirements for certified 
personnel, the judiciary will examine the quality of the 
educational program in home schools to determine teacher 
competency. 
6. Instruction comparable to that available in public schools 
will be considered the minimum requirement for home schools. 
7. Courts will become increasingly concerned with certification 
at the appropriate level of instruction, especially for 
older students. 
8. Claims that certification of teachers in home schools violates 
religious rights will usually not be successful in courts. 
9. The broad claim that "fundamental rights" are violated by 
regulation of home school personnel must be supported with 
specific charges. 
10. The burden of proving that regulation of home school person­
nel is unconstitutional falls on parents who make such 
charges. 
11. The teaching certificate is accepted by courts as a legiti­
mate measure of competency of teachers even though it is 
not absolute. 
12. Standardized tests are generally rejected as an alternative 
to teacher certification as a measure of competency. 
13. The socialization value of public school education has not 
been determined. 
14. Legislatures will be encouraged by home school advocates 
to relax standards^for home school personnel. 
15. Home schooling efforts will be assisted by cooperative 
efforts of groups and individuals who advocate parental 
rights. 
16. Public school officials will be faced with more challenges 
to compulsory school attendance laws and by parents who 
are more imaginative in their effort to provide home 
schooling. 
17. The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the home 
schooling question. Until it does, parents and school 
officials must rely on the opinions of lower courts which 
are conflicting and inconsistent. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A growing number of families in the United States are exercising 
the prerogative to provide education for children in the home. It has 
been predicted that by 1990 the number of families choosing this 
alternative to public schools will reach at least one half million.1 
2 3 
This will be a significant increase from the 10,000 to 30,000 
families providing home schooling today. The movement toward home 
schooling is a return to the practice which was the "rule rather than 
4 the exception" prior to the adoption of compulsory school attendance 
laws throughout the United States. 
At the same time that an increasing number of children are 
being removed from the classrooms of America in favor of home instruc­
tion, there is a public call for better instruction for all children. 
Since the beginning of this decade there have been nearly thirty major 
national reports and countless state and local studies which have 
focused on the imperative of improving the quality of education in 
*J. John Harris, III and Richard E. Fields, "Outlaw Generation: 
A Legal Analysis of the Home-Instruction Movement," Educational 
Horizons, 61 (Fall 1982), p. 26. 
2 Richard A. Bumstead, "Educating Your Own Child: The 
Perchemlides Case," Phi Delta Kappan, 61 (October 1979), p. 97. 
^Neal Devlns, "A Constitutional Right to Home Instruction?" 
Washington University Law Quarterly, 62 (Fall 1984), p. 435. 
Sue F. Burgess, "The Legal Aspects of Home Instruction," (Ed.D. 
dissertation, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1985), p. 1, 
2  
5  America. These reports have consistently recognized the need for 
better teachers in the classroom. One issue states have chosen to 
focus upon in their efforts to recapture "a sense of quality" through 
C. 
"a return to a common core of shared intellectual experiences" is the 
matter of certification standards for teachers. These standards are 
being examined and revised in an effort to insure the public that 
teachers are properly trained to provide quality educational experi­
ences in the classroom.^ 
The right of states to regulate who teaches in public schools 
through the use of the certification process and the right of parents 
to educate children at home have generally been accepted by the public 
and the courts. Conant summarized the subject of certification when 
he said, "There is little doubt that the states possess the ultimate 
power to regulate schools and to determine the conditions of teacher 
Q 
employment." The courts have agreed that certification of teachers 
is a legitimate power of the state to assure that teachers are ade­
quately prepared. 
5 Richard W. Moors, Master Teachers (Bloomington,  Indiana: Phi 
Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1984), p. 10. 
6Fred M. Hechinger, Education Agenda for the 1980's 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1981), 
p. 19. 
^J. Arthur Taylor, "Quality Assurance for Professional School 
Personnel: A position Paper," (Unpublished paper). 
Q 
James Bryant Conant, "The Certification of Teachers: The 
Restricted State Approval Program Approach." Lecture presented to the 
Annual Meeting of the American Association of Colleges for Teacher 
Education, Chicago, February 19, 1964. 
3  
"The courts have not recognized the existence of a fundamental 
g 
right to educate children at home." However, they have generally 
ruled in favor of "parents whose fundmental rights have been violated 
by application of the compulsory attendance law"^ if "the instruction 
given is adequate . . . [and provided] by a parent who is competent 
to teach. 
Recognizing the importance of providing qualified teachers in 
all schools, some states have regulated who is allowed to teach in 
home instruction programs. It is the issue of state regulation of 
teachers in home schools which is addressed in this research. 
Statement of the Problem 
As the number of parents who choose to provide home instruction 
grows so will the number of legal questions which need to be answered. 
Public school officials must be cognizant of the legal issues they will 
face when parents, with or without the approval of local boards of 
education, initiate the practice of home schooling. 
Nolte points out that if parents want to remove their children 
from public schools in favor of home instruction, they have a fifty 
percent chance to successfully meet the legal challenge of public 
g 
Burgess, p. 213. 
10Ibid. 
^People v. Turner^ N.Y.S. 2d. 886 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950). 
4  
1 2  school officials. Many cases are lost by school officials which 
could be won if school officials were more knowledgeable of statuatory 
requirements of compulsory attendance laws and alternatives available 
to parents in fulfilling the requirements of these laws. 
Ritter illustrates the problem by saying that "parents are more 
imaginative than school officials in finding provisions in state laws 
13 that permit home education instruction." Because of parents' 
determination to provide home instruction and their ability to find 
legal ways to provide it, school boards are often ill-prepared to 
challenge the parents. Ritter also contends that boards of education 
lose cases because they are unprepared, do not know the laws, and make 
hasty decisions. To emphasize her point, she quotes a parent who was 
successful in defending his right to educate his child at home as 
saying, "If school officials had known the laws, they would have 
avoided a lot of bad publicity."1^ 
One of the most litigated issues in the area of home schooling 
is the question of who conducts the instruction and the qualifications 
and/or certification of the instructor. Court decisions on this matter 
are an oxymoron. There have been rulings that the lack of a 
*2M. Chester Nolte, "Home Instruction in Lieu of Public School 
Attandance," in School Law for a New Decade, ed. M. A. McGhehey 
(Topeks, Kansas: National Organization on Legal Problems in Education, 
1982), pp. 5-6. 
^Marian Ritter, "Read This Before You Veto Home Education 
Requests," American School Board Journal, 16 (October 1979), p. 38. 
5  
1 5  certificate is evidence of incompetency and rulings that certifica-
16 
tion requirements can be waived if equivalent training is proven. 
Courts have ruled that irrespective of other considerations the lack of 
a certificate is evidence that instruction is insufficient,1^ and in 
the case of a parent who had a certificate but had not taught for 
18 twenty years, that competency must be demonstrated. 
This study is designed to provide information and guidance to 
educators who may be faced with requests from parents who want to 
establish home schools. A heightened awareness of the legal issues of 
the certification of teachers in home schools will help school adminis­
trators be more successful in their defense of state statutes related 
to home instruction. 
Key Questions to be Answered 
"Teacher certification is the principal mechanism to assure the 
public that teachers have received the minimal training necessary to 
19 teach a subject" and is designed to protect the children and state 
20 against incompetent and inadequately trained teachers." 
15 
Kobylski v. Board of Education of Central School District 
Number 1, 304 N.Y.S. 2d. 453 (New York App. 1969). 
16Peop1e v. Turner. 
17In re Shinn, 195 Cal App. 2d 683, 16 Cal Rptr. 165 (1961). 
18 
Commonwealth v. Kollock, 27 Pa. D and C. 81 (1936). 
19 James E. Woodford, Susan M. Presti, Alison Gray, and Ron 
Goble, Teacher Certification: Out-of Field Teaching in Grades 9-12 
(Raleigh, North Carolina: North Carolina Center for Public Policy 
Research, 1982), p. v. 
20Ibid., p. 1. 
6  
Many states have extended authority to certify teachers to non­
public schools, including instruction by parents or others in home 
schools. Legal issues have been raised concerning the authority to 
regulate who teaches in home schools and other nonpublic schools. It 
is imperative that those interested in home schooling be aware of the 
legal aspects of certification guidelines in such schools. 
This study answers key questions on the subject of certification 
of teachers in home schools. These questions are as follows: 
1. What is the legal status of home schooling in the United 
States? 
2. How widespread is the practice of requiring certification 
for teachers in home schools? 
3. What type of certification is required? 
4. What have been the court decisions on the regulation of 
teachers in home schools? 
5. What trends, if any, can be identified from an analysis of 
state statutes and court decisions in this area? 
6. On what grounds have parents based their objections to 
certification of teachers in home schools? 
7. In what other ways have states regulated who teaches in home 
schools? 
7  
Scope of the Study 
This is a historical and descriptive study of the practice of 
requiring certification of teachers in home schools. The reseach 
presents the historical background of the practice of requiring 
certification for home instructors and examines the practice as it 
exists today in the fifty states. It also examines the extent to which 
this practice has been litigated, the legal issues addressed, the 
results of major cases, and the possible effects these decisions may 
have on the practice of educating children in the home. 
Method, Procedures, and Sources of Information 
Interest in the topic of home schools was generated in Public 
School Law, a graduate course at The University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. After reviewing literature on the subject and a review of 
Dissertation Abstracts, it was discovered that there are many 
unanswered questions on the topic of home schooling. Upon discovering 
that "Legal Aspects of Home Instruction," a doctoral dissertation, had 
recently been completed, a need was seen for research into specific 
areas of home schooling. Since it is accepted that "of all the factors 
which influence the effectiveness of our schools, teaching is the most 
21 important," it was decided to focus on certification of teachers in 
home schools. 
21 North Carolina Commission on Education for Economic Growth, 
Education for Economic Growth: An Action Plan for North Carolina 
(Raleigh, North Carolina: North Carolina Commission on Education for 
Economic Growth, 1984), p. 14. 
8  
Letters were sent to the chief state school officer in each of 
the fifty states requesting information relative to home schooling and 
certification of teachers in those schools. Also, the National 
Organization for Legal Problems in Education, the Education Commission 
of the States, the North Carolina Attorney General's office, and the 
North Carolina School Boards Association were contacted for relevant 
information. 
A list of resources was received from a computer search from the 
Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC).. These resources were 
supplemented by resources located through Resources in Education, the 
Education Index, Current Law Index, Index to Legal Periodicals, Current 
Index to Journals in Education, and Reader's Guide to Periodical 
Literature. 
The evaluation and categorization of state statutes and an 
analysis of court decisions was undertaken. Resources for these func­
tions included NOLPE School Law Reporter, West Law Report, National 
Reporter System, Corpus Juris Secundum, School Law News, School Law 
Bulletin, Shepard's Citation, and American Digest System, 
9  
Definition of Terms 
22 The following programmatic definitions apply to terms in this 
study: 
Certificate: A license granted by the state in the form of a 
document which specifies that the named individual has fulfilled the 
legal and academic requirements specified by state statutes and enables 
23 that individual to enter into a lawfully binding contract to teach. 
Certification: The process of completing requirements in order 
to be issued a teaching certificate. 
Nonpublic School: A school offering a program of instruction 
which is not under the control, supervision or management of a local 
24 school board. 
School: Any supervised^program of instruction designed to pro­
vide educational instruction to students in a "particular place, manner, 
25 and subject area." 
Compulsory Education: The requirement that the "parent, 
guardian, or other person having control or charge or custody of a 
26 
child" between certain ages send the child to school. 
22 Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education, Seventh Printing 
(Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1368), p. 19. 
23 Richard D. Gatti and Daniel J. Gatti, Encyclopedic Dictionary 
of School Law (West Nyack, New York: Parker Publishing Co., Inc., 
1975), p. 45. 
^New Mexico, New Mexico Statutes Annotated, Sec. 22-2-2 (1984). 
25Ibid. 
26Wyoming, Wyoming Statutes Annotated, Sec. 21-4-101 (a)(ii) 
(1977). 
1 0  
Home School; A program of educational instruction provided in 
the home to a child by the child's parent or legal guardian or by a 
27 person designated by the parent or legal guardian. 
Certified Teacher: An individual who has met the certification 
requirements of a state and who is licensed to teach. 
Public School: A school offering a program of Instruction which 
is under the control, supervision, and management of a local school 
board. 
Significance of the Study 
As noted earlier there are two distinct movements afoot in the 
mid-1980's. The first is the trend for more parents to instruct their 
children in the home and the second is to insist on better qualified 
instructors in all schools. As these movements gain momentum, there is 
the legal question of the qualifications of parents or others who 
teach children at home. 
Zirkel contends that the matter of home instruction depends 
28 primarily on interpretation of state statutes. A study of state laws 
on the subject of home schools reveals a great variation of require­
ments. One area in which the variation is especially noticeable is the 
area of certification of teachers in these schools. Lines describes 
^Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
28 Perry A. Zirkel and Ivan Gluckman, "Home Instruction: When 
It's Legal," Principal, 6 (January 1983), pp. 37-38. 
1 1  
the subject of certification of teachers as a "thorn in the side of 
29 
private [including home] schools." 
The statutory requirements for teaching in home schools vary 
from certification being required to no requirements at all. Some 
states require that teachers in all nonpublic schools, including home 
schools, be certified and other states allow voluntary certification. 
Some other variations include: 
1. Certification of the teacher or the teacher must work under 
30 
the supervision of a certified teacher. 
31 2. Certification for teaching of certain types of students. 
32 
3. Approval by state officials. 
33 4. High school education or equivalent. 
34 5. College degree. 
35 6. Required testing of-'noncertified teachers. 
29 
Patricia Lines, Compulsory Education Laws and Their Impact on 
Public and Private Education (Denver, Colorado: Education Commission 
of the States, 1984), p. 1. 
Washington, Washington Revised Code, Sec. 28A.27.010 (1981). 
31 
Arkansas, Arkansas Statutes Annotated, Supplement, Sec. 42 
(1985). 
32 
Louisiana, West's Louisiana Revised Statutes, Annotated, 
Sec. 17:236 (1980). 
^Washington 
^Tennessee, Tennessee Code Annotated, Supplement, Sec. 49-6-3001 
(1985). 
^Nebraska, Nebraska Revised Statutes, Sec. 79-201 (1981). 
1 2  
Other state statutes are not as specific. Examples of these 
36 
vague requirements include, "a person qualified to teach," "of quali-
37 fications prescribed by the Board of Education," "a competent 
38 39 
person," "comparably instructed," "in any other manner arranged 
for by the school committee . . . and . . . approved by the commis-
40 41 sioner," and "proper instruction." 
The imprecise wording of many state statutes and the lack of 
consistency from state to state will provide parents with grounds to 
challenge any opposition to their attempt to teach their own children. 
They will also challenge educators to seek guidance in the interpreta­
tion of many of the laws. 
Educators will face more parents demanding more answers to the 
question of who can teach in home schools. It is imperative that 
educators be aware of statutory laws and judiciary rulings resulting 
from these laws. This research provides educators with information 
on the legal aspects of certification of teachers in home schools. 
3®0hio, Ohio Revised Code, Sec. 3321.04(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1981). 
"^Virginia, Virginia Code, Sec. 22.1-254 (1980). 
38Hawaii, Hawaii Revised Statutes, Sec. 298-9(b) (1981). 
39Idaho, General Laws of Idaho, Sec. 33-202 (1981). 
^°Maine, Maine Revised Statutes, Annotated, Sec. 911 (3)(a) 
(West Supp. 19817"! 
^Mississippi, Mississippi Code Annotated, Sec. 37-13-9 
(Supp. 1982). 
1 3  
Design of the Study 
This research is composed of five parts. The first chapter is 
an overview of the topic of compulsory education and the principle of 
certification of teachers in home schools. This chapter also includes 
key questions to be answered and definitions of terms used in the 
study. 
Chapter two is a review of literature relative to compulsory 
education, home schools, and the certification of personnel. Special 
emphasis is placed on the legal and judicial issues of the topics. 
The third chapter is an analysis of the state statutes which . 
address the topic of home school personnel. The statutes are analyzed 
and grouped according to requirements. 
Chapter four is a discussion of the legal aspects of certifica-
tion of teachers in home schools. Major issues which surfaced during 
the review of literature are discussed. Highlights of major judicial 
decisions through September 1985 are presented and juxtaposed against 
emerging issues on the topic. 
Chapter five is a review and analysis of court cases which have 
been decided in the area of certification of personnel in home schools. 
It includes reasons for litigation and decisions which have been 
handed down. 
The last chapter contains a summary of findings and recoitmenda-
tions based on these findings. Answers are given to the questions 
presented in the first chapter and conclusions reached from a review 
of the state statutes and court decision are stated. 
1 4  
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Introduction 
We believe that, in the interest of parental right to 
choose an alternative to public education, [home instruc­
tion with safeguards, such as approval of curriculum or 
testing of the child] . . . should be extended to all 
jurisdictions because the state's interest in assuring 
minimum levels of education does not extend to control of 
the means by which that interest is realized.1 
This statement by the American Civil Liberties Union in the form 
of Policy No. 71A as reported by Lines is an example of the strong 
support for home schools in America which comes from private school 
o 
groups and organizations interested in civil liberties. 
The concept of home schooling is not new. Beshoner sees it as 
3 
a "closing of the circle" which had its beginning in Colonial America 
when children were educated in the home or not educated at all. How­
ever, it is a concept which has seen a revival in the form of a pro­
test against public schools. With the revival of interest in home 
schools has come a host of legal questions including who can teach in 
these schools and what qualifications the teachers should possess. 
^Patricia M. Lines, Home Instruction (Update), Education 
Commission of the States Issuegram, No. 49 (August 1985):!. 
2Ibid. 
o 
E. Alice Law Beshoner, "Home Education in America: Parental 
Rights Reasserted," UMKC Law Review 49 (Winter 1981):191. 
1 5  
Historically parents have had the right and obligation to direct 
the intellectual and moral upbringing of their children. The right and 
duty to feed, clothe, and otherwise provide for the basic needs of 
4 children have not been questioned. However, when "basic needs" is 
expanded to include education, questions arise. No one disputes the 
fact that all children should be provided an education, but there is 
disagreement on who is to provide the education, in what manner, and in 
what setting. 
The debate over home schools and the state's right to impose 
regulations on them has heard such arguments as: 
It is almost impossible for a child to be adequately taught 
in his home. I cannot conceive how a child can receive in 
the home instruction and experiences . . .in any manner or 
form comparable to that provided in the public school.5 
On the other hand, proponents of home schools say: 
Any compulsory education statute which does not allow home 
education when it conforms to the public school curriculum 
should be struck down as violative of the Constitution.6 
Opposition to state control of home schools is further expressed 
by Beshoner when she says: 
States that require certification of teachers or the 
meeting of other criteria that unreasonably restrict 
parental choice are without constitutional justification 
to do so.1 
4Ibid. 
5Stephen v. Bongart, 189 A. 131 (Essex County Ct. 1937), p. 137. 
^Brendan Stocklin-Enriqht, "The Constitutionality of Home Educa­
tion: -The Role of the Parent, the State and the Child," Willamette Law 
Review 18 (1982):611. 
^Beshoner, p. 206. 
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In order to understand the strong sentiments toward teacher 
certification in home schools and the accompanying legal aspects, it is 
necessary to study three separate topics. This chapter reviews rela­
tive literature on these topics of compulsory school attendance, home 
schooling, and certification of teachers. 
Compulsory School Attendance 
Introduction 
Statutes requiring school attendance within certain ages has 
O 
long formed the backbone of the American educational system. The 
extent to which compulsory school attendance has been accepted in 
America is seen in the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. 
Board of Education. In this historic ruling the court said: 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures 
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It is 
required in the performance of our most basic public respon­
sibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the 
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a princi­
pal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping 
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it 
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa­
tion. Such an opportunity where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on 
equal terms.9 
Q 
E. Edmund Reutter, Jr. and Robert H. Hamilton, The Law of 
Public Education, 2nd ed. (Mineola, New York: Foundation Press, Inc., 
1976), p. 537. 
9Brown v. Board of Education, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954); p. 691. 
17 
This section looks at the historical development of compulsory 
attendance in the United States and the legal aspects of such laws. 
History of Compulsory School Attendance 
The concept of compulsory attendance originated, according to 
Ensign, with a statute of Henry IV in 1405. This law required all 
children to engage in regular employment if they were not attending 
school. A 1530 statute of Henry VII gave local authorities the power 
to take idle or begging children between the ages of five and thirteen 
and to make them apprentices to husbandmen or craftsmen in order that 
they might be taught a trade. By so doing, the children would be 
able to earn their own livelihood when they were grown.10 
The rudiments of compulsory school attendance in America are 
found in a law passed in 1642 in Massachusetts. This statute said 
that "... the selectmen in every town shall have power to take 
account of all parents and masters as to their children's education 
and employment," and "They are to see that the children can read and 
understand the principles of religion and the capital laws of the 
country."11 This, like the earlier laws in Europe, was a compulsory 
education law which required that children be educated but said nothing 
10Forest Chester Ensing, Compulsory School Attendance and Child 
Labor: A Study of the Historical Development of Regulations Compelling 
Attendance and Limiting the Labor of Children in a Selected Group of 
States IIowa City: Atnens Press, 1921), p. 231. 
^Walter S. Monroe, ed., Encyclopedia of Educational Research: 
A Project of the American Educational Research Association (New York: 
Macmillan, 1950). p. 292. 
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of how or where they were to be educated. It was not until 1852 that 
Massachusetts passed the first state-wide compulsory attendance law in 
the United States. Other states followed the lead of Massachusetts; 
and in 1918, Mississippi became the last of the states to enact such 
laws.^ 
The study of the growth of compulsory education, compulsory 
school attendance and the regulation of child labor in the United States 
are inseparable. Ensign divided the study of these movements into 
three distinct periods. 
The first period began with the colonies and extended into the 
second and third decades of the nineteenth century. During this time 
the children of the poor were conceded the rudiments of education, but 
labor was regarded as desirable and its moral and economic values were 
stressed. 
The second period began during the middle of the nineteenth 
century and was marked by the uniting of forces which recognized the 
common interest in children. These forces united to seek legislation to 
serve the rights of children. However, they were not unopposed. They 
faced the opposition of those who regarded any interference with 
parental control over children as undemocratic and those who were 
afraid that compulsory education would interfere with unrestricted use 
of child labor in factories. 
12 Lawrence A. Cremln, The Transformation of the School: Pro-
gressivism in American Education, 1876-1957 (New York: Vintage Books, 
1964), p. 127. 
19 
The latter part of the nineteenth century was the beginning of 
the third period. It was at this time that employers discovered that 
the labor of young children was not profitable after all, and a begin­
ning was made toward the establishment of systems of education that 
recognized the industrial and social needs of children. During this 
period states began to discover and express their own power and to 
13 become more aware of the responsibility to educate children. 
The purpose of compulsory education changed just as attitudes 
about it changed. The first compulsory education laws in America were 
passed to control the labor of children. Later laws were enacted with 
the realization that "only through compulsory measures can the masses 
14 be saved from ignorance" and that the "welfare of the state is served 
15 by the creation of an enlightened citizenry." 
Compulsory school attendance laws have historically made pro­
visions for the exemption of certain children from compulsory school 
attendance. Benton states that school attendance is not usually 
required in the following circumstances: 
1. When the mental or physical condition of the child 
is such that school attendance is likely to endanger the 
well-being of the child. 
2. When the child's home conditions are such that the child's 
attendance at school will endanger the well-being of or 
work an undue hardship upon the family or individual 
members of the family. 
13 Ensign, pp. 2-5. 
^Ibid., p. 5. 
15Ibid., p. 2. 
2,0 
3. When the child's attendance at school will require that 
the child walk an unreasonable distance or travel over 
a hazardous route. 
4. When the child's attendance at school will require that 
the child attend a school wherein assignments are based 
upon race, creed, social class, or other factors which 
indicate an unjustified discrimination between Indi­
viduals or groups of individuals. 
16 
5. When school age youth are legally married. 
Monroe points out that some statutes make provisions for the 
exemption of students from compulsory attendance when it is "for the 
best interest of the child or for good reasons."^ 
A trend in compulsory attendance laws has been to increase the 
number of years children are required to attend. The age span has been 
increased by lowering the minimum age and by raising the age.at which 
a student is no longer covered by the law. Another trend has been to 
lengthen the school term from an average of five months in 1914 to nine 
months in 1950.*® 
Legal Aspects of Compulsory Attendance Laws 
The growth of compulsory education has not been without litiga­
tion. These cases have traditionally been based on the belief that 
16 
Thomas M. Benton, "Legal Aspects of Compulsory School Attend­
ance," in Legal Tssues in Education: Abridged Duke Doctoral Disserta­
tions, ed. Edward C. Bolmeier (Charlottesville, Va.: Michie Company, 
19707, p. 13. 
^Monroe, p. 297. 
18Ibid., p. 295. 
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parents have a natural and constitutional right to determine the manner 
19 and place of their children's education and that fundamental rights 
20 of parents are abridged by compulsory attendance statutes. 
Early court decisions upheld the rights of parents. The 
earliest reported legal challenge to compulsory education was in 
21 Illinois, and the court ruled in favor of the parents in the case 
when it said: 
Parents and guardians are under the responsibility of pre­
paring children intrusted to their care and nurture, for 
the discharge of their duties in life .... The state 
has provided the means and brought them within the reach 
of all to acquire the benefits of a common school educa­
tion, but leaves it to the parents and guardians to determine 
the extent to which they will render it available to the 
children under their charge.22 
This ruling reflected the general philosophy of the mid-
nineteenth century; but as public sentiment changed, so did the court 
rulings. In 1897 a Georgia court ruled that: 
The child, at the will of the parent, could be allowed 
to grow up in ignorance, and become a more than useless 
member of society, and for the great wrong, brought 
about by neglect of his parents the common law pro­
vided no remedy."23 
19 
Edward C. Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure, 2nd ed. 
(Cincinnati, Oh.: W. H. Anderson Company, 1973], p. 232. 
20 
David Schimmer and Louis Fischer, The Rights of Parents in the 
Education of Their Children (Columbia, Md.: National Committee for 
Citizens in Education, 1977), p. 83. 
21 Edward C. Bolmeier, Judicial Excerpts Governing Students and 
Teachers (Charlottesville, Va~ Michie Company, 1977), p. 7. 
22Rulison v. Post, 79 111. 567, 28 N.E.68 (1876); p. 573. 
23Board of Education v. Purse, 28 S.E. 896 (Georgia 1897); 
p. 899. 
22 
The complete reversal of earlier decisions was evident in an 
Indiana ruling in 1901. This decision declared the state's authority 
to compel school attendance regardless of the wishes of the parents 
with the ruling that: 
The natural rights of a parent to the custody and control 
of his infant child are subordinate to the power of the 
state .... One of the most important natural duties of 
t h e  p a r e n t  i s  h i s  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  e d u c a t e  h i s  c h i l d  . . . .  
If he neglects to perform it or willingly refuses to do 
so, he may be coerced by law to execute such civil obliga­
tion. 24 
State and federal courts have consistently upheld the constitu­
tionality of compulsory education laws. Typical of the rulings is one 
by the North Carolina Appeals Court which stated in 1976 that: 
The natural and legal right of parents to the custody 
companionship, control, and bringing up of their 
children may be interfered with or denied for 
substantial and sufficient reasons, and it is subject 
to judicial control when the interest and welfare of 
children require it.25 
Not only have the courts upheld the concept of compulsory educa­
tion, but the United States Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board of Educa-
26 
tion, expounded the importance of compulsory attendance. 
The judiciary has consistently ruled that parents must educate 
their children. However, the courts have been explicit in ruling that 
it is not necessary to do so in public schools. 
24State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730 (Ind. 1901); p. 732. 
25In re McMillan, 226 S.E. 2d. 693 CN.C. Appeal. 1976); p. 695. 
26 
Brown v. Board of Education, p. 691. 
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In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the United States Supreme Court 
declared that the state has the power "to require that all children of 
27 proper age attend some school." The Society of Sisters of the Holy 
Names of Jesus and Mary charged that the Oregon statute requiring 
attendance in a public school deprived them of a property Interest they 
had 1n their private schools. The court decided that the statute 1n 
question: 
Unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control .... The fundamental theory of 
liberty upon which all governments in this union repose 
excludes any general power of the state to standardize chil­
dren by forcing them to accept instruction from public 
teachers only.28 
The United States Supreme Court ruled in Yoder v. Wisconsin that 
the state's compelling interest in education must be balanced against 
the parents' rights to direct the religious upbringing of their children 
and the rights of free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First 
Amendment to the Constitution. The court found, based on 300 
years of producing self sufficient citizens through Amish tradition, 
that religion and the Amish mode of life were inseparable and inter­
dependent. Therefore, Amish children were not required to attend 
29 school after completion of the eighth grade. 
Burgess points out that observers who thought the Yoder decision 
would mean the end of compulsory attendance laws were wrong. She 
^Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); p. 532. 
28Ibid., pp. 534-535. 
^Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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states that courts have not extended the Yoder doctrine to non-Amish 
children 
Benton reports that the question examined in the courts relating 
to exemptions from compulsory attendance is whether, in a particular 
case, there is an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of state authority. 
Laws are usually considered unreasonable if, in the opinion of the 
court, "the well-being of the child or members of the child's family 
will be endangered by his attendance at school.,,,3, If there is evidence 
of discrimination or favortism in educational opportunity, the courts 
will find the enforcement of such laws as arbitrary and a denial of 
32 equal protection. 
Summary 
All fifty states have enacted compulsory attendance laws. The 
purpose of these laws is to insure students an education, not to require 
that they be instructed in a particular manner or place. With few 
exceptions, the laws have survived constitutional attacks which allege 
that they prohibit free exercise of religious beliefs or in some other 
way infringe upon liberties guaranteed in the United States Constitu­
tion. 
30 
Sue F. Burgess, "The Legal Aspects of Home Instruction" (Ed.D. 
dissertation, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1985), p. 1. 
31 
Benton, p. 14. 
25 
Parents have a constitutional interest against unreasonable 
interference by the state in the upbringing and education of their 
children. However, these rights are subordinate to the power of the 
state to set minimal educational standards. 
Home Schooling in America 
Introduction 
Educating children in the home is an old practice which is 
receiving renewed interest in the United States. Prior to the enact­
ment of compulsory school attendance laws, home schools were common. 
The isolation of families and the scarcity of teachers made public 
schools impossible for many children. Home schools were the only 
alternative for many parents who wanted their children to be educated. 
Lines reports that, even today, in some areas of Alaska, Montana, and 
other sparsely populated areas home instruction is by necessity rather 
than choice. In other places parents educate their children at home 
as a matter of preference. For various reasons they choose home schools 
33 rather than public or private schools. 
This section examines the status of home schools in America and 
the legal aspects of offering home instruction. 
The Status of Home Schools in America 
There are numerous reasons parents choose not to send their 
children to public schools. Among the reasons children are educated in 
00 
Patricia M. Lines, Compulsory Education Laws and Their Impact 
on Public and Private Education (.Denver, Col.: Education Commission 
of the States, 1985), p. 42. 
26 
alternative settings is that parents find public schools too orthodox 
34. 3*5 
in their curriculum and methods, to escape racial integration, to 
36 
separate from governmentally controlled education, religious and 
37 "sociopsychological objectives" to public schools, the desire to pro-
38 tect children from exposure to objectionable secular values, dis-
39 
agreements with teachers and other school officials, and the desire 
40 for a quality education. Gaffey elaborates on the term "quality 
education." He states that such an education includes religious and 
moral values, rules and discipline, respect for students, teachers who 
care about students and who are able to impress on students high levels 
of expectation, and the ability to make children "so interested in 
41 learning that they talk about school at the dinner table." 
34 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Com­
pulsory Schooling in a Changing World (Paris, France: Author, 1983), 
p. 37. 
35 John E. Coons and Stephen D. Sugarman, Education by Choice: 
The Case for Family Control (Berkley, Cal.: University of California 
Press, 1978), p. 109. 
36Virgil C. Blum, "Why Inner City Families Send Their Children 
to Private Schools," in Private Schools and the Public Good: Policy 
Alternatives for the Eighties, ed. Edward McGlynn Gaffey, Jr. (Notre 
Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 24. 
37Pe1conte v. State, 329 S.E. 2d. 636 (N.C. 1985). 
38Puro v. District Attorney, Second Judicial District of N.C., 
712 F. 2d. 96 (4th Cir. 1983). 
39State v. Peterman, 70 N.E. 505 (Ind. App. 1904). 
^°Blum, p. 24. 
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The legality of alternative schools was determined in 1925 when 
the United States Supreme Court declared that the state has the power 
42 "to require that all children of proper age attend some school." The 
law in question was an Oregon statute which required all children to 
attend public schools. The court ruled that the statute was unconsti­
tutional and declared that the state cannot "standardize children by 
43 forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." 
The Pierce decision was reinforced by the Yoder ruling in which 
the United States Supreme Court declared "that the state acts reasonably 
and constitutionally in requiring education to age 16 in some public or 
44 private school meeting the standards prescribed by the state." 
Pierce and Yoder clearly established the right of parents to 
choose alternative schools for children by inserting the word "some" in 
the rulings. 
When parents exercise their prerogative to choose a school 
setting other than public schools, one choice is a home school. This 
is a choice which is growing in popularity. Lines points out that there 
are no accurate figures available on the number of families who operate 
home schools. Many families who educate their children at home fear 
that the programs will not be approved and do not report them. She 
states that the best estimate is that at least 10,000 families now 
A O  
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, p. 534. 
43Ibid., pp. 534-535. 
44 Wisconsin v. Yoder. 
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45 
provide instruction in the home. Beshoner puts the number at 20,000 
46 
families, and Devin contends that as many as 30,000 families now 
choose this alternative.4^ 
The increasing popularity of home schools is evident by the 
number of states enacting laws permitting the practice. Burgess found 
that only twenty-six states had such laws in 1976. By 1983 this number 
had increased to thirty-six, and by 1984 two more states had been 
48 
added to the growing number of states with such statutes. Forty-one 
states now have statutory provisions for home schools. In addition to 
these forty-one states, home instruction is permitted by case law in 
two states. The attorney general of another state has ruled that home 
schools are permitted under existing state laws, and the state board 
of education of another state has adopted regulations which permit 
instruction in the home. A total of forty-five states have provisions, 
statutory or otherwise, for home instruction. Table 1 shows which 
states permit home instruction. 
Statutory requirements for home schools are in a state of change. 
In Montana "county superintendents are finding some difficulty in 
enforcing this [home school] law . . . [and] there may be amendments to 
45 Lines, Home Instruction (Update), p. 1. 
46 
Beshoner, p. 191. 
4^Neal Devin, "A Constitutional Right to Home Instruction?" 
Washington Law Quarterly 62 (Fall 1984}:435. 
48Burgess, p. 3. 
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Table 1 
States Which Permit Home Schools 
By Law By Other Means 
A1abama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Case Law 
Attorney General 
Opinion 
30 
Table 1 - Continued 
By Law By Other Means 
New Hampshire State Board Regs. 
New Jersey X 
New Mexico X 
New York X 
North Carolina Case Law 
North Dakota 
Ohio X 
Oklahoma X 
Oregon X 
Pennsylvania X 
Rhode Island X 
South Carolina X 
South Dakota X 
Tennessee X 
Texas 
Utah X 
Vermont X 
Virginia X 
Washington X 
West Virginia X 
Wisconsin X 
Wyoming X 
Total 41 4 
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49 
it in the 1989 Legislature." In August 1985 the Governor of Iowa 
appointed a three-man task force to make recommendations to the state 
50 legislature on a definition of "equivalent instruction" as required 
51 
by the federal district court in Fellowship Baptist v. Benton. Also 
bills are pending before the Kansas legislature to amend existing laws 
52 on school attendance and home schools, and a "legislative committee 
is considering making several changes during the 1986 session" in 
Idaho.53 
Legal Aspects of Home Schools 
Burgess points out that the United States Supreme Court has never 
54 heard a home instruction case. However, decisions by the court have 
been the basis for decisions by other courts on the subject of home 
schools. 
The decisions in Pierce and Yoder emphasized the principle of 
public regulation of alternative schools, including home schools. The 
49 
Letter received from Claudette Morton, Liaison to County 
Superintendent, Montana Department of Basic Instructional Services, 
18 November 1985. 
^Letter received from Kathy L. Collins, Administrative Legal 
Consultant, Iowa Department of Public Instruction, 26 November 1985. 
^Fellowship Baptist v. Benton, 620 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Iowa 1985). 
52Letter received from Rodney J. Bicker, Legal Services Section 
Director, Kansas State Department of Education, 26 September 1985. 
53 
Letter received from David 6. Steadman, Bureau of Instruction 
Chief, Idaho Department of Education, 24 September 1985. 
54 
Burgess, p. 22. 
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Supreme Court said that the state has the power "to regulate all 
schools, to inspect, supervise, and examine them, their teachers and 
55 pupils," "to Impose reasonable regulations for the control and dura-
56 tion of basic education," and that schools must meet the "standards 
57 
prescribed by the state." 
McCarthy and Deignar point out that in addition to permitting 
states to regulate education in nonpublic schools, the federal judiciary 
has deferred to state legislatures to determine how much education is 
enough and has upheld the use of state standards to assure a basic 
CQ 
education for all children. Their statement is supported by the 
decision in Scoma v. The Chicago Board of Education which declared that 
states have the right to prescribe how much education is needed to 
59 satisfy the state's interest in assuring an educated citizenry. 
The fact that the principle of regulation of alternative schools 
includes home schools was made clear in Prince v. Massachusetts when 
the court ruled that generally parents can act in good faith to accom­
plish the proper education of their own children through their own 
55 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, p. 534. 
56W isconsin v. Yoder, p. 213. 
57Ibid., p. 236. 
58 
Martha M. McCarthy and Paul T. Deignar, What Legally Consti­
tutes an Adequate Public Education: A Review of Constitutional, Legis­
lative and Judicial Mandate IBloomington, Ind.: Phi Delta Kappa 
Educational Fund, 1982), p. 31. 
^Scoma v. The Chicago Board of Education, 391 F. Supp. 452 
CN.D. 111. 1974). 
# 
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efforts at home, but the public, through the school official, can set 
standards to see that the child is well educated.6® 
The legality of home schools was also upheld in State v. Peterman 
when the court said: 
If a parent employs and brings into his residence a teacher 
for the purpose of instructing hfs child or children, and 
such instruction fs given as the law contemplates, the 
meaning and the spirit of the [compulsory attendance] law 
has been fully complied with.61 
The North Carolina Supreme Court also upheld the right of parents 
to provide home instruction. This court ruled that since the legisla­
ture of that state did not define school, nor prohibit home schools, it 
62 
was permissible for parents to provide home instruction. 
The North Carolina ruling is not consistent with the ruling in 
State v. Garber which declared: 
Even if a system of education, consisting essentially of 
home instruction was considered as instruction equivalent 
to that given in public, private, denominational, or parochial 
school . . . such would not constitute excuse for nonattendance 
at latter, in view of the fact that legislature made no pro- g3 
vision for such equivalent instruction as basis for exemption. 
An area of legal concern in the debate over home schools is 
parental rights.6^ Schwartz says that there are "no clear guidelines 
establishing the degree to which states may regulate education without 
6®Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 
2d. 645 0944). 
61State v. Peterman, p. 551. 
62 
Delconte v. State. 
6^State v. Garber, 419 P. 2d. 896 (Kansas 1966).; p. 896. 
64 
Beshoner, p. 198. 
34 
65 infringing upon the rights of parents." On this subject, Beshoner 
points out that the Pierce decision is best known for its "dicta about 
66 
freedom of parents to control their children's education." In 
Farrlngton v. Tokuskige the court spoke of the rights of parents and 
concluded that parents should be offered alternatives for educating 
their children. It further stated that the government should not make 
alternative schools identical to public schools,®7 Also, the Yoder 
decision reaffirmed the rights of parents to guide the religious educa­
tion of their children.®8 
In Olmstead v. United States, the United States Supreme Court 
dealt with the rights of privacy and defined this right as the right 
eg 
"to be left alone." This right, based on the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, was applied to the parent's personal 
right to raise his children in'the case of Meyer v. Nebraska.7^ In 
addition, the court said in Doe v. Bolton that "the freedom of choice is 
basic decisions of one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, 
contraception, and the educating and upbringing of children."71 
65Bruce H. Schwartz, "Parental Rights: Educational Alternatives 
and Curriculum Control," Washington and Lee Law Review 36 (1979):277. 
66 
Beshoner, p. 198. 
67Farrington v. Tokuskige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
Wisconsin v. Yoder. 
6901mstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1927); p. 498. 
70Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
71Poe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); p. 211. 
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Beshoner points out that courts have been inconsistent 1n their 
rulings in home school cases and charges that Washington has used a 
72 "double-edged sword against home instruction." She uses two cases, 
decided in that state, to illustrate her point. 
In State v. Counort a Washington court ruled against Mr. Counort, 
a qualified and experienced teacher. His home school did not meet the 
court's definition of school as a "regular, organized and existing 
Institution making a business of instructing children of school age in 
the required studies and for the full time required by the law [of 
73 Washington]." His home school was found to be illegal on the grounds 
that the program offered was not "sufficiently institutional."^ 
Another case was decided by the Superior Court of Washington 
with little notice of the adequacy of instruction. The parents in the 
case of Shoreline School District Number 412 v. Superior Court lost in 
their attempts to offer home instruction because they "had the place and 
pupils, but not a teacher qualified to teach in the state of 
Washington."^ 
According to Beshoner, each case in the area of home instruction 
is decided by "careful and sometimes tortured, analysis of the state 
72 
Beshoner, p. 197. 
73State v. Counort, 124 p. 910 (Wash. 1912); pp. 911-912. 
74Beshoner, p. 196. 
75 
State ex rel. Shoreline School District Number 412 v. Superior 
Court for King County, 346 p. 2d. 999 (Wash., 1960); p. 999. 
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compulsory education statute."76 The cases often revolve around the 
issue of equivalence of instruction in the home school and public 
77 schools. 
Courts usually uphold standards of equivalence established by the 
78 
state according to Burgess. In the absence of state standards it has 
become the duty of the court to decide equivalence. In People v. 
Levisen the court ruled that school "included the place and nature of 
instruction but did not require a certain number of students to qualify 
79 
a s  a  s c h o o l I n  Farrington v. Tokuskige the court said the program 
of study in private schools did not have to be "identical to public 
80 schools" to meet the equivalency test. According to the rulings in 
81 82 Knox v. O'Brien and In re Franz equivalence is based on several 
factors. Among these factors are qualifications of the teacher, 
materials, curriculum and methodology, social intercourse with other 
83 children, and the presence or absence of the "full advantages supplied 
by the public schools."84 
76Beshoner, p. 191. 
77Ibid., p. 193. 
78Burgess, p. 137. 
79People v. Levisen, 90 N.E. 2d. 213 (111. 1950). 
80 Farrington v. Tokuskige. 
81Knox v. O'Brien, 72 A. 2d. 389 (N.J. 1950). 
82In re Franz, 378 N.Y.S. 2d. 317 (New York 1976). 
83Ibid. 
8\nox v. O'Brien, p. 391. 
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The question of socialization of students in home schools as 
compared to those in public schools has received conflicting answers 
from the judiciary. In Perchemlides v. Frizzle the court said that 
socialization should not be considered when approving home schools 
because "the parents must be allowed to decide whether public school 
education, including its socialization aspect, is desirable or undesir-
oc 
able for their children." On the other hand, the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court decided that it was not unreasonable to consid&r sociali-
86 
zation in determining the legality of home schools. This view was 
upheld in Stephens v. Bongart when the judge said he could not conceive 
of a home school providing a "social outlook in any form or manner 
87 comparable to that provided in the public school." 
In the absence of standards for nonpublic schools, the courts 
88 
have been more inclined to favtfr the parents. This is evident from 
the ruling in State of Florida v. M.M. and S.E. In this case the court 
ruled that certification of teachers in private schools could not be 
required since "there are currently no rules or statutes regulating 
89 
schools in the area of education of teachers." 
85 
Perchemilides v. Frizzle, No. 16641 (Mass. Hampshire Cty. 
Super. Ct: 19781; p. 13. 
86State v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170 (N.H. 1929). 
87 Stephens v. Bongart, p. 137. 
88 
Gary E. Sherma, "Alternatives to Public School: Florida's 
Compulsory Education Dilemma," Nova Law Journal 6 (Winter 1982):272. 
89State v. M.M. and S.E., 407 So. 2d. 987 (Fla. 1982). 
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Summary 
Home schooling is an option available to parents in forty-five 
of the fifty states, and the number of states permitting such instruc­
tion is growing. However, Devin states that the legal status of 
home schools is characterized by "vague statutes, incomplete evidentiary 
90 records and very narrow rulings." He further declares that "it is 
impossible to provide a hard and fast determination of what the state 
91 
can and cannot do in its regulation of home study programs." 
Schwartz is more optimistic and states that "compliance with all 
92 state educational requirements is usually sufficient" for parents who 
want to establish home schools. 
Devin summarizes the legal status of home instruction programs 
by saying; 
Until the Supreme Court'chooses to review the issue, it 
appears that the basic questions concerning parental 
authority in the instruction of their children will be g3 
discussed through an entangled body of state court decisions, 
90Devin, p. 464. 
91Ibid., p. 474. 
92 
Schwartz, p. 281. 
93Devin, p. 474. 
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Certifica tionof T eac hers 
Introduction 
In 1983 the National Coirnilssion on Excellence in Education 
issued a strong, almost frightful, challenge to American education 
when it declared: 
Our nation is at risk . . . . The educational foundations 
of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide 
o f  m e d i o c r i t y  t h a t  t h r e a t e n s  o u r  v e r y  f u t u r e  a s  a  n a t i o n  . . . .  
If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on 
America the mediocre performance that exists today, we 
might well have viewed it as an act of war. As it stands, 
we have allowed this to happen to ourselves,94 
This is only one of nearly thirty major national reports and 
countless state and local studies**5 which have focused on the impera­
tive to improve the quality of education in America. 
These reports and studies have consistently addressed the need 
* 
for better teachers in the classroom. This is reflected in statements 
such as "teachers are accused of being mediocre,"®6 and that improve­
ments in education can be accomplished only through the "availability of 
97 teachers carefully educated to do the job." 
94 National Coirnilssion on Excellence in Education, "An Open 
Letter to the American People. A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for 
Educational Reform," Education Meek 27 (April 1983):12-16. 
95 
Marvin Cetron, Barbara Soriano, and Margaret Gayle, Schools.of 
the Future: How American Business and Education Cooperate to Serve 
Our Schools INew York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), p. 146. 
96 
Richard W. Moore, Master Teachers (Bloomington, Ind.: Phi 
Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1984), p. 10. 
97 
Fred M. Hechinger, Education Agenda for the 1980's (Bloomington, 
Ind.:. Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1981), p. 18. 
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The certification of teachers, a responsibility discharged by 
each of the fifty states, is a means of meeting the challenge of pro­
viding qualified teachers and assuring the public that "professional 
personnel have the minimum academic and professional skills necessary to 
meet the objectives of the instructional programs offered to our 
children."98 
This section looks at the purpose of certification, the histori­
cal development of the practice of certifying teachers, and the legal 
aspects of teacher certifications. 
The Purpose of Teacher Certification 
99 
"Universal education is accepted as the right of every child." 
The basic obligation to provide this education rests with individual 
states as mandated by state constitutions to provide education for its 
citizens on whatever terms and to whatever extent the legislature 
chooses.^0 One of the terms of education expressed by the legislatures 
of all fifty states is the certification of education personnel J®1 
The teaching certificate is "a license granted by the state and 
it enables a teacher to enter into a lawfully binding contract to 
QQ 
J. Arthur Taylor, "Quality Assurance for Professional School 
Personnel: A Position Paper." Unpublished paper. 
100w illiam R. Hazard, Lawrence D. Freeman, Stephen Eisdorfer, 
and Paul Tractenberg, Legal Issues in Teacher Preparation and Certifi-
catlon (Washington, D.C7: ERIC Clearinghouse on Teacher Education, 
1977), p. 6. 
101Taylor. 
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102 teach." Even though it does not carry the assurance that the teacher 
is properly prepared, it means that the minimum requirements established 
by the state have been met. Conant summarizes the requirements as the 
amount of college instruction in professional education courses, and 
103 the amount of general education and subject matter specialization. 
Taylor points out that the purpose of certification is "to 
104 maintain standards of professional competence," and Kinney says that 
the public has come to view certification as an "indispensable safeguard 
105 
of quality education." Certification "protects and promotes . . . 
[the] legitimate public Interest in education"106 according to Hopkins. 
The certificate is designed to permit the holder to teach, not 
to serve as a guarantee of a job. Hopkins illustrates this by saying, 
Just as the state does not examine and license physicians 
in order to assist the graduate ... in pursuing his 
special interest in setting up a practice and making 
money, so the proper purpose of state procedures for 
teacher certification is not to assist the graduate of a 
school of education in pursuing his legitimate, private 
goal of getting a job J 07 
102 
Lucien Kinney, Certification in Education (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 36. 
103 James Bryant Conant, The Education of American Teachers 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 43. 
104Taylor. 
105Kinney, p. 40. 
*°®John Hopkins, Basic Legal Issues in N.Y. State on Teacher 
Certification (Lincoln, Neb.: Study Coimiission, 1973), p. 4. 
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History of Teacher Certification 
Historically the function of certification has been performed by 
108 guilds and professional organizations, but teacher certification has 
been divorced from the historical practice and has become a state func­
tion exercised by each of the fifty states. 
The states have not always regulated the certification of 
teachers. Kinney traces the evolution of teacher certification from 
the Colonial period when, due to scarcity of teachers and the difficulty 
of conmunication and travel between settlements, the selection of 
teachers was a local matter. Local officials were concerned with the 
teachers' ability to govern the schools, their moral character, and 
finally their academic attainment. The latter was determined by 
109 
personal interviews and/or written examinations. Prospective 
teachers were often "questioned" on the orthodoxy of their religious 
beliefs"11^ by local religious leaders. Frequently teachers were 
108 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Selec­
tion and Preparation in Education and Employment (Paris, France: ECOD, 
137*), p. 74. 
l09K1nney, p. 36. 
*^Gerald L. Gutek, Education and Schooling in America 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1983), p. 351 . 
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employed, not because of their educational competency, but because of 
"doctrinal conformity."111 
In 1686 the General Assembly of Virginia took the first action 
to assure that teachers were qualified to teach when it requested that 
every county appoint a person who would be duly fit to examine and 
license schoolmasters. Even though Vermont and Rhode Island followed 
Virginia's lead, there was nothing to prohibit local officials from 
112 employing teachers other than those approved by the proper officials. 
The practice of certification actually began in 1825 when the 
Ohio Court of Common Pleas was directed to appoint three examiners of 
schools in each county with the major responsibility of certifying 
113 
teachers. The certification of teachers was accomplished through 
examinations. Kinney states that the typical examination for teachers 
in Ohio consisted of five questions on general subjects, and five in 
each area of reading, orthography, arithmetic, definitions, government, 
granmar, penmanship, geography, and the theory of teaching.114 
Other states followed the lead of Ohio and initiated the prac­
tice of certification through examination. This practice was not 
without problems. Conant notes that often the examiners were too 
unschooled to develop and evaluate rigorous examinations and that the 
scarcity of teachers led to the practice of tailoring examinations to 
^Kinney, p. 41. 
113Ibid., p. 45. 
114Ibid., p. 49. 
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the knowledge and experience of the examinee rather than to the 
requirements of the position. Also, the examining procedure was not 
free from local politics, religious prejudices, or personal favori­
tism.115 
When rural areas were unable to attract teachers meeting the 
certification requirements, they were forced to employ individuals who 
failed to score high on the examination. This led to the practice of 
establishing levels of certificates. Those examinees with a score of 
eighty-five percent or higher were given a First Grade Certificate; 
those who scored between seventy-five and eighty-five percent were 
given a Second Grade Certificate; and Third Grade Certificates were 
granted to those scoring between sixty-five and seventy-five percent.116 
In the mid-nineteenth century states began to have a chief state 
school official, and this paved the way for the centralization of the 
certification of teachers at the state level. Each state, often 
through a teacher certification board, developed procedures for 
licensing teachers as a means to regulate entry into teaching.11'' 
The trend toward centralization of teacher certification con­
tinued until the beginning of the twentieth century when all fifty 
118 states were exercising authority to issue certificates for teachers. 
115Conant, p. 11. 
116Kinney, p. 51. 
11^Gutek, p. 351. 
118Kinney, p. 81. 
45 
To enforce certification guidelines, state funds were often provided 
119 only to school districts which employed certified teachers. 
Prior to 190Q teachers were issued blanket certificates which 
licensed them to teach any subject at any grade level. During the 
twentieth century this practice has ended, and certificates have 
120 become more subject and level specific. 
With centralization of control over the certification process 
came a change in emphasis. The growth of normal schools and colleges 
and universities gave rise to the course completion concept of certifi> 
cation. This concept specified the bachelor's degree plus specific 
courses or courses in specific areas as prerequisites for certifica-
tion.121 
Gradually the course completion concept gave way to the program 
approval concept whereby the state establishes guidelines for accept­
able teacher education programs, evaluates programs as offered in 
colleges and universities for compliance, accepts credentials of 
graduates, and issues certificates based upon the recommendation of the 
122 colleges and universities. The program approval concept is the 
dominant process of certification today. 
119Gutek, p. 351. 
120Kinney, p. 82. 
^Hazard, p. 111. 
122Ibid., p. 112. 
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An emerging concept is that certification should be based upon 
the evaluation of teacher competencies as assessed by local school 
officials. This assessment should take place during student teaching 
123 and during the initial teaching experience. This approach stresses 
the joint responsibility of the colleges, universities, and local school 
124 districts for the preparation and early performance of teachers. 
The evaluation of teacher certification has come to a point at 
which requirements and procedures are administered by all fifty states 
with the cooperation of teacher training institutions which prepare 
"resourceful teachers who are liberally educated and professionally 
125 prepared." The state and colleges and universities "combine theory 
and practice with a greater focus on clinical experience in the class-
126 
room" to assure the public that teachers are educationally and pro­
fessionally prepared. 
Legal Aspects of Teacher Certification 
The certification of teachers is the responsibility of each 
individual state. Consequently the result is what Grieder describes 
123Ibid. 
124 North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, North 
Carolina Administrative Code, Sec..1801 (3) (1982); p. 2-469. 
l25Gutek, p. 355. 
l26Ib1d. 
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127 
as "a nationwide crazy quilt" of certification guidelines. The 
practice of issuing certificates "has its legal authority in the action 
of a state legislature [and] its implementation in an appropriate 
agency."128 
Different requirements for certification of teachers have been 
established in the various states. As a minimum requirement, all states 
require teachers to hold a baccalaureate degree with specified courses 
in professional education. Several states now require a fifth year of 
129 
college for earning a certificate. 
In states where wide discretion is placed in the examining and 
certifying agency, the courts are not inclined to interfere with that 
130 
discretion. This is echoed by Garber and Edwards who say, 
Those to whom the state has delegated authority to 
determine whether a prospective teacher has met the 
statutory requirements for a certificate and to issue 
a certificate in case the requirements have been met, 
perform a discretionary duty and the courts will not 
control their discretion unless it is abused.131 
127 Calvin Grieder, Truman M. Pierce, and K. Forbis Jordan, 
Public Administration (New York: Ronald Press, 1969), p. 215. 
128Hazard, p. 7. 
129Gutek, p. 352. 
130Reutter, p. 363. 
131 Leo 0. Garber and Newton Edwards, The Law Governing Teaching 
Personnel. Casebook No. 3 (Danville, 111.: Interstate Printers 
and Publishers, 1962), p. 3. 
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In the exercise of their power to regulate public education, 
"the state may prescribe such qualifications for teachers as public 
132 
policy may demand." The courts have ruled that; 
equal protection clauses ... do not take from the 
state the power to classify persons or activities when 
there is reasonable basis for such classification and 
for consequent differences in treatment under law.1,3,3 
The certificate for teachers is a license, and the principle of 
control by the legislature over a license is well established by 
134 judicial decree. State legislatures have exercised their control 
over certification of teachers through qualifications such as minimum 
age, American citizenship, good physical health, and good moral 
character.*35 
The discretionary act of issuing a certificate cannot be 
136 exercised arbitrarily. If a teacher has met all requirements for a 
certificate, the "issuance of the certificate is merely a ministerial 
137 duty which the officer may not refuse to perform." 
Both Edwards and Bolmeier speak of the state's plenary power 
over the certificate. Edwards states that it is not a property right 
132 Newton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools: The Legal 
Basis of School Organization and Administration (Chicago": University 
of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 437. 
133Guthrie v. Taylor, 185 S.E. 2d. 193 (N.C. 1971); p. 175. 
134Gullet v. Sparks, 444 S.W. 2d. 901 (Ky. 1901). 
135Gutek, p. 352. 
136Keller v. Hewitt, 41 P. 871 (Cal. 1895). 
137Reutter, p. 363. 
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and does not have any elements of a contract between the state and the 
138 
teacher. Since it is a license and not a contract, the state may 
139 impose additional qualifications upon the certificate holder. 
Not only are states empowered to issue certificates but also to 
revoke them. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a mere 
license by a state is always revokable.140 However, if statutes 
specify reasons for revoking a certificate, it can be revoked for those 
141 reasons and no other. Since the revocation of the certificate 
deprives the teacher of employment in his profession in public educa­
tion, the courts tend to examine closely the procedures used in such an 
action. This action is considered as dismissal, and the board of 
142 education should act accordingly. 
A teacher must hold a certificate before he can enter into a 
contract to teach. Entry into a contract without a certificate makes 
the contract void, and the teacher, according to Bolmeier, is a 
143 144 "volunteer" not entitled to receive a salary. 
*38Edwards, p. 439. 
139 
Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure, p. 190. 
^°Douglas v. Continental Insurance Company, 94 U.S. 535, 24 
L. Ed. 148 (.1876). 
^Stone v. Fritts, 82 N.E. 793 (Ind. 1907). 
142 
Reutter, p. 368. 
14"? 
Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure, p. 190. 
^Floyd County Board of Education v. SI one, 307 S.W. 2d, 912 
(Ky. 1957). 
50 
The courts have upheld regulations requiring teachers to renew 
their certificate by saying the practice "cannot be deemed arbitrary" 
145 and does "not deny [the] teacher the equal protection of law." In 
making this ruling, the state court quoted the United States Supreme 
Court's ruling in Adler v. Board of Education when it said teachers have 
146 no right to work for the state in the system on their own terms. 
Summary 
Even though "certification does not necessarily equate with 
teaching competence in every instance,"*47 it has been generally 
accepted by the public and courts as a "reasonable and effective means 
148 to carry out a legitimate state purpose" of providing an education 
for all children. 
The state may prescribe qualifications for teachers it deems 
necessary and may require that a teacher hold a certificate which is 
evidence that he possesses the qualifications prescribed by the 
149 state. All fifty states have established certification procedures 
for teachers, and the qualifications established under these procedures 
have been generally accepted by the public and the courts. 
145Guthrie v. Taylor, p. 195. 
146Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S. Ct. 380, 
96 L. Ed. 517 U952). 
147State v. Shaver, 294 N.W. 2d. (N.D. 1980). 
148 
Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, 348 
N.W. 2d. 263 CMich. App. 1984); p. 268. 
149 Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure, p. 189. 
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS OF STATE STATUTES RELATING 
TO CERTIFICATION OF TEACHERS 
IN HOME SCHOOLS 
Introduction 
An analysis of statutes in states which permit home Instruction 
reveals great variations in qualifications required for teachers in 
home schools. Legislatures in some states have issued specific man­
dates on the subject. Other state statutes provide only general 
guidelines, while others make no mention of the qualifications of 
instructors in home schools. 
Teachers providing home instruction must be certified in some 
states, while alternative qualifications can be met in lieu of certifi­
cation in other states. A college education is required for persons 
teaching in some states, while other states specify that a high school 
education or its equivalent is sufficient. One state requires that the 
instructor pass a proficiency examination, and several states simply 
require that the instructor be "competent" or "qualified." 
Newly enacted legislation indicates that the inconsistency in 
requirements for instructors in home school continues. Not one of the 
six states which enacted legislation in 1985 permitting home instruction 
requires certification as an absolute requirement for all persons 
teaching in home schools. Arkansas enacted a law which requires a 
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special education certificate for teachers who teach exceptional chil­
dren in the home.1 New laws in Florida and Washington specify certifi­
cation for home school teachers but provide alternative qualifications 
for such instructors. Parents are permitted to provide home instruc­
tion for their own children under newly enacted laws in Oregon and 
Tennessee, but the statutes do not specify any qualifications parents 
must meet in order to offer the Instruction. The Wyoming legislature 
enacted a law permitting home instruction but makes no mention of who 
is to do the teaching. 
This chapter analyzes state statutes which relate to certifica­
tion of teachers who offer instruction in home schools. The text of 
applicable laws appears in the Appendix. 
States Which Require Certification 
An analysis of state statutes reveals that forty-one states have 
enacted legislation permitting home schooling as an alternative to 
public education. In five other states home schools are permitted 
through other means. Lines reports that case law allows for home 
schooling in Illinois; the Michigan Attorney General has ruled that home 
instruction is a viable alternative; and regulations of the New 
2 Hampshire Board of Education permit home instruction of children. In 
"^Arkansas, Arkansas Statutes Annotated - Supplement, Sec. 42 
(1985). 
2 Patricia Lines, Home Instruction, Education Commission of the 
States, Issuegram, No. 49 (August 1984), p. 1. 
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addition the Supreme Court of North Carolina has ruled that home 
3 
instruction is not prohibited in that state. 
Of the forty-five states which permit home instruction through 
legislative action or other means, only eight make certification an 
absolute requirement for persons providing such instruction. One of 
these eight does not require certification for teachers of all students. 
Four other states have certification requirements which can be waived 
if other conditions are met. One state requires that home instruction 
be "supervised by a certified person"4 and another one requires that 
the quality of the curriculum offered in home schools must be verified 
by a "statement from a teacher certified to teach at the child's grade 
level."5 Table 2 shows which states have the certification requirements 
mentioned above. 
The states in which the home instructor must meet certification 
requirements are: Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Idaho and 
Iowa. Statutes in the former three states refer to the person who con­
ducts home instruction as "tutors," while laws in the latter three 
states refer to them as "teachers." The requirement in Alabama is that 
children "be instructed by a competent private tutor."6 Tutor is 
defined as "a person who holds a certificate issued by the State 
^Delconte v. State, 329 S.E. 2d. 636 ( N . C .  19851. 
^Washington, West's Revised Code of Washington Annotated, Sec. 
28A. 02 201, 0985). 
C 
Louisiana, West's Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated, Sec. 
236 0982). 
6Alabama, Alabama Code, Sec. 16-28-3 0984). 
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Table 2 
States Which Have Certification Requirements 
for Teachers in Home Schools 
Certificate 
Certificate Requirement 
May be Waived Other 
A1abama X 
Alaska X 
Arkansas Xa 
California X 
Colorado X 
Florida X 
Idaho X 
Iowa X 
Louisiana Xfa 
Maryland X 
Michigan xc ( 
Nevada X 
Washington xd 
aTeachers of special education students only. 
^Program must be verified by certified teacher. 
cAttorney General opinion. 
^Must be supervised by certified teacher. 
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Superintendent of Education."'' California's requirement is similar to 
that of Alabama. California statute requires that children in home 
schools be "instructed in study ... by a private tutor or other 
person [who] shall hold a valid state credential [certificate] for the 
Q 
grade taught." The statutory requirement for a child to receive 
instruction in the home in Alaska is that such instruction be "tutoring 
g 
by personnel certified." 
The laws of Iowa, Colorado, and Idaho specify "certified teachers" 
for home instruction. In Iowa "in lieu of such attendance [public or 
private school] such child may attend upon equivalent instruction by a 
certified teacher elsewhere than at school."*0 Colorado's compulsory 
attendance law does not apply to a child "who is being instructed at 
11 home by a teacher certified." Teachers in home schools in Idaho are 
covered by the law which requires that "every person who is employed to 
* 
serve any elementary or secondary school in the capacity of teacher . . . 
shall be required to have and to hold a certificate issued under the 
12 authority of the state board of education." 
7Ibid. 
California, Peering's California Code, Sec. 4 8224 (1984). 
^Alaska, Alaska Statutes, Sec. 14.30.010 (1984). 
10Iowa, Iowa Code Annotated, Sec. 299.1 (1984). 
^Colorado, Colorado Revised Statutes, Sec. 22-33-104 (1983). 
^Idaho, General Laws of Idaho Annotated, Sec. 33-202 (1981). 
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The seventh state which requires teachers in home schools to be 
13 certified is Michigan. Even though statutes do not address home 
schools, the attorney general has ruled that such alternatives to 
public schooling are allowed under the provisions for "state approved 
14 nonpublic schools." The attorney general has ruled that "a parent 
may not provide for his or her child's education without having a certl-
15 
fled teacher providing instruction." 
Arkansas law requires a certificate for instructors of some 
students but not all. The statute requires that a child who has been 
"identified ... as needing special education services," must be 
instructed by a person "properly certified to teach special educa­
tion."16 
States Which Require Certification 
or Alternative Qualifications 
The statutes of three states (Florida, Maryland, and Nevada) 
address the subject of certification of home instructors but provide 
alternatives for parents who are not certified. 
One condition for conducting home instruction in Florida is that 
"the parent holds a valid regular Florida certificate to teach the 
^Michigan, Michigan Statutes Annotated, Sec. 15.41561 (1984). 
15 
Frank J. Kelly, Letter to Honorable Kerry Kramer, 27 September 
1979. 
^Arkansas. 
subjects or grades in which instruction is given.The law provides 
an alternative for parents who do not meet this requirement. If a 
parent wants to instruct his child at home and does not hold a certifi­
cate, he may legally do so by providing for "an annual educational 
evaluation" under the direction of "a teacher selected by the parent 
. . . . Such teacher shall hold a valid regular Florida certificate 
18 to teach academic subjects at the elementary or secondary level." 
Maryland statutes likewise provide alternatives for parents who 
wish to operate home schools. The requirements state that 
the teacher of the home instruction program . . . 
must meet full certification requirements of the 
State Department of Education for the subjects 
covered [or] be a graduate of an accredited 
college with sufficient academic background in 
subjects and areas being taught to the child and 
. . . have sufficient academic training to ensure 
competency in the subjects specified. 19 
Even this requirement may be waived by the local superintendent if the 
parent can justify by "reason of the person's excellence in previous 
teaching or occupational experience, special preparation, or other 
20 
acceptable qualifications" that he is capable of providing instruc­
tion. 
^Florida, West's Florida Statutes Annotated, Sec. 232.01 (1985). 
18Ibid. 
^Maryland, Annotated Code of Maryland, Sec. 292 (1983). 
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Nevada also provides alternatives for noncertified parents who 
wish to provide home instruction. In Nevada home instruction may be 
provided by: 
a teacher . . . who possesses a teaching certificate 
. . the parent, when the parent qualifies for a teach­
ing certificate [or] by the parent in consultation with 
a person who possesses a teaching certificate issued 
by the superintendent of public instruction.21 
Consultation must be provided "in the planning of the educational plan 
. . .  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o r  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t  t o  b e  t a u g h t  e a c h  d a y  
22 . . . and about any learning problems which may occur." The law 
specifies that the teacher, parent, or consulting teacher must be certi­
fied for the appropriate grade level. Another alternative available to 
parents in Nevada is to enroll their children in "an approved correspon-
23 dence course." 
States Which Have Other Statutory 
References to Certification 
Arkansas and Washington provide opportunities for home instruc­
tion, and the statutes address certification in ways not found in any 
other states. Home instruction is defined by Arkansas statutes as 
instruction "primarily conducted by parents or legal guardians for 
24 their own children." To operate a home school, the parent must 
^Nevada, Nevada Revised Statutes, Sec. 292 ( 1 9 8 1 ) .  
22Ibid. 
23Ibid. 
24 Arkansas. 
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25 report "for statistical purposes," information about the school 
unless the child receiving instruction has been "identified ... as 
26 
needing special education." As stated earlier, if such a child is 
receiving instruction, the teacher must be certified in the field of 
special education. 
The statutes of Washington provide several choices for instruct­
ing children at home. One choice is that instruction be "provided by a 
27 parent who ... is supervised by a certificated person." The second 
option is to provide instruction by a parent who has "earned forty-five 
college level quarter hours or its equivalent in semester hours or has 
28 completed a course in home-bound instruction." A third option is to 
seek the approval of the superintendent of the local school district,, 
29 If the parent is "deemed sufficiently qualified" by the superintendent, 
the other options do not have to be met. Finally, the statute declares 
that the above mentioned provisions "relating to the nature and quantity 
of instruction and related educational activities should be liberally 
30 construed" and that parents providing home instruction "shall be 
25Ibid. 
26Ibid. 
27 Washington. 
28Ibid. 
29Ibid. 
30Ibid. 
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subject only to those minimum state laws which are necessary to insure 
31 that a sufficient basic educational opportunity is provided." 
In Louisiana the home study program must offer a "sustained 
curriculum of a quality at least equal to that offered by public 
32 schools at the same grade level." The fact that such a program is 
being offered in home schools must be verified by a "statement from a 
teacher certified to teach at the child's grade level that the teacher 
33 
has examined the program" and found it to meet the standards. 
A unique provision is found in the statute of South Dakota. 
This provision is that "the individuals [who provide home instruction] 
are not required to be certified but the state superintendent . . . may 
investigate to determine if the instruction is being provided by a 
34 
competent person." 
States Which Require "Qualified" 
or "Competent" Instructors 
The legislative bodies of six states (Hawaii, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota and West Virginia) address the qualifications 
of instructors in home schools in less specific terms than certified. 
While legislators in those states are concerned that children who 
receive instruction at home are properly taught, statutes require only 
32 
Louisiana. 
33Ibid. 
"^South Dakota, South Dakota Codified Laws, Sec. 13-27-3 (.1983). 
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that the person offering instruction be "qualified" or "competent" as 
shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
States Which Require "Qualified" or "Competent" 
Teachers in Home Schools 
Hawaii 
New York 
Ohio 
Pennsylvania 
South Dakota 
West Virginia 
Qualified 
X 
X 
Competent 
X 
X 
West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio require the home instruc­
tor to be qualified as determined by the local superintendent. 
New York and Hawaii require instruction by a competent instruc­
tor. New York statutes say that "instruction may be given only by a 
35 competent teacher," but they do not define competent nor elaborate on 
how competency is to be determined. 
36 "A competent person" is required to provide home instruction in 
Hawaii. The same law specifies that the instructor must be "approved 
37 by the superintendent." 
^New York, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Sec. 3204 
CI 984). 
"^Hawaii, Hawaii Revised Statutes, Sec. 298-9 (1983). 
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As stated earlier the South Dakota state superintendent is 
authorized by law to determine if home instruction is "provided by a 
competent person."^8 
States Which Specify Other Requirements 
for Home Instructors 
As indicated in Table 4, there are five states which have 
statutory requirements other than "certified," "qualified" or "compe­
tent" for persons teaching in home schools. These states are Arizona, 
Georgia, Tennessee, New Mexico, and Virginia. 
Arizona law specifies that a person excused from compulsory 
school attendance must be "instructed at home by a person passing the 
39 
reading, grammar, and mathematics proficiency examination." 
In order to provide home instruction in Georgia, the parent must 
have earned "at least a high school diploma or the equivalent GED cer­
tificate."40 However, a parent may employ a tutor "who holds at least 
41 a baccalaureate college degree" to provide instruction. 
The requirements in Tennessee for parents who provide instruc­
tion for children in grades K-8 are similar to those in Georgia. "A 
^8South Dakota. 
^Arizona, Arizona Revised Statutes, Sec. 15-802 (1983). 
40Georgia, Official Code of Georgia, Sec. 20-2-690 (1984). 
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Table 4 
States Which Specify Other Requirements 
for Teachers in Home Schools 
Arizona 
Georgia 
New Mexico 
Tennessee 
Virginia 
Requirement 
Pass proficiency exam 
High school education or equivalent3 
Baccalaureate degreeb 
K-8 high school education or equiva-
lentb 
9-12 baccalaureate degreeb 
Baccalaureate degree, or teacher of 
qualifications, or child enrolled in 
correspondence course, or prove 
parent is able to provide adequate 
instruction 
a0r a tutor who holds a baccalaureate degree. 
bMay be waived. 
42 high school diploma or GED" is sufficient preparation to teach these 
grades. The requirements for teaching secondary students are more 
strict. The instructor at this level must possess at "least a bacca­
laureate degree."^ This requirement can be waived by the Department 
44 of Education of Tennessee on a "year-to-year basis." 
Statutes of Virginia give parents a wide choice on how to pro­
vide home instruction. The law says that home instruction is permitted 
^Tennessee, Tennessee's Code Annotated, Sec. 49-6-301 (1983). 
43Ibid. 
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if: 
he [the parent] 01 holds a baccalaureate degree . . .; 
(2l is a teacher of qualificationa . . .; (31 has 
enrolled the child . . . in a correspondence course 
approved by the Board of Education; or (4] . . . pro­
vides evidence that the parent is able to provide an 
adequate education for the child.45 
New Mexico is another state which mentions a college degree for 
parents who teach in home schools. The law states that the person pro­
viding such instruction shall possess "at least a baccalaureate degree, 
which requirement may be waived by the state superintendent upon a 
46 
determination that such waiver is in the child's best interest." 
States Which Permit Home Instruction But Have No 
Laws on Home Instructors 
Table 5 shows the states which permit home instruction but have 
no statutory qualifications for the person providing the instruction. 
The laws of Montana, Wyoming, and Oregon specify who can offer 
home instruction but do not elaborate on the qualifications the instruc­
tors must possess. In Montana the instruction must be "by a parent of 
his child, stepchild, or ward,"4^ while the law in Wyoming provides for 
instruction by the "child's parent or legal guardian or by a person 
48 designated by the parent or legal guardian." The requirement in 
^Virginia, Code of Virginia, Sec. 22.1-254,1 0 984). 
^New Mexico, New Mexico Statutes Annotated, Sec. 22-1-2.1 
0 9 8 4 ) .  
^Montana, Montana Code Annotated, Sec. 20.5-102 0 9841. 
^Wyoming, Wyoming Statutes Annotated, Sec. 21-4-101 (1984). 
Table 5 
States Which Do Not Specify Qualifications 
for Home Instructors 
Connecticut3 
Delaware 
Illinois 
Indiana3 
Kansas3 
Kentucky 
Maine3 
Massachusetts 
Mississippi 
Missouri3 
Montana 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
North Carolina3 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Rhode Island3 
South Carolina3 
Utah 
Wisconsin 
Wyomi ng 
a = Address quality of instruction rather than qualifications of 
instructors. 
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Oregon is similar and says that home instruction must be "by a parent 
or a private teacher" with "permission from the executive officer of 
49 the resident school district." 
In the remaining states which permit home instruction by law or 
by other means, there is no statutory mention of home instructors. 
Eight of these states have statutes which address the quality 
of instruction rather than the qualifications of the instructors. These 
requirements are that the instruction be "equivalent," "substantially 
equivalent," or "substantially to the same extent" as that offered in 
public schools. States with such requirements are Indiana, South 
Carolina, New Jersey, Missouri, Maine, Kansas, Connecticut, and Rhode 
Island. 
The home instruction program in Delaware must provide "regular 
and thorough instruction in subjects prescribed for the public 
50 schools." The requirement in Mississippi is that the home school 
51 must provide a "legitimate home instruction program, and in 
Massachusetts the child must be instructed "in a manner approved in 
52 
advance by the superintendent or the school committee." 
Four states do not address the quality of instruction nor 
qualifications of the instructors. Wisconsin home schools must provide 
^Oregon, Oregon Revised Statutes, Sec. 339.010 (1983). 
^Delaware, Delaware Code Annotated, Sec. 2703 (1982). 
^Mississippi, Mississippi Code Annotated, Sec. 37-13-91 (1984). 
CO 
Massachusetts, Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, Sec. 76 (1984). 
53 a "progressive curriculum of fundamental instruction." Home instruc­
tors in Illinois and Utah meet state requirements if they provide 
instruction in the "proper branches of education." In North Carolina 
nonpublic schools, including home schools, must "maintain such minimum 
54 
curriculum standards as are required of public schools." 
In the remaining states which have provided for home schools, 
the requirements are simple. In Oklahoma children not enrolled in 
55 
public schools must be provided "other means of education." The laws 
of Kentucky say that children may be exempt from compulsory attendance 
in public schools if they are "enrolled and in regular attendance in a 
56 private school." 
53 
Wisconsin, West's Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, Sec. 3 118.15 
(1983). 
54 
North Carolina, The General Statutes of North Carolina, 
Sec. 115C-378 (1984). 
^Oklahoma, Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, Sec. 10-105 (1983). 
cc 
Kentucky, Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated, Sec. 159.030 
(1984). 
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CHAPTER IV 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF CERTIFICATION OF 
TEACHERS IN HOME SCHOOLS 
Introduction 
The increase in the number of states making statutory provisions 
for home schools has been accompanied by increased state regulation of 
teachers in such schools. Chapter III presented the number of states 
which require teachers in home schools to be certified as well as the 
states which require the teachers to be "qualified," "competent," or 
able to provide instruction equivalent to that provided in public 
schools. 
A study of judicial decisions arising from statutory require­
ments for teachers in home schools reveals that the number of cases has 
increased with the rise in the number of parents who choose alternative 
settings for educating their children. Statutes regulating teachers in 
home schools have been challenged on a variety of grounds. Litigation 
has occurred when parents felt that their religious freedom was vio­
lated by state regulations which specified requirements for teachers in 
home schools. Statutes have also been challenged as being unconstitu­
tionally vague. Other parents have argued that regulation of teachers 
in home schools violates basic constitutional rights such as equal 
protection, trial by jury, right to life, privacy, and family integrity. 
Such regulations have also been challenged as being arbitrary and 
capricious. 
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Parents seeking to offer home instruction without regulation by 
the state have contended in court that certification of teachers does 
not ensure educational excellence. The same parents have offered as 
defense of their home schools testimony that uncertified teachers can 
offer instruction equivalent to that offered in public schools. 
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on a home 
schooling case. Therefore, the legality of requiring certificates for 
teachers in such schools will not be determined until such a case is 
heard by that court. Decisions reached by other courts have been 
inconsistent and contradictory. However, the judiciary has generally 
deferred to the state the right to regulate home schools, including who 
is to offer instruction in them. 
This chapter examines legal issues raised by parents in opposi­
tion to state regulation of teachers in home schools. Not one case has 
been based entirely on the right to regulate home school teachers. 
Each case examined questioned other aspects of home schools such as 
curriculum, schedule, textbooks, or state reporting requirements. 
However, this study is limited to issues dealing with teachers in home 
schools. 
Some cases included in this study were brought by parents who 
enrolled their children in church schools. While these cases do not 
address the question of home schools, the arguments presented and 
decisions reached are applicable to all nonpublic schools including 
those operated in the home. 
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Religious Objections to Certification of 
Teachers in Home Schools 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states 
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .m1 This 
prohibition was extended to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment 
which says, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
2 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." 
Parents who oppose certification of teachers in home schools 
often base their opposition on religious grounds and contend that the 
requirement abridges their rights guaranteed by the Fist and Four­
teenth Amendments. These parents contend that they are instructed by 
the Bible "to raise and educate their children 1n accordance with its 
precepts . . . and that they, not the state, are mandated by God to 
3 
provide their children with an education." According to these parents, 
to allow the state to certify teachers would be "at the risk of God's 
4 displeasure," because the "obligation imposed by the law of God is 
5 
superior to that of the laws enacted by the temporal government." 
^.S. Const. Amend. I (1791). 
^U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (1868). * 
3State v. Rlvinus. 328 N.W. 2d. 220 (N.D. 1982); p. 222. 
^Rice v. Commonwealth, 49 S.E. 2d. 342 (Va. 1948); p. 344. 
5Ibid. 
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Teachers, according to parents who oppose certification, are 
"religious teachers called by God to teach,"6 and it would violate 
their religious beliefs to seek state certification "before they could 
do God's will*"7 In compliance with this belief, they contend that a 
person "would be sinning if he or she disobeyed God and did not do God's 
Q 
will by pursuing the work to which he or she had been called." 
In one case it was argued that Sunday school teachers were not 
certified; and since they taught the same students in Sunday school 
that they taught during the week, they should not be required to be 
g 
certified to teach in the nonpublic school. 
Defendants in another case stated that they had been "commanded 
by God to send their children to teachers who have not submitted them­
selves to the state certification process."1** Objection to certifica­
tion is often based on the process and the "humanistic education courses 
which are requisite to obtaining certification."11 Such courses are 
fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 620 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. 
Iowa 1985); p. 314. 
7Ibid. 
8Ibid., p. 315. 
9State v. Shaver, 294 N.W. 2d. 883 (N.D. 1980); p. 886. 
10State v. Rivinus, p. 222. 
^Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, 348 
N.W. 2d. 263 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); p. 268. 
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believed to teach concepts which are "contrary to sincerely held 
12 religious beliefs" of parents. 
Court's recognize the rights of parents to their religious 
beliefs but do not see such beliefs to be a "legal justification for 
13 violation of a positive law." The Supreme Court of Appeals in 
Virginia expressed the opinion which has been generally accepted by 
other courts when it ruled: 
The constitutional protection of religious freedom, while 
it insures religious equality, on the other hand does not 
provide immunity from compliance with reasonable civil 
requirements imposed by the state. The individual cannot 
be permitted, on religious grounds, to be the judge of his 
duty to obey the regulatory laws enacted by the state. 14 
The same court did not rule out the possibility of religious 
beliefs being the basis for exemption from statutory requirements 
imposed by the state. However, it did rule that: 
The mere fact that such a claim of immunity is asserted 
because of religious conviction is not sufficient to 
establish its constitutional validity.15 
To determine the validity of a charge of violation of religious 
freedom, courts often apply the guidelines established by the United 
States Supreme Court in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder.16 In this case 
Jonas Yoder and other members of the Amish faith refused to send their 
12 Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, p. 314. 
13 
State ex rel. Shoreline School District No. 412 v. Superior 
Court for King County, 346 p. 2d 999 CI960); p. 1004. : 
14 Rice v. Commonwealth, p. 347. 
15Ibid. 
16Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1977). 
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children to public schools beyond the eighth grade. The Green County 
Court of Wisoncsin convicted them of violating the compulsory school 
attendance law which requires children to attend school to the age of 
sixteen. The conviction was upheld by the Circuit Court but was over­
ruled by the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the grounds that the defen­
dants' rights to free exercise of religion had been violated. 
The United States Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Burger writ­
ing the opinion, upheld the decision of the state Supreme Court. It was 
ruled that requiring public school attendance beyond the eighth grade 
would expose Amlsh children to influences contrary to the sincere 
religious beliefs of the Amish people. Such influences would interfere 
with the integration of the youth into the Amish faith and culture at 
a crucial adolescent stage of life. 
The court declared that'the absence of one or two years of 
additional schooling in public schools would not impair the physical or 
mental health of the children. Because of the emphasis the Amish put 
on vocational training through practical work experiences, the court 
said that allowing the children to end their public schooling at the 
end of the eighth grade would not result in an inability to be self 
supporting nor place a burden on society to support them.1^ 
The Yoder decision established a three-pronged test to determine 
whether or not an action infringes upon religious freedoms. The first 
determination to be made is whether or not the activity interfered with 
by the state is motivated by and rooted in a legitimate and sincerely 
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18 held religious belief. The second decision is whether or not the 
free exercise of religion has been unduly burdened by the regulation 
19 and the impact on the religious practices involved. The final test 
is whether or not the state has a compelling interest in the regulation 
which justifies the burden on free exercise of religion and overrides 
20 the interest of parents in exercising their religious practices. 
The three-pronged test established in Yoder has been used by 
other courts to balance the rights guaranteed by the First and Four­
teenth Amendments against the state's general interest in the health, 
safety, and welfare of its citizens. The balancing test is needed 
because the mere fact that a statute imposes a burden on religion does 
21 not automatically make the statute unconstitutional. Even though the 
freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute, actions 
motivated by these beliefs and'opinions are not immune from regula-
22 tion. 
In establishing the first step of the three-pronged test, the 
Yoder court examined the "religious beliefs they [the defendants] and 
23 and their forebears have adhered to for almost three centuries" and 
found the beliefs and their mode of life to be inseparable and 
18Ibid., pp. 215-216. 
19Ibid., pp. 217-219. 
20Ibid., pp. 219-222. 
21 
State v. Shaver, p. 888. 
22Ib1d. 
2\ isconsin v. Yoder, p. 215. 
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24 interdependent. The court concluded that: 
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not 
be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation 
of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; 
to have the protection of the religious clauses, the claim 
must be rooted in religious beliefs.25 
Lower courts have applied this test when parents objected to 
requirements that students in nonpublic schools be taught by certified 
teachers. Some parents have successfully showed that the religious 
beliefs on which they base their objections to certification are an 
26 
integral and inseparable part of their ministry, that their beliefs 
27 are sincere, and that their objections are "firmly rooted in religious 
beliefs."28 
In a North Dakota case the Supreme Court of that state assumed 
that the beliefs of parents were sincere religious beliefs because there 
was no "contrary showing that the defendants' beliefs are based on any-
29 thing but religion." Even though the defendants in the case gave 
inconsistent accounts of their beliefs and objections to certification 
of teachers, the court upheld their belief. The conclusion of the 
court was that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, 
24Ibid. 
25Ibid. 
2^State v. Shaver. 
27 Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education, 
368 N.W. 2d. 74 (Iowa 1985); p. 84 
28 
Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, p. 269, 
29 
State v. Rivinus, p. 225. 
76 
consistent or comprehensible to others in order to meet the First 
30 
Amendment protection." 
All challenges to state regulation of teachers in nonpublic 
schools have not passed the first part of the test. In Johnson v. 
Charles City the court found that even though the beliefs were sincere, 
the "plaintiffs offered no evidence that any principle or tenet of 
31 
their church is in conflict with" the regulations and that they 
"insisted only that their church be able to teach . . . with teachers 
32 of its own exclusive choice." 
In the case of Jernigan v. State the parents failed to show that 
"their entire way of life is inextricable from their religious beliefs" 
or that the use of certified teachers "would substantially interfere 
33 
with their religious practices." The court ruled against parents in 
another case because they failed "to present any evidence of their 
religious beliefs or of the manner in which . . . [the law requiring 
34 certified teachers] interferes with the exercise of these beliefs." 
In Hanson v. Cushman the court decided that the objection to 
30Ibid., pp. 224-225. 
31 Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education, 
p. 84. 
^Jernigan v. State, 412 So.'2d. 1242 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982); 
p. 1245. 
34State v. Moorhead, 308 N.W. 2d. 60 (Iowa 1981); p. 64. 
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certification of teachers did not "rise above a personal or philosophi­
cal choice and therefore is not within the bounds of court protec­
tion."35 
The second prong of the test was formulated when the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that the impact of compulsory education 
beyond the eighth grade for Amish children was "not only severe, but 
36 
inescapable" because such a requirement "would gravely endanger, if 
37 not destroy, the free exercise of the respondents' religious beliefs." 
The Amish belief would be endangered by "exposing Amish children to 
worldly influences in terms of attitude, goals and values contrary to 
beliefs, and by substantially interfering with the religious develop­
ment of the Amish child."38 
Other defendants have not been as successful in demonstrating 
an undue burden on religious tenets. In the Sheridan Road Baptist 
Church case, the defendants failed to show that compliance with the 
requirement of certified teachers would render the mission of the 
39 church impractical or impossible. In the Shaver case the court 
ruled against the parents after hearing testimony that "instruction 
could be conducted by a certified teacher without violating the basic 
tenets" of their religion as long as the teachers were "saved and born 
35Hansen v. Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 1980); p. 114. 
36 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, p. 218. 
37Ibid., p. 219. 
38Ibid., p. 218. 
39 Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, 
p. 270. 
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40 
again." In another case the court heard testimony that certified 
teachers could be used without "compromising religious principles"^ 
and, in fact, one teacher in the school was certified. The judge ruled 
against the parents. 
The third part of the test formulated by the Yoder court was to 
determine whether or not the state has some compelling interest that 
justifies the burdensome impact of the requirements. In balancing the 
burden of the person's religious rights with the compelling nature of 
the state's interest, "alternative means by which the state could 
achieve its objective through the imposition of a lesser burden on 
42 religion" should be examined. 
Prior to the Yoder ruling in 1972, courts generally ruled that 
the state had absolute power to regulate schools. This is reflected in 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia which declared: 
No amount of religious ferver he [the parent] may entertain 
in opposition to adequate instruction should be allowed to 
work a lifelong injury to his child. Nor should he, for this 
religious reason, be suffered to inflict another illiterate 
citizen on his community or his state.43 
This philosophy is reflected in the words of the Supreme Court 
of Washington which declared that "religious beliefs, whatever they may 
44 be, are not a legal justification for violation of a positive law." 
40 
State v. Shaver, p. 894. 
^State v. Rivinus, p. 226. 
42 State v. Shaver, p. 890. 
43 Rice v. Commonwealth, p. 348. 
44 State ex rel. Shoreline School District No. 412 v. Superior 
Court for King County, p. 1004. 
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In balancing the state's rights with that of parents who 
objected to the requirement that teachers be certified, the Iowa 
Supreme Court said: 
The parents have the clear right to select for them 
[children in nonpublic schools] teachers with religious 
convictions which are consistent with the purpose of the 
school. But it is quite another thing to argue that 
those same teachers can be devoid of the qualifications 
of an educator.45 
In the same ruling the court recognized the "transcendent impor-
46 tance" of education "to all children" and ruled that the Yoder princi­
ple did not apply to defendants in Iowa because: 
they [the children] will have to compete with well-
educated children, will associate with them in a 
society very different from the simple rural, and 47 
largely isolated one that lies ahead for Amish children. 
The religious rights of parents are not "absolute and totally 
• 48 free from legislative restrictions" according to the Supreme Court of 
North Dakota, and the "incidental burden on the free exercise of the 
parents' religion as a result of the state requirement is justified . . 
by the state's compelling interest in the regulation [requiring certi­
fied teachers]."49 
p. 81. 
45 
Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education, 
46Ibid., p. 85 
47Ibid. 
48 
State v. Shaver, p. 897. 
49Ibid. 
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In another case the same court looked at the intent of teacher 
certification and declared the purpose was to "promote and further the 
education of the children . . . [and] not to impede the observance of 
one or all religions or to discriminate invidiously between reli-
50 gions." As such, the requirement for certification did not "unduly 
si 
impinge on the constitutional rights of the defendants." 
"The state need not demonstrate a 'compelling interest* but only 
that it acted 'reasonably' in requiring . . . that children be taught 
52 
only by certified teachers' according to a New York court. Conse­
quently the court ruled against uncertified parents who sought to edu­
cate their children at home. 
The reasonableness principle was also expressed by the Michigan 
court which ruled that the issue is "whether the individual regulations 
[requiring certified teachers] are reasonable means to give effect to 
53 a broad compelling state interest." 
Even after the Supreme Court set the precedent for allowing 
religious beliefs as a defense for noncompliance with statutory require­
ments, other courts have been reluctant to accept religious beliefs as 
a legitimate defense for failure to utilize certified teachers in non­
public schools. 
50 
State v. Rivinus, p. 231. 
5lIb1d. 
52 Hanson v. Cushman, p. 114. 
53 Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, 
p. 274. 
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The Court of Appeals in Michigan ruled that requiring certified 
teachers is not only a recognized interest in providing an education 
for youth but also "of sufficient urgency to be classified as 'compel -
54 ling* within the constitutional standard." 
Not all religious challenges to certification of teachers have 
been decided by the Yoder principle. In West Virginia the case against 
Bobby and Ester Riddle was determined on the ground that no person may 
disregard the law and then raise First Amendment defenses as to the 
prosecution for violation of the law. The parents made no effort to 
seek approval of their home school. The court ruled that to allow such 
55 "ad hoc noncompliance with compulsory school attendance laws," would 
lead to hideous results. To permit such would 
imply that parents have the right to keep their children 
in medieval ignorance, quarter them in Dickensian squalor 
beyond the reach of ameliorating influence, of the social 
welfare agencies, and so to separate their children from 
organized society in an environment of indoctrination and 
deprivation that the children become mindless automators 5g 
incapable of coping with life outside their own families. 
The court concluded that the Constitution of the United States 
does not contemplate such a result. Therefore, the parents lost the 
case. 
An issue which has not been addressed by the courts is the reli­
gious rights of children. Justice Douglas raised the issue in his lone 
dissenting opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder. He stated that "children are 
54Ibid. 
55State v. Riddle, 285 S.E. 2d. 359 (W. Va. 1981); p. 367, 
56Ibid. 
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57 
'persons' within the meaning of the Bill of Rights" and should be 
heard in cases which determine their future. His conclusion was: 
While parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the 
entire family, the education of the child is a matter in 
w h i c h  t h e  c h i l d  w i l l  o f t e n  h a v e  d e c i d e d  v i e w s  . . . .  I t  
is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, 
that is imperiled by Toslay's decision.58 
Vagueness of Statutes 
Requirements that teachers in home schools be certified have 
been challenged as being unconstitutionally vague. Wording which has 
been challenged include "a person or persons who . . . are qualified to 
give instruction,"59 "equivalent instruction by a certified teacher,"^ 
"teachers whose qualifications are essentially equivalent to minimum 
61 
standards for public school teachers," and even "certified 
teachers."6^ 
When courts are faced with a charge that language in a statute is 
unconstitutionally vague, they judge the statute by determining if the 
language gives adequate notice to the ordinary man of what is prohibi-
63 
ted by the law. A statute will be determined to be vague if a person 
57Wisconsin v. Yoder, p. 243. 
58Ibid., pp. 244-245. 
59West Virginia, West Virginia Code, Sec. 18-8-1 (1951). 
60Iowa, Iowa Code Annotated, Sec. 299.1 (1983). 
61Minnesota, Minnesota Statutes Annotated, Sec. 120.10(2) (1984). 
®^Iowa, Iowa Code Annotated, Sec. 299.1 (1983). 
63Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); p. 111. 
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of common intelligence is left to guess at the meaning of the statute 
or to its application.64 
A greater certainty of meaning is required where a statute 
imposes a criminal penalty. The Supreme Court, in Kolender v. Lawson, 
declared: 
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness requires that a 
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct 
is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbi­
trary and discriminatory enforcement.65 
The Iowa District Court further explained the due process stan­
dard for determining the constitutionality of a challenged statute. It 
ruled that in order for a statute to be constitutional, it "must give a 
person of ordinary intelligence fair warning of what is prohibited and 
CC 
. . . it must provide explicit standards for those who enforce it." 
Courts have reached conflicting decisions on the vagueness of 
the term "equivalent instruction" when required by a certified or quali­
fied teacher in home schools. In State v. Moorhead the court looked to 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary for a definition of equiva­
lent and concluded that "equivalent instruction is instruction which is 
equal to kind and amount to that provided in public schools."^ 
64Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385 (1925); 
p. 391. 
65Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 358 (1983); p. 358 n. 8. 
66Kniqht v. Iowa District Court, 269 N.W. 2d. 430 (Iowa 1978); 
p. 432. 
6^State v. Moorhead, p. 64. 
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A district court in Iowa ruled that "'equivalent instruction' 
fails to give adequate notice to the ordinary man of what is prohibited 
go 
by the statute." The decision was that the term must be further 
defined before it can be used as a requirement to be met by teachers in 
home schools. 
The West Virginia statute requiring that home instruction be pro­
vided by a person "qualified to give instruction in subjects required 
to be taught in free elementary schools"69 was challenged as unconsti­
tutionally vague. In State v. Riddle the court ruled that the wording 
of the statute was "sufficiently definite."^ 
The term "certified teacher" has been challenged on the vagueness 
principle. In Iowa parents charged that it could be defined to mean 
71 "certified by a licensing agency" and that the legislature had meant 
72 for it to mean "competent" when it required certified teachers for 
nonpublic schools. In both cases the judiciary concluded that since 
"certified teachers" is clearly defined elsewhere in Iowa statutes and 
that the procedure for becoming certified is clearly stated, the term 
"certified" is not unconstitutionally vague. One court pointed out that 
the legislature had substituted the word "certified" for "competent" in 
1953. In so doing the legislature changed the requirement "from a 
go 
Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, p. 318. 
69West Virginia, West Virginia Code, Sec. 18-81-1 (1951). 
^°State v. Riddle, p. 360. 
71 State v. Moorhead, p. 64. 
72 Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, p. 314. 
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subjective factual evaluation to an easily identifiable objective 
73 
standard." The question of vagueness of the term was settled with 
the declaration that "the term should cause no difficulty for citizens 
74 who desire to obey the statute." 
The Supreme Court of the state of Minnesota overturned 
a parent's conviction of violating the compulsory education law and 
75 
declared the statute unconstitutionally vague. The Minnesota statute 
stated that students in home schools must be "taught by teachers whose 
qualifications are essentially equivalent to the minimum standards for 
public school teachers."''6 
The state contended that the language meant that the requirements 
were the same for public and home school teachers. The mother countered 
that her "experience, knowledge, and performance"^ made her instruc­
tion equivalent to that offered in public schools. The court agreed 
with the mother that the term "essentially equivalent" is unconstitu­
tionally vague and reversed her conviction. 
In reaching its conclusion the court cited the intent of the 
legislature and declared, "If the legislature had intended that the 
74 State v. Moorhead, p. 64. 
75State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W. 2d. 527 (M1nn. 1985). 
^Minnesota. 
77 
State v. Newstrom, p. 527. 
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qualifications of a nonpublic school teacher be the same as the minimum 
70 
standards for a public school teacher, it would have said so." The 
decision continued with the declaration that: 
The legislature chose a term which, while encouraging the 
certifiability of nonpublic school teachers, permits . . . 
some flexibility in the employment of teachers who may 
lack professional education credit but whose preparation 
in knowledge and background of subject matter may be quite 
superior.'9 
Violation of Fundamental Rights 
Opponents of regulation of home schools, Including teacher 
certification, have argued that such action violates their fundamental 
rights. Among the alleged violations are the guarantees of equal pro-
80 81 82 tection, and due process, and the rights of trial by jury, and to 
83 life, privacy, and family integrity. 
The judicial response to charges of violation of these rights 
has generally been the same and can be summarized by the ruling in 
78Ibid., p. 528. 
79Ibid., p. 530. 
80 Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education, 
Rice v. Commonwealth, and Hanson v. Cushman. 
Q1 
Rice v. Commonwealth and Knox v. O'Brien, 72 A. 2d. 389 
(N.J. 19557! 
82 
Rice v. Commonwealth and Grigg v. Commonwealth, 297 S.E. 2d. 
799 (Va. 1982). 
^Jernigan v. State, 412 So. 2d. 1242 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982). 
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Hanson v. Cushman which declared: 
The plaintiffs'claimed right to educate their children 
through a program of home study free from the require­
ment of compliance with state education laws involving 
teacher certification does not rise above a personal or 
philosophical choice, and therefore is not within the 
bounds of constitutional protection.84 
In the Hanson case the parents raised the issue of equal protec­
tion. They argued that the state "treats those who wish to educate 
their children at home differently depending on whether or not they are 
85 
certified." The court responded that the state was acting rationally 
and reasonably in advancing its interest in insuring the minimum com­
petence of those who teach as justification for requiring that teachers 
86 
in home schools be certified. 
Plaintiffs in Johnson v. Charles City contended that their equal 
protection rights were violated because they were not given an exemp­
tion from the compulsory attendance laws as the Amish were granted in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder. The court ruled against the parents when it 
declared that the children in the case faced a future very different 
from that faced by the Amish. Consequently, the separate classifica­
tions for the Amish and the plaintiffs were justified and the equal 
87 protection claim was denied. 
In response to the due process challenge, the courts have ruled 
that the regulation of home schools, including requirements for a 
84 
Hanson v. Cushman, p. 114. 
85Ibid., p. 115. 
86Ibid. 
87 
Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education. 
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competent teacher, do no infringe upon any constitutional rights. A 
New Jersey court stated: 
A democracy would fail to meet the challenge if it were 
not to approve the right of the state to adopt legislation 
having for its end standards of education which may forever 
destroy illiteracy, and to clothe its youthful citizens 
with academic attainment wherewith to enjoy the high 
cultural and secular heights thus far reached.88 
The parents in Rice v. Commonwealth argued that a jury should be 
allowed to determine if the parents were qualified to teach their chil­
dren at home. The Supreme Court of Appeals in Virginia rejected the 
argument and said the determination of qualifications could best be 
made by "competent agencies of the state upon whom has been placed the 
duty and responsibility of supervising and maintenance of a proper 
89 education standard." 
Parents in another case contended that their right to a trial by 
jury had been denied because of the court's failure to classify the pro­
ceedings as criminal. The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that the 
parents had waived their right to a jury trial when they did not 
90 request a trial by jury at the lower level. 
An Alabama court heard the argument that the portion of the 
compulsory school law which requires private tutors to be certified 
teachers violated their rights of "liberty, privacy, and family integ-
91 rity," The court's response was that the state has a "high 
88Knox v. O'Brien, p. 391. 
OQ 
Rice v. Comnonwealth, pp. 348-349. 
90 Griggs v. Commonwealth, p. 803. 
91 Jernigan v. State, p. 1246. 
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responsibility for the education of its citizens . . . [and] the power 
to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic 
92 
education." Recognizing the importance of qualified instructors, the 
court decided that there is "ample justification for the state's . . . 
requirement of board certification for public and nonpublic teachers" 
and such regulations do not "sweep past the constitutionality permis-
93 
sible interference into the sanctity of the family unit." 
Arbitrary and Capricious 
At least two challenges have been made against laws requiring 
certification of teachers in nonpublic schools on the grounds that such 
laws can be applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner. In both 
instances the judiciary overruled the objections of the parents. 
In Michigan the court held that "the mere existence of the right 
94 to impose teacher certification" is not unconstitutional. It further 
declared that if the law is applied in an unconstitutional manner 
"plaintiffs have the burden of showing an actual infringement on their 
rights."95 
The West Virginia Supreme Court issued a similar ruling. It 
said that the requirement that home instructors be "qualified to give 
instruction" was "sufficiently definite and that an arbitrary and 
capricious refusal of the county superintendent and county board of 
92Ibid. 
93Ibid., p. 1247. 
94 Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, p. 276, 
95Ibid. 
education can be corrected either by an action of declaratory judgment 
or an action in mandamus."96 
Challenges to the Value of Certification 
Parents who are opposed to certification of teachers in home 
schools often argue that holding a certificate is not a guarantee of 
competency to teach. They offer arguments similar to those advanced by 
Koerner when he charged that: 
The certification process in most states involves the mere 
mechanical adding up of credit hours the applicant has had 
in education and in other subjects no matter what the quality 
may be.97 
He further declared: 
Einstein could not be licensed to teach third grade 
arithmetic ... or that leonard Bernstein would not be 
competent to teach music to any public school student, or 
that many professors of education . . . could not them­
selves be licensed to teach in our public schools.98 
It is generally agreed that the purpose of certification is to 
provide competent teachers in the classroom. However, Koerner stated: 
In view of the quality of teachers who are often certified 
today with a full complement of education courses and then 
some, and in view of the quality of persons who are often 
not certifiable despite a first-rate liberal education and 
demonstrated intellectual achievement, one wonders just what 
kind of incompetence public schools are now being saved from by 
by the state departments of education." 
96State v. Riddle, p. 366. 
97 James D. Koerner, The Miseducation of American Teachers 
(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1963), p. 207. 
"ibid., p. 208. 
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The arguments against certification are often verified by experts 
1n the field of education who point out that "there are no scientific 
studies indicating that a teaching certificate did or did not make 
better teachers,"100 and that "certification actually produces medioc­
rity."101 Opponents of certification contend that the "certification 
requirement relies upon the process (education of the teacher) rather 
102 
than the product Cls the child learning?)." They provide anecdotal 
evidence that some untrained persons have become excellent teachers 
while some certified teachers are incompetent to teach. 
The courts, while admitting the fallibility of certifications 
have accepted certification as a legitimate process. The fact that 
certification does not guarantee competency is recognized by the courts 
and is reflected in statements such as: "certification does not neces-
103 sarily equate with teaching competence in every instance," "teacher 
104 
certification may also have its deficiencies," and "the certificate 
105 is not guarantee that everyone who hold one is a competent teacher.". 
In State v. Rivinus the court ruled that "each method which purports to 
measure learning can be questioned as to its validity" since such 
100Fel1owship Baptist Church v. Benton, p. 316. 
1Q1Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, 
p. 268. 
102 Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, p. 316. 
103State v. Shaver, p. 894. 
10State v. Rivinus, p. 229. 
105 
Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, p. 316. 
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measurements are "concerned with probabilities" and not "an exact 
l|106 science. 
While "certification may not be infallible and does not 
107 assure that every teacher is a good teacher," it is generally 
accepted that certification "appears to be the best method now available 
to satisfy the state's prime interest in seeing that its children are 
108 
taught by competent persons." Certification is accepted as a 
"reliable indicator of the probability of success in [a] particular 
109 field," and "an acceptable method of satisfying part of the constitu­
tional mandate to the legislature to properly provide an education for 
its youth."110 
The value of the certificate is not that it assures competence, 
but "in the education a person must receive to become eligible for the 
certificate"111 and the consideration of character, adequate educational 
112 preparation and general fitness to teach." In State v. Rivinus the 
court declared: 
We have serious reservations that anyone truly concerned 
with educating children would object to the teacher 
106State v. Rivinus, p. 229. 
^Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, p. 316. 
108Ibid. 
109 
State ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, et a!., 301 
N.W. 2d. 571 CNeb. 1981), p. 579. 
110State v. Rivinus, p. 229. 
^Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, p. 316. 
112 State v. Rivinus, p. 230. 
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having the [required] . . . qualifications or would not 
want the teacher to have them.113 
In order for the state to require certification of teachers in 
nonpublic schools, the state is not required to "prove conclusively that 
certification of the teaching profession guarantees excellent perform-
114 ance." If such proof were to be required, the legislative authority 
of the state would be "severely inhibited."115 The futility of proving 
that certification brings competency was seen in a court decision which 
said: 
We are not suggesting as an absolute that every person who 
has earned a baccalaureate degree in teaching is going to 
become a good teacher any more than one who has obtained the 
appropriate training and education will become a good ,,6 
engineer, lawyer, beauty operator, builder, or pipefitter. 
Parents who question the value of certifying teachers suggest the 
use of standardized achievement tests to determine teacher effective­
ness. Parents see this as a less restrictive and more precise alterna­
tive than teacher certification. Courts have been reluctant to accept 
this proposal. 
One objection the judiciary has found to the use of standardized 
testing in lieu of teacher certification is the question of the valid­
ity of such tests.11'' One court recognized the value of testing but 
p. 273. 
115 
113Ibid. 
114 Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, 
Ibid. 
116 
State ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church et a!., p. 579. 
^State v. Shaver, p. 897. 
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declared, "it is not sufficient in and of itself to determine whether 
118 a student is receiving an adequate education." 
A second objection to testing to measure adequacy of instruction 
is the timing of the tests. While certification is a process which 
takes place before the instruction to ensure competency tests are 
administered after the instruction and can only be a "backward look" to 
119 
"measure whether a child has been receiving an education." The 
decision in State v. Rivinus included the declaration that: 
Standardized testing ordinarily does not result in the 
discovery of a deficiency in education until after the term, 
semester, or the school year is over, which would, in 
effect, result in a child wasting its period of time if the 
results of the standardized test indicated that the child's 
education was deficient.120 
It has been pointed out that "the court is ill-equipped to 
determine whether or not standardized achievement tests would provide 
the state with any assurance that children are receiving a good educa­
tion" and if the legislature "deemed it [standardized testing] as an 
appropriate means to monitor the work of schools," it would have pro-
121 vided such an alternative. 
Some parents contend that standardized testing is a less restric­
tive means to monitor education. The courts have expressed the opposite 
118 Fellowship Baptist Church v» Benton, p. 316, 
119 
Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education, 
p. 81. 
120 
State v. Rivinus, p. 229. 
121 
State v. Shaver, p. 897. 
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view. A Michigan court declared: 
Standardized testing would very likely be designed to test 
secular subjects, would have a nonreligious orientation, and 
would enable the state to become as much or more involved 
with the manner of teaching courses as the existing regulatory 
scheme.122 
The same thought was expressed in State v. Shaver. A concurring 
opinion stated: 
The testing alternative would appear to give the state the 
authority to require not only that certain basic subjects 
must be taught but would vest in the state . . . the 
authority, through testing, to dictate exactly what will 
be taught and, as a result to regulate the thought process 
of the students.123 
At least one court disagreed with the general concept of dis­
allowing standardized testing as an alternative to certification of 
teachers as a tool to monitor nonpublic schools. The Supreme Court of 
Kentucky ruled that such monitoring could be accomplished by an appro­
priate testing program. The court concluded: 
If the results [of testing] show that one or more [nonpublic] 
schools have failed to reasonably accomplish the constitu­
tional purpose, the Commonwealth may then withdraw approval 
and seek to close them for they no longer fulfill the purpose 
of 'schools.'124 
122 Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, 
p. 273. 
123 
State v. Shaver, p. 901. 
124 
Kentucky State Board of Education v. Rudasill, 589 S.W. 2d. 
877 (Ky. 1979), p. 884. 
96 
Quality of Instruction Examined 
In the absence of statutory requirements for certification of 
teachers in home schools, the courts have generally been inclined to 
look at the quality of instruction rather than how it is given or by 
whom it is given. This philosophy is seen in the declaration of the 
court in People v. Turner that: 
The object of a compulsory educational law is to see that 
children are not left in ignorance, that from some source 
they will receive instruction that will fit them for their 
place in society.125 
A New York court ruled in favor of parents who wanted to educate 
their children in home. The court stated: 
A parent need not avail himself of formal education facili­
ties for a child ... it being sufficient that a systematic 
course of study be undertaken at home and that the parent 
render qualified instruction.126 
A court in Indiana said, "The result to be obtained, and not the 
means or manner of attaining it was the goal which lawmakers were 
127 
attempting to reach." The decision further concluded that parents 
fulfill the compulsory education law when they "place within the reach 
of the child the opportunity and means of acquiring an education equal 
128 to that obtainable in the public schools." 
^People v. Turner, 98 N.Y. S. 2d. 886 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950); 
p. 888. 
126In re Lash, 401 N.Y.S. 2d. 124 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976); p. 126. 
*2^State v. Peterman, 70 N.E. 550 (Ind. App. Ct. 1904); p. 552. 
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In order to provide the required instruction, it is not always 
necessary to have a certified teacher. In Kentucky the Supreme Court 
ruled that certification is an indicator of the level of achievement 
"but it is not a sine qua non the absence of which establishes that 
129 
. . . [other] teachers are unable to teach their students." It was 
pointed out by another court that "there are teachers today teaching in 
130 
various schools in New Jersey who are not certified." The decision 
was that noncertified teachers could teach in home schools if the 
state permitted teachers in the public schools to teach without a 
certificate. 
Even though courts have permitted noncertified teachers in home 
schools, they have insisted on qualified teachers. In Meyer v. Nebraska 
the court declared, "Education of the young is only possible in schools 
conducted by especially qualified persons who devote themselves 
thereto."131 
The importance of the proper qualifications for teachers in home 
schools was emphasized when the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled: 
In order to impart an education to a child, it is self-evident 
that the instructor must himself have adequate learning and 
training 1n the art of teaching. Obviously, an illiterate 
parent cannot properly educate his child, nor can he, by 
attempting to do so, avoid his obligation to send it to 
school .132 
1 OQ 
Kentucky State Board of Education v. Rudasill, p. 884. 
130State v. Massa, 231 A. 2d. 252 (N.J. Super. 1967); p. 256. 
131Meyer v. Nebraska, 260 U.S. 390 (1923). 
132 Rice v. Commonwealth, p. 348. 
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The insistence on a quality education is reflected in the case 
of a mother who was uncertified and combined babysitting with small 
children with teaching her two older children in an unstructured home 
setting. The court declared that such a situation did not constitute a 
school, and "if such a family arrangement will serve as a substitute for 
133 school there is no compulsory school attendance." 
Certification does not always equate with qualified according to 
judicial decisions. Mrs. O'Brien, a parent certified to teach in 
secondary schools, who had two years of teaching experience was deter­
mined to be unqualified to teach her elementary aged children at home 
because she "has not now or ever had a certificate to teach in the 
134 elementary grades." The court stated that there are two groups of 
teachers: 
Those qualified and certified to teach in elementary schools 
and those qualified and certified to teach in the secondary 
schools. The individual teacher must possess special skills 
to teach in the separate schools; the qualifications are not 
interchangeable. 135 
The importance of teachers being qualified for the appropriate 
level of instruction was echoed in another decision which declared, 
"Very likely respondents' plan for home instruction up to and including 
136 
the more advanced grades is doomed to failure." The same court 
133In re Sawyer, 24 Kan. 436 (1983); p. 442. 
134Knox v. O'Brien, p. 392. 
135Ibid. 
136In re Falk, 441 N.Y.S. 2d. 785 (N.Y. 1985); p. 790. 
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said: 
We cannot visualize these caring and concerned parents teach­
ing properly and successfully the Intricacies of say Boyle's 
law, the mysteries of algebra and geometry, or the nuances of 
the Missouri Compromise.137 
"There is no substitute for an educated teacher who is capable o 
138 answering questions and guiding inquiring minds." The court which 
made this declaration went on to say that teachers must be able to 
lead students into "new and uncontemplated directions to which any 
139 wel1-prepared material should inevitably lead." 
Courts often look beyond the academic programs of home schools 
to the social and cultural aspects of education. One parent was con­
victed of violating the compulsory education law partly because, in the 
opinion of the court, the "children have not made the acquaintances of 
any other children in the community" and this was "a disadvantage where 
140 the comradeship of other desirable children is available." 
Another court expressed concern that "home instruction [even by 
qualified instructors] would leave a great deal to be desired in the 
social development derived from group education in a public school 
environment."141 Since the state statutes did not require "courses of 
137ibid. 
^State v. Riddle. 
139Ibid. 
140Knox v. O'Brien, p. 392. 
141In re Falk, p. 789. 
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instruction designed to enhance a student's learning experiences by the 
142 free association with other children," the court upheld the parents' 
privilege of providing home schooling. 
The Supreme Court of Appeals in West Virginia ruled that in 
order to be qualified to give instruction in the home the instructor 
must be able to "afford students diverse forms of cultural enrichment 
ranging from organized athletics, art, music, and literature, to an 
understanding of the multiple possibilities for careers which this 
143 society offers." To deprive students of the cultural and social 
opportunities would mean that: 
Children can lawfully be sequestered on a rural homestead 
during all of the formative years to be released upon the 
world only after the opportunities to acquire basic skills 
have been foreclosed and their capacity to cope with modern 
society has been so undermined as to prohibit useful, happy 
or productive lives.144 
A New Jersey court disagreed that social and cultural aspects 
should be considered. It insisted only on academic equivalency by a 
qualified teacher and said: 
To hold that the statute requires equivalent social contact 
and development as well [as academic training] would 
emasculate this alternative [home schools] and allow only 
group education, thereby eliminating private tutoring and 
home education.145 
142ibid. 
^State v> Riddle, p. 366. 
144Ibid. 
idR 
State v. Massa, p. 257. 
101 
A family court in New York upheld the right of parents to edu­
cate their handicapped child in the home when it was determined that 
the parents "provided more education for their son than is required by 
the state law"^® even though they did not meet the reporting require­
ments. The court found that in the home school directed by qualified 
147 teachers, the boy had "made progress in all areas." 
Power to Regulate Home School Teachers 
Courts have generally recognized the regulatory power of the 
state legislatures to determine who can teach in nonpublic schools. 
"The courtroom is simply not the best arena for the debate of issues of 
148 educational policy and the measurement of educational quality" was 
the conclusion of the Supreme Court of North Dakota in affirming the 
conviction of parents in a compulsory attendance case. 
This philosophy was echoed in such judicial opinions as: "Had 
the legislature intended such a requirement [certified teachers], it 
149 
would have so provided"; "If a better solution is available ... it 
150 
should be through the legislative process"; and "If the legislature 
had intended that the qualifications of a nonpublic school teacher be 
146In re Lash, 401 N.Y.S. 2d. 124 CN.Y. Ct. App. 1976); p. 126. 
147.. .. 
Ibid. 
148 
State v. Shaver, p. 900. 
149 
State v. Massa, p. 256. 
150 
State v. Rivinus, p. 231. 
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the same as the minimum standard for a public school teacher, it would 
have said so."^ 
The right of the state to make the requirements for home school 
personnel as stringent or as liberal as they see fit was seen in the 
statement of a New York Family Court which said: 
If a professional educator looks with disfavor upon a home 
school staffed by noncertified teachers, then it is up to 
the legislators to tighten up the standards for home 
instruction.I52 
The absence of statutes requiring instructors to be certified has 
generally been interpreted by the courts as the intent of the legisla­
tors to permit noncertified people to conduct the instruction. In a 
New York ruling it was held that compulsory education laws were designed 
to "see that children are not left in ignorance, that from some source 
they will receive instruction that will fit them for their place in 
153 society." It further stated that if a parent were providing adequate 
instruction, even without a certificate, the requirement of the law was 
being met. 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts agreed when it said that the 
objective of compulsory education laws was to ensure that "all children 
should be educated, but not that they be educated in any particular 
154 way." This same idea is reflected in a ruling of a New York court 
151 
State v. Newstrom, p. 528. 
152In re Falk, p. 789. 
153 
People v. Turner, p. 319. 
^Commonwealth v. Roberts, 38 N.E. 402 (Mass. 1893); p. 413. 
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which declared: 
Provided the instruction given is adequate and the sole purpose 
of nonattendance at [public] school is not to evade the 
statute, instruction given to a child at home by its parent, 
who is competent to each should satisfy the requirement of 
the education law.155 
» 
Even though courts have generally interpreted the absence of a 
requirement for certified teachers in home schools as permitting non-
certified parents to provide such instruction, they have not interpre­
ted them to allow unqualified home instructors. The Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire said that the "state must bear the burden of reasonable 
supervision [of home schools]" and "the power of supervision necessarily 
156 involves the power to reject the unfit [as teachers]." Another 
court pointed out the necessity of reasonable supervision of nonpublic 
schools when it said, "Absent the approval requirement, the state 
would have virtually no assurance that children [in nonpublic schools] 
157 . . . are receiving and will continue to receive a good education." 
In Florida, where there is no statutory authority regulating the 
establishment of private schools, a court ruled that the absence of 
such regulations did not mean "that Florida parents, unqualified to be 
private tutors can proclaim their homes to be private schools and with-
1 58 
draw their offspring from public school." 
155 
People v. Turner, p. 320. 
156State v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170 (N.H. 1929); p. 171. 
157 
tate v. Shaver, p. 897. 
158State v. M.M. and S.E., 407 So. 987 (Fla. 1982); p. 990. 
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The Supreme Court of Washington elaborated on the lack of 
requirements for private schools in that state. The court said: 
The three essential elements of a school are (1) the teacher, 
(2) the pupil or pupils, and (3) the place or institution. 
If the alleged school has no teacher then it does not qualify 
as a school J 59 
Even though the Washington Legislature had not established 
regulations of private schools, it had declared that: 
No person shall be accounted as a qualified teacher within 
the meaning of the school law, who is not the holder of a 
valid teacher's certificate or diploma issued by lawful 
authority of the state.160 
The court ruled that this law was applicable to nonpublic as well as 
public schools. Therefore, uncertified parents who offered instruction 
161 in their home were guilty of violating the compulsory education laws." 
A different conclusion was reached in Kentucky when the Supreme 
Court ruled that the law applying state accreditation standards (requir-
162 ing certified teachers) to private schools "must fall." In arriving 
at this conclusion the court declared that the legislature had made 
provisions for private schools; and if the state required the same 
standards for public and private schools, it would be "but to require 
that the same hay be fed in the field as is fed in the barn."^ 
159 
State ex rel. Shoreline School District No. 412 v. Superior 
Court for King County, p. 1002. 
1 go 
Washington, West's Revised Code of Washington Annotated, Ch. 
97, Sub. 4., Art. VII. (.1909). 
161 
State ex rel. Shoreline School District No. 412 v. Superior 
Court for King County. 
162 Kentucky State Board of Education v. Rudasill, p. 884. 
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Burden of Proof 
When parents challenge the compulsory education laws, the courts 
usually place the burden of proof on the parents. In Commonwealth v. 
Roberts the Supreme Court of Massachusetts said that a parent who 
chooses to educate his child in a school not approved by the designated 
officials, "must take the responsibility of being able to prove that he 
[the child] has been sufficiently and properly instructed there. 
Even when parents object to certification of teachers in home 
schools because of religious beliefs, the courts have decided that the 
parents must prove that "compliance with the law would affect the reli-
165 gion of the parent and their children," and they must show "an 
actual enfringement of their religious rights."166 
In an Iowa case, Normari and Linda Moorhead contended that the 
state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the home 
instruction provided for their children was not equivalent as specified 
in Iowa statutes. The court rejected their claim and said the state 
only had to prove that the children did not attend a public school and 
that the burden was on the parents to prove that the children were being 
167 properly instructed elsewhere. 
In another case the parents argued that since the proceedings 
against them were criminal in nature, the state had the burden to prove 
164. Commonwealth v. Roberts, p. 403. 
165State v. Shaver, p. 893. 
166Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education, 
p. 266. 
16^State v. Moorhead, p. 62. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the compulsory education law was 
168 
violated. The court ruled that the commonwealth had "showed with 
169 
almost conclusive effect" that the children were: 
Taught at home by persons who were not qualified as tutors 
or teachers, and that this unlawful practice would have 
continued indefinitely had not the court intervened and 
ordered the parent to comply with the school attendance 
law J 70 
The outcome of at least two cases has been determined by the 
parents' ability or inability to prove that they were providing adequate 
instruction at home by qualified instructors. In one case the parents 
"met the burden of proof that they are providing instruction for the 
child ... by a competent teacher."^^ In the other case the parents 
who had "the background and qualifications as competent teachers" did 
not "preponderantly show the home instruction ... to be substantially 
172 
equivalent to the instruction given at the district school." 
In the former case the mother who was a high school graduate 
with one year of community college education was able to prove that she 
was providing equivalent instruction in her home, thereby, meeting the 
"onus of demonstrating that home instruction equivalent [which] falls 
173 on parents." 
168 
Griggs v. Commonwealth, p. 803. 
169Ibid-, p. 805. 
170Ibid. 
171 In re Falk, p. 791. 
172In re H., 357 N.Y.S. 2d. 384 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1974); p. 391. 
^73In re Falk, p. 785. 
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In the latter case the court declared that "proof that a minor 
is not attending upon instruction at a school in the district where the 
parents reside is prima facie proof that such minor is a neglected 
child" and the burden is on the parents "to overcome the presumption 
that the minor is not attending with proof that the minor is attending 
upon required instruction 'elsewhere/"1^ The father held two degrees, 
including an advanced degree in literature, had taught literature in at 
least three school systems, and was a certified teacher. In addition, 
the mother had majored in English and literature and had worked as a 
librarian. In spite of their training and experience they did not 
present evidence that the instruction provided in their home for their 
six children was equivalent to that the children would have received 
in public schools.175 
^In re H., p. 386. 
175In re H. 
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CHAPTER V 
REVIEW OF SELECTED COURT DECISIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter contains a review of judicial decisions in the 
area of certification of teachers in home schools. Since the Supreme 
Court of the United States has never handed down a decision on this 
topic, nor any area of home schooling, the cases are taken from local, 
state, and lower federal courts. Selected for review are cases which 
are illustrative of the most frequently litigated issues on the topic 
of home school personnel. 
Included in the review are some cases which deal with church 
supported schools rather than home schools. These cases were selected 
because the opinions rendered are applicable to all nonpublic schools 
in the states in which they were heard. 
Each of the cases selected for review dealt with components of 
home schooling other than personnel. However, only the portions of 
each case addressing qualifications of personnel are reviewed here. In 
addition, some cases raised more than one objection to regulation of 
personnel in home schools. In most cases, only one category has been 
selected as representative of the categories selected for inclusion in 
this review of cases. In other cases the opinions rendered in more than 
one category are of sufficient significance to merit inclusion in both 
categories. 
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The categories and cases selected for review in this chapter are 
listed below: 
1. Free Exercise of Religion 
Rfce v. Commonwealth (1948) 
State ex rel. Shoreline School District No. 412 v. Superior 
Court for King County (I960] 
State v. Shaver (1980) 
Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education 
(1985) 
2. State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools 
State v. M.M. and S.E. (1982) 
State v. Lowry (1963) 
In re Falk (1581) 
3. Fundamental Rights 
Hanson v. Cushman (1980) 
Jernigan v. State (1982) 
4. Unconstitutionally Vague 
State v. Moorhead (1981) 
Grfgg v. Commonwealth (1982) 
State v. Newstrom (1985) 
State v. Riddle (1981) 
5. Burden of Proof 
State v. Moorhead (1981) 
Jernigan v. State (1982) 
Free Exercise of Religion 
Rice v. Commonwealth 
49 S.E. 2d. 342 (Va. 1948) 
Facts 
The defendants, Spurgeon Rice, C. W. Lewis, and A. C. Bishop, 
were the fathers of eleven minor children. Deeply religious families, 
they interpreted the Bible to obligate them to educate their own chil­
dren. To do otherwise, according to their beliefs, would be to risk 
the displeasure of God. In compliance with this belief, each defendant 
n o  
educated his children in the home with disregard to the requirement of 
the Virginia Legislature that home instruction be provided by "a tutor 
or teacher of qualifications prescribed by the State Board of Education 
and approved by the division superintendent."1 
The Circuit Court of Nottoway County heard the case and convicted 
the defendants of violating the compulsory education law. Each defen­
dant was fined $5.00. Their conviction was appealed, and the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia rendered its decision on September 8, 
1948.2 
Decision 
The conviction was affirmed by the Suprmee Court of Appeals. 
The court recognized the sincere religious beliefs of the defendants 
but ruled that these beliefs did not provide immunity from compliance 
with reasonable civil requirements imposed by the state. This point was 
eloquently stated by Justice Staples who ruled: 
No amount of religious ferver he [the parent] may entertain 
in opposition to adequate instruction should be allowed to work 
a lifelong injury to his child. Nor should he, for this reli­
gious reason, be suffered to inflict another illiterate 
citizen on his coimiunity or his state.3 
The court concluded that in order to provide the instruction in 
a home school, the person must possess adequate learning and training 
Virginia, Code of Virginia, Sec. 683 (1948). 
2Rice v. Commonwealth, 49 S.E. 2d. 342 (Va. 1948). 
3Ibid., p. 348. 
Il l  
in the art of teaching. Therefore, the regulations established by the 
state were reasonable and did not violate the free exercise of the 
religious rights of the defendants.4 
Discussion 
Parents will not be able to use their religious beliefs, regard­
less of sincerity^as justification of noncompliance with reasonable 
regulations imposed by the state. The possession of sincere religious 
beliefs does not permit a person to choose which laws he will obey and 
which ones he will ignore. 
State ex rel. Shoreline School District No. 412 
v. Superior Court for King County 
346 P.2d. 999 U960) 
Facts 
William and Maude Wold removed their daughter, Alta Lee Wold, 
from public school for instruction in the home. Mrs. Wold, a high 
school graduate, was the teacher in the nonpublic school established by 
the parents for their daughter. Pursuant to charges by the school 
district that the parents were violating the compulsory school attend­
ance law, the Superior Court for King County, Washington ruled in 
favor of the parents. This court found that the home school qualified 
as a nonpublic school, and the parents were not guilty of noncompliance 
with state statutes. The school district was granted a review by 
certiorari, and the case was presented to the Supreme Court of 
Washington. 
4 Rice v. Commonwealth. 
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The defense presented by the parents was that public school 
attendance violated the religious beliefs of the Seventh Elect Church 
In Spiritual Israel of which they were members. They contended that 
Alta Lee Wold was being taught the regular courses required in grade 
5 schools by a competent teacher. 
Decision 
Judge Otto of the Supreme Court of Washington declared that vio­
lation of the religious beliefs of the parents was not an adequate 
defense for violation of compulsory school attendance laws. 
The court enumerated the elements which are necessary for the 
existence of a school. These elements are: "(1) the teacher, (2) the 
pupil or pupils, and (3) the place of instruction."6 In the absence 
of any of these three elements, the court ruled, the alleged school 
does not exist. 
The legislature of Washington had determined that a person must 
hold a "valid teacher's certificate or diploma issued by lawful author­
ity" in order to be "accounted as a qualified teacher."'' Since Mrs. 
Wold did not meet these requirements, the school which the parents 
alleged to have established did not have a teacher, one of the requi­
sites for a school. Therefore, it did not qualify as a nonpublic school 
5 
State ex rel. Shoreline School District No. 412 v. Superior 
Court  for  King County,  346 P. 2d. 999 ( . I960) .  
6Ibid., p. 1004. 
^Washington, Laws, Sec. 97 (1907). 
113 
and the child was made a ward of the state "until such time as she is 
purged of dependency by attendance at either a public or qualified 
school ."8 
Discussion 
The decision in this case illustrates that statutory standards 
for public schools must be maintained in home schools in order for 
such schools to qualify as nonpublic schools. In the absence of speci­
fied standards for nonpublic schools, minimum standards for public 
schools must be applied by authorities who are charged with the respon­
sibility of determining if alternative schools qualify as nonpublic 
schools. Sincerely held religious beliefs are no justification for 
noncompliance of these regulations. 
State v. Shaver 
294 N.W. 2d. 883 CN.D. 19801 
Facts 
Paul Shaver and Paul Stelnwald, defendants, removed their chil­
dren from the public schools of North Dakota and enrolled them in the 
Bible Baptist Church School in Bismarck, a nonapproved school estab­
lished by the fundamental Baptist Church. Neither the principal nor 
teachers of the school were certified. These fundamental Baptist con­
tended that permitting the state to approve teachers would be placing 
the state as the head of the school rather than God. The basic 
Q 
State ex rel. Shoreline School District No. 412 v. Superior 
Court for King County, p. 1002. 
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requirement to teach in the school was that the person be "saved and 
q 
born again." 
The defendants were tried and convicted of failure to comply 
with the requirements of the compulsory education laws of North Dakota. 
The conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court of the state where it 
was argued that the defendants' right to free exercise of religion was 
violated.10 
Decision 
The judgment of the lower court was affirmed. In reaching the 
decision the court applied the three-pronged inquiry formulated by the 
Yoder case.11 The defendants successfully met the first prong of 
inquiry by demonstrating the sincerity of their religious beliefs. 
However, they were unable to provide evidence of undue burden on the 
free exercise of their religion nor to satisfy the court that the 
requirement of certificated teachers was unreasonable. 
The court recognized the fallibility of the teaching certificate 
but accepted it as a "reasonable tool and one which the legislature 
12 may use ... to assure . . . quality education for all children." 
It further declared that the religious rights guaranteed by the First 
9State v. Shaver, 294 N.W. 2d. 883 (N.D. 1980); p. 887. 
10State v. Shaver. 
^Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 0977). 
12 
State v. Shaver, p. 894. 
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Amendment "are not absolute and totally free from all legislative 
restrictions."*3 
Discussion 
Parents who saw the Yoder decision as an Indication that they 
could easily obtain an exemption from provisions of the compulsory 
attendance laws discovered that it was not to be. To receive such an 
exemption parents must be able to meet all three inquiries formulated 
by the case involving the Amish children. Courts may be hesitant to 
question the sincerity of religious beliefs but will apply the other 
inquiries, and it will not be easy to use religious beliefs as a vehicle 
for bypassing compulsory attendance laws. 
Johnson v. Charles City Schools Board of Education 
368 N.W. 2d. 74 llowa 1985) 
Facts 
Members of a fundamental Baptist Church in Charles City, Iowa 
organized a parochial school under the leadership of Rev. Randy Johnson, 
the pastor. When members of the church enrolled their children in the 
school, they were charged with violating the compulsory school atten­
dance law of the state. They sought declaratory judgment action which 
challenged portions of the law and applied for an "Amish exception" as 
14 established by the United States Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 
13Ibid., p. 897. 
14 Wisconsin v. Yoder. 
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When such action was denied the case reached the Supreme Court of 
Iowa. 
Before the Supreme Court the parents argued that "the selection 
of a teacher is made by God and a state can have no influence over the 
matter even through certification or licensing."15 Rev. Johnson 
testified that he selected teachers 
after prayer and after learning of God's will in the matter, 
and, therefore, his selection of a teacher is God's selection 
of a teacher and that a mere state can have no part in either 
approving or disapproving or controlling or having any 
influence or licensing or certifying authority as to school 
teachers in his church school.16 
The parents insisted that compliance with state requirements that the 
school be staffed by certified teachers would violate their First 
Amendment rights.^ 
Decision 
The Supreme Court of Iowa compared the evidence heard with that 
presented by Amlsh parents in their case against the state of 
18 Wisconsin. It was found that the only similarity in the two cases 
was the sincerely held religious beliefs. Members of the church in 
Charles City failed to show that the educational needs of their children 
were substantially different from those of other children. Neither 
15 
Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education, 
368 N.W. 2d. 74 tlowa 1985); p. 78. 
16Ibid., p. 77. 
^Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education. 
18W isconsin v. Yoder. 
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were they able to convince the court that their right to educate their 
children through schooling by uncertified teachers counterbalanced the 
compelling interest of the state to provide an education for all chil-
19 dren. The decision of the lower court was affirmed. 
Piscussion 
Once again, parents who depended on the Yoder principle to 
justify noncompliance with compulsory attendance laws failed to win 
their case. Courts appear reluctant to establish a precedent whereby 
parents can easily use religious beliefs as an excuse for noncompliance 
with reasonable state control. The unique cultural and religious heri­
tage of the Amish tipped the scale in their favor before the United 
States Supreme Court. Other religious groups will find it difficult 
to prove such a heritage and to qualify for the Amish exception. 
State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools 
State v. M.M. and S.E. 
407 So. 2d. 987 CFla. 1982} 
Facts 
The Circuit Court of Broward County, Florida ruled that M.M. and 
S.E., minor children, were not guilty of truancy, because they were 
being instructed in a nonpublic school located in the family home. 
Statutes of Florida specify that the requirement for compulsory 
school attendance can be met through instruction "at home with a private 
19 Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education. 
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tutor who meets all the requirements prescribed by law and regulations 
20 
of the state board for private tutors." 
The circuit court pointed out that regulations had not been 
established for nonpublic schools. It was ruled that in the absence of 
"rules regulating nonpublic schools (in contrast with the numerous 
21 statutes controlling public schools)" parents who did not hold a 
teaching certificate could teach their children in a school located in 
the home. The ruling was reviewed by the Fourth District Court of 
22 Appeals of Florida on a petition for a writ of common-law certiorari. 
Decision 
Judge Downey stated that the question to be answered by the 
court was: "Can the parents establish a private school in their home 
23 
pursuant to Florida statute . . . without certified teacher or tutor?" 
The court pointed out that the mother was acting as a private 
tutor to the children and that no one else would be allowed to attend 
the school. Since she was the sole tutor for her own children, it did 
not qualify as a nonpublic school within the meaning of the law. The 
legislature had made provisions for nonpublic schools and for home 
instruction by private tutors. In so doing the legislature recognized 
a difference in the two types of schools, and the parents could not 
^Florida, West's Florida Statutes Annotated, Sec. 232.01 , 
0981) .  
21 State v. M.M. and S.E., 407 So. 2d. 987 (F la .  1932); p. 990. 
22State v. M.M. and S.E. 
23Ibid., p. 989. 
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offer one under guidelines for the other. Since the place of instruc­
tion did not meet the requirements for a nonpublic school, and the 
uncertified teacher did not meet the requirement for home instruction, 
the Supreme Court overruled the lower court, and the children were 
guilty of truancy. 
Discussion 
This decision dispelled the notion that nonpublic schools and 
home schools are synonymous when the legislature specifies different 
regulations for the two types. Parents cannot ignore the requirements 
for qualified tutors in home schools when such requirements are 
established by the state. 
State v. Lowry 
383 P. 2d. 962 tKan. 1963) 
Facts 
Dr. Ray F. Lowry, a physician, and Mrs. Mildred E. Lowry, a 
holder of a Kansas teacher's life certificate, chose to instruct their 
four children at home rather than send them to Kansas public schools. 
In response to notification that they were violating the truancy act, 
the parents stated they were operating a school in their home. Prose­
cution was initiated, and the parents were convicted. They appealed the 
24 decision to the Supreme Court of Kansas. 
^State v. Lowry, 383 P. 2d. 962 (Kan. 1963) 
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Decision 
In the decision by Justice Wertz, the court offered some history 
of home schools in Kansas. Prior to 1919 the general statutes of the 
state made provisions for home schools as an alternative to public 
schools, but established no standards for such schools. In 1919 the 
legislature corrected the deficiency by making certain regulations 
applicable to all schools in the state, public, private, and parochial. 
Included 1n the requirements were standards for curriculum and the 
requirement that instructors be competent. 
There was no question that Mrs. Lowry,who did most of the teach-
ingiwas a competent teacher. However, the schedule of home instruction 
for grades 3, 4, 6, and 7 with one child in each grade did not meet 
25 
the curricular requirements. Therefore, the conviction was affirmed. 
Discussion 
It takes more than having a competent, certified teacher to 
qualify as a home school. Even though a parent may be certified, as 
Mrs. Lowry was, other statutory requirements must be met in order for a 
home school to serve as an alternative to public school attendance. 
This case is similar to State ex rel. Shoreline School District No. 412 
26 v. Superior Court for King County which enumerated the elements of a 
school. In that case the missing element was the teacher. In this case 
26 
State ex rel. Shoreline School District No. 412 v. Superior 
Court for King County. 
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the curricular requirements were missing. This ruling reaffirmed that 
all elements must be present. 
In re Falk 
441 N.Y.S. 2d. 785 CFam. Ct. 1981) 
Facts 
The Family Court of Lewis County, New York heard the case in 
which Raymond Falk, age eight, was alleged to be neglected by his 
parents because they had not supplied him with an education in compli­
ance with New York statutes. The boy had been removed from public 
school and taught at home by Mrs. Falk, a high school graduate with one 
year of conmunlty college training. 
The respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Falk, contended that they were 
complying with the statute which requires that home instruction be by a 
competent person and substantially equivalent to that in public 
27 schools. 
Decision 
The court agreed that Mrs. Falk was a competent instructor and 
that the instruction met the statutory requirements of being substan­
tially equivalent to that in public schools. The conclusion was: 
If the professional educators look with disfavor upon a home 
school staffed by noncertified teachers, then it is up to the28 
legislators to tighten up the standards for home instruction. 
27In re Falk, 441 N.Y.S. 2d. 785 CFam. Ct. 1981). 
28Ibid., p. 789. 
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Discussion 
In the absence of requirements that home instructors be certi­
fied, the courts are apt to examine the quality of instruction provided 
by uncertified persons in home schools. State legislatures have the 
authority to establish requirements for teachers in home schools, but 
their failure to do so permits the courts to use other criteria to 
determine the legality of home instruction programs. 
Fundamental Rights 
Hanson v. Cushman 
490 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 1980} 
Facts 
Lowell and Carol Hanson were the parents of four minor children 
and the legal guardian of another. The Hansons and Charlotte O'Brien 
sought to instruct the children in the Hanson home through a home 
study program. Gerald Cushman, superintendent of the school district in 
which the Hansons resided, informed the parents of the requirement that 
home schools must be taught by certified teachers. 
Action was brought by the Hansons to declare the state compulsory 
attendance law unconstitutional, because it deprived the parents of the 
right to educate their children at home. They contended that the right 
to control the education of their children was "protected by the 
penumbra of the first nine amendments and the Fourteenth Amendment to 
29 
the United States Constitution." Defendants in the case, Gerald 
^Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 109 (W.D.  Mich. 1980); p. 112. 
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Cushman and other officials of the school district, sought a motion to 
dismiss the case.3® 
Decision 
The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Michigan cited the United States Supreme Court case of Meyer v. 
Nebraska which declared that "education of the young is only possible in 
31 schools conducted by especially qualified persons." It then declared 
that the state of Michigan had acted "reasonably in requiring children 
to attend school and that children be taught only by certified 
teachers. 
According to the decision rendered, the plaintiffs' desire to 
educate their children at home was a personal and philosophical choice. 
As such it was not within the bounds of constitutional protection. The 
Hansons failed to prove that fundamental rights had been abridged, and 
the action to have the compulsory education law, including the require­
ment for certified teachers in home schools, declared unconstitutional 
33 
was dismissed. 
30 
Hanson v. Cushman. 
31 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 0923); p. 400, 
32 
Hanson v. Cushman, p. 115. 
33 Hanson v. Cushman. 
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Discussion 
The decision in Hanson v. Cushman indicated that courts will look 
carefully at challenges to state statutes requiring certified teachers 
in home schools. Exceptions to compulsory attendance laws, as allowed 
34 
by the Yoder court, will be difficult to obtain. In order to 
successfully claim such an exception, parents must be prepared to 
demonstrate that basic rights have been abridged. The general charge 
of violation of "fundamental rights" will be difficult to prove in 
courts. Parents must be prepared to specify the rights which they 
think are being violated. 
Jernigan v. State 
412 So. 2d. 1242 (Ala. Cr. App. 19821 
Facts 
Charles and Ann Jernigan, members of the Catholic Order of the 
Society of St. Pius X, refused to send their children to public schools 
in Alabama. They based their refusal on the belief that the education 
of children is the responsibility of parents. They believed that to 
allow children to attend public schools would violate their traditional 
Catholic beliefs and expose the children to nonreligious influences. 
They contended it would be a mortal sin to expose the children to a 
secular education. They argued that the requirement that private 
tutors hold a teaching certificate violated their liberty, privacy, and 
family integrity. In spite of their charges of violation of 
^Wisconsin v. Yoder. 
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constitutional rights, they were convicted and appealed the conviction 
35 
to the Court of Criminal Appeals in Alabama. 
Decision 
The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the request for an exemp-
36 
tion based on the Yoder decision and affirmed the conviction of the 
parents. Judge Bowen pointed out two important ways this case differed 
from the case brought by the Amish parents. The Yoder case was dealing 
with parents who objected to public schooling for students beyond the 
eighth grade. On the other hand, the Jernigans did not approve any 
public schooling. The other difference was that the Jernigans did not 
provide evidence that their home schooling would be successful in pre­
paring the children for life in a modern society while the Amish 
parents were able to do so. 
The court ruled that the state has a high responsibility for the 
education of its citizens and the power to regulate such education. It 
cited other court rulings which emphasized the importance of providing 
instruction by qualified instructors and concluded that the state 
requirement that private tutors hold a teaching certificate was reason-
37 able and violated no constitutional rights of the parents. 
^5Jernigan v. State, 412 So. 2d. 1242 (Ala. Cr* App. 1982). 
36 
Wisconsin v. Yoder. 
37 Jermqan v. State. 
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Discussion 
Courts generally uphold the right of state legislatures to regu­
late public and nonpublic schools as long as such regulations are 
reasonable. Parents will not be able to charge violation of their 
constitutional rights unless they are able to provide evidence of such 
violations. The interest of the state in compulsory education is both 
legitimate and compelling. As such it will be upheld by the courts. 
Unconstitutionally Vague 
State v. Moorhead 
308 N.W. 2d. 60 (.Iowa 1981) 
Facts 
The defendants, Norman and Linda Moorhead, were convicted of 
violating the compulsory school attendance law of Iowa. They had 
removed their children, Janese and Kirk, from school and instructed 
them at home. A jury convicted them of failure to provide "equivalent 
38 instruction by a certified teacher elsewhere" as required of parents 
who chose to provide alternatives to public schools. The conviction 
was appealed on the contention that the law was unconstitutionally vague 
39 and that it violated their religious rights. 
38Iowa, Iowa Code Annotated, Sec. 299.1 (1979). 
39State v. Moorhead, 308 N.W. 2d. 60 (Iowa 1981). 
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Decision 
The Supreme Court of Iowa ruled against the defendants. The 
40 court declared that "literal exactitude or precesion is not necessary" 
for a statute to be sufficiently definite. The term "certified 
teacher" was not unconstitutionally vague in light of other statutes 
which deal extensively with requirements for certification of teachers. 
Neither was "equivalent instruction" unconstitutionally vague because of 
other statutes enumerating the curricular requirements for public and 
41 nonpublic schools. 
Discussion 
Iowa statutes establish certification and curricular standards 
for all schools. Even though these issues are not addressed in the 
compulsory attendance law, parents cannot successfully challenge the 
law as unconstitutionally vague. As long as terms are defined and 
explained in some other sections of the general statutes of a state, it 
is not necessary for them to be explained in other sections of the 
statutes. 
Griqg v. Commonwealth 
297 S.E. 2d. 799 (Va. 1982} 
Facts 
A juvenile court in Chesapeake, Virginia determined that 
Stephanie and Nicole Grigg were children in need of services, because 
40Ibid., p. 64. 
41 
State v. Moorhead. 
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they were not in school. They were placed on probation and ordered 
to attend "a private, public, denominational or parochial school, or 
. . . be taught at home by a tutor of qualifications prescribed by the 
State Board of Education and approved by the Superintendent of 
42 Schools." Their parents, Robert and Vickie Grigg, insisted that the 
children were receiving instruction at home by the parents. They con­
tended that the term "private school" is not clearly defined in Virginia 
statutes, and thus the requirement that the tutor in such a school 
meet state prescribed qualifications did not apply. The Circuit Court 
of the City of Chesapeake ordered the parents to comply with the com­
pulsory education law, and they appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Virginia.43 
Decision 
Chief Justice Carrico wrote the opinion of the court. He noted 
that the Griggs had not challenged the statute which requires that home 
instruction be by qualified instructors. Instead they contended they 
had established a private school in their home. The court ruled that 
home instruction by parents who are not approved as private tutors does 
not constitute attendance at a private school. Therefore, whether or 
not the term "private school" was vague became a moot question. Since 
the instruction provided by the Griggs was in a home school rather than 
a private school, it was irrelevant whether the term was vague or 
42Griggs v. Commonwealth, 297 S.E. 2d. 799 (Va. 1982); p. 800. 
43 Griggs v. Commonwealth. 
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definite. Even though it was unnecessary for the court to rule on the 
vagueness of the term "private school," it did so. It ruled that the 
average parent would be able to read the statute and know that home 
instruction by a person not qualified to teach would not serve as an 
44 alternative to public school education. 
Discussion 
Some state statutes do not differentiate between private schools 
and home schools. In such cases courts usually consider them to be the 
same. If statutes do make provisions for the two distinct types cf 
schools, as do the laws of Virginia, parents cannot choose to apply 
regulations formulated for private schools to their home instruction 
programs to avoid compliance with home school regulations. 
State v. Newstrom 
371 N.W. 2d. 525 (.Minn. 1985) 
Facts 
Jeanne Newstrom and her husband were charged and convicted, after 
a jury trial, of violating the compulsory school attendance laws of 
Minnesota. They had removed their two children from public school 
during the afternoons for home instruction. Mrs. Newstrom, who was not 
a certified teacher, taught the children each afternoon. Their convic­
tion was affirmed by a three-judge district court panel and then 
appealed to the state supreme court. 
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The parents argued that the requirements for teachers in non­
public schools was unconstitutionally vague. The statutory requirement 
stated that such schools must be "taught by teachers whose qualifica­
tions are essentially equivalent to the minimum standards for public 
45 schools." Defendants in this case contended that "essentially 
equivalent" was vague and that the court should examine Mrs. Newstrom's 
training and experience when determining her fitness to conduct home 
instruction for her children.4® 
Decision 
The Supreme Court agreed with the parents. They ruled that the 
term in question, "essentially equivalent," is ambiguous. It was 
pointed out that the term has no comnon law meaning and no established 
meaning. The opinion further stated: 
If the legislature had intended that the qualifications of a 
nonpublic school teacher to be the same as the minimum 
standards for a public school teacher, it would have said 
so. It did not.47 
The court found that the Newstroms had intended to comply with 
the law and believed that Mrs. Newstrom possessed the training and 
experience "essentially equivalent" to that of certified teachers. 
Based on these findings, the Supreme Court overruled the conviction of 
48 
the parents. 
^Minnesota, Minnesota Statutes Annotated, Sec. 120.10C2) 0 984). 
46State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W. 2d. 525 (Minn. 1985). 
47Ibid., p. 528. 
48 State v. Newstrom. 
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Discussion 
Legislators need to be more specific in their requirements for 
teachers in home schools. In order for statutory requirements for 
these teachers to be enforceable they must be written in terms under­
stood by the ordinary citizen. Neither parents who want to offer home 
instruction nor educators who are expected to enforce compulsory 
school attendance laws must have questions about the meaning of the 
statutes. 
State v. Riddle 
285 S.E. 2d. 359 (W. Va. 1981) 
Facts 
Defendants in this case, Bobby E. Riddle and Ethel Riddle, 
appealed their conviction and fine of ten dollars for failing to send 
their children to school. The children had been enrolled in the 
Emmanuel Christian Academy but were withdrawn when the parents, who 
described themselves as "Biblical Christians," became displeased with 
the religious philosophy of the academy. In order "to have their chil­
dren totally indoctrinated and educated in their religious beliefs with 
no smattering of heresy" and to protect them from "the pernicious 
49 influence" of public schools, they chose to educate the children at 
home. Their appeal was based on their charge that the requirement that 
49State v. Riddle, 285 S.E. 2d. 359 (W. Va. 1981); p. 361. 
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50 teachers in home schools must be "qualified to give instruction" was 
51 unconstitutionally vague. 
Decision 
Justice Neely offered the opinion of the West Virginia Supreme 
Court which affirmed the conviction. He declared that the requirement 
for a teacher "qualified to give instruction" was flexible rather than 
vague. The court recognized that the term is open to interpretation 
but pointed out that parents who feel the law is administered in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner can seek to correct the action by a 
52 declaratory judgment or an action in mandamus. 
Discussion 
Parents do not possess the option of ignoring a statutory 
requirement because it is open to interpretation by school officials. 
Fear that a requirement will be interpreted in a way objectionable to 
parents is no defense for noncompliance. 
Burden of Proof 
State v. Moorhead 
308 N.W. 2d. 60 (Iowa 1981) 
Facts 
The facts of this case can be found in this chapter under the 
heading of "Unconstitutionally Vague." 
^^West Virginia, West Virginia Code, Sec. 18-8-1 (1951). 
State v. Riddle. 
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Decision 
The Supreme Court of Iowa overruled the contention of the 
Moorheads that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that their children were not being instructed in compliance with 
the laws of Iowa. It was ruled that the issue of equivalency of 
instruction received "elsewhere" was a defense to the charge of violat­
ing the compulsory attendance law rather than part of the offense. As 
such the burden of proof was on defendants charged with violating the 
statute and not on the state. The parents did not present evidence 
that the instruction of their children was equivalent and by a certi-
53 fied teacher. Therefore, the prior conviction was sustained. 
Discussion 
Parents who choose to educate their children at home will need to 
prove to the courts that their instruction meets the statutory require­
ments established by the state legislature. 
Jerniqan v. State 
412 So. 2d. 1242 (Als Cr. App. 1982) 
Facts 
The main issue of this case was the violation of fundamental 
rights of the parents. For this reason the facts are contained in 
this chapter under the heading of "Fundamental Rights." 
53 
State v. Moorhead. 
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Decision 
The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower court's convic­
tion of the parents who refused to send their children to public 
schools. The court noted that the parents had failed to prove that 
certification of teachers would in any way tend to harm the children's 
salvation or interfere with the religious practices of the family. 
The conclusion of the court was: "The defendants have not demonstrated 
that they can and will continue to provide an equivalent education, and 
54 
it is not incumbent upon the state to verify the same." 
Discussion 
Parents have been put on notice that they must bear the burden 
of proof in cases when they challenge requirements for personnel in 
home schools. Courts will accept home schools as an alternative to 
public schools 1f parents can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
statutory requirements are being met by those who teach in such schools. 
54 
Jernigan v. State, p. 1247. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Home instruction has existed in the United States since colonial 
times when the isolation of families and the scarcity of teachers made 
public education impossible for many children. If parents wanted their 
children to receive an education, the only alternative was for the 
parents to instruct the children at home. The spread of public schools 
and the advent of compulsory school attendance legislation resulted in 
a decline in the number of home schools. The practice of providing 
home instruction never disappeared in America, and even today in some 
sparsely populated areas children are taught at home out of necessity 
rather than by choice. The number of home schools has steadily 
increased in recent years as many parents, for diverse reasons, have 
chosen to remove their children from public schools and to educate them 
in alternative settings, including their own homes. 
The increase in the number of home schools has been accompanied 
by an increase in litigation on the subject. Court cases have been 
heard on a variety of subjects related to home schools. These subjects 
include curriculum, scheduling, public funding, textbooks, reporting 
requirements, and personnel. It is the latter aspect which was chosen 
for this research. 
The purpose of this study was to examine the legal aspects of 
teacher certification in home schools through analysis of statutory 
provisions of the fifty states and judicial decisions arising from these 
statutes. No attempt was made to determine the desirability of certi­
fication of teachers in home schools. Instead, the study examined 
existing statutes, litigious subjects, and court decisions on the 
subject. 
In Chapter I seven key questions on the subject of teacher 
certification in home schools were proposed to guide the research. 
Answers to these questions were sought in books, pamphlets, periodicals 
state statutes, legal decisions, dissertations, and correspondence 
from the chief state school officers in the fifty states. Chapter II 
contained a review of literature on the three related subjects of com­
pulsory school attendance, home schools, and certification of teachers. 
The review identified and introduced some of the major legal issues in 
the area of certification of teachers in home schools. Chapters III, 
IV, and V provided answers to the questions posed in the first chapter 
through an examination of state statutes related to teacher certifica­
tion in home schools, an analysis of judicial decisions on the subject, 
and a discussion of other legal aspects of home school personnel. 
This chapter contains a summary of the findings and recommenda­
tions of the researcher based upon these findings. The answers to ques 
tions posed in the introductory chapter can guide public school 
educators as they come in contact with parents who choose not to send 
their children to public schools and to provide instruction for them in 
the home. 
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Summary 
Nonpublic schools, including home schools, serve a number of 
purposes for parents who do not want to send their children to public 
schools. Among the purposes are the separation of children from 
racial Integration, the protection of students from undesirable influ­
ences in public schools, and an opportunity to teach children according 
to the convictions of the parents. 
The introductory chapter of this study identified the historical 
fact that home schools have existed in the United States since colonial 
times. The latter half of the twentieth century has witnessed a 
revival of interest in alternative ways to meet the statutory require­
ments of compulsory school attendance laws. This renewed desire to 
provide alternatives to public school is a reflection of the changing 
social, political, and moral climate in America. One of the alterna­
tives chosen by many parents is home schools. 
The growing practice of teaching students in the home has come 
into conflict with the desire to ensure competency in classrooms through 
teacher certification. This conflict has resulted in litigation by 
parents and by school officials. This litigation and the resultant 
decisions offer answers to the questions posed in the first chapter of 
this research. 
The first question listed in Chapter I concerned the legal 
status of home schools in the United States. The number of states 
which recognize home schools as an alternative to public schools con­
tinues to grow. In 1985 six states enacted legislation permitting home 
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schools. This brings to forty-one the number of states with such 
statutory provisions. In addition to these forty-one states, home 
instruction is permitted by case law in two states, the attorney 
general of one state has ruled that home schools are permissible under 
existing state laws, and another state has adopted regulations which 
permit instruction in the home. Even though a total of forty-five 
states now permit home schools through statutory action or other means, 
the Supreme Court of the United States has not decided a case on the 
subject. Until that tribunal hears such a case the basic legal ques­
tions related to home schools will be answered by decisions of lower 
courts where the opinions are contradictory and inconclusive. 
The second question posed in the introductory chapter related to 
the practice of requiring certification for teachers in home schools. 
An analysis of statutory requirements for personnel in home instruc­
tional programs reveals that the requirements vary greatly from one 
state to another. Only seven states have statutory requirements for 
certification of all home instructors. These states are Alabama, 
Alaska, California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, and Michigan. Arkansas laws 
require a certificate for teachers of students who have been identified 
as exceptional students but not for other students. Three additional 
states, Florida, Maryland, and Nevada, have requirements that teachers 
in home schools hold a teaching certificate but make provisions for the 
waiver of the requirement if certain other conditions are met. In 
addition to these statutory requirements, Louisiana has a law which 
requires that home schools be supervised by a certified teacher, and 
Washington requires that a certified teacher verify the quality of home 
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school programs in that state. Only one state, South Dakota, has 
specified that teachers in home schools are not required to hold a 
teaching certificate. Six states have laws which specify that home 
school instruction be provided by persons who are "competent" or "quali­
fied." These states are Hawaii, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Dakota, and West Virginia. Five Additional state legislatures have 
established requirements ranging from a high school education to a 
baccalaureate degree. States with these specifications are Arizona, 
Georgia, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Virginia. The remaining twenty-
one states which permit home schools have no statutory requirements for 
instructors in these schools. 
The third question asked the type of certification required for 
teachers of home schools. Five of the eight states which require that 
teachers in home schools be certified simply state that the teachers 
must hold a certificate, with no reference to the type or level of cer­
tificate needed. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, and 
Michigan. Two states, California and Michigan, require that the 
teachers be certified for the grade or subject taught. As stated ear­
lier, Arkansas has a requirement that students identified as excep­
tional students who are taught in home schools must be instructed by a 
teacher certified in special education. Teachers of other students in 
home schools in Arkansas are not required to hold a teaching certificate. 
The fourth question listed in the first chapter was: What have 
been the court decisions on the regulation of teachers in home schools? 
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on a home schooling 
case, and decisions handed down by lower courts have been inconsistent 
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and contradictory. The judiciary has generally concurred that the 
regulation of teachers in home schools is a legitimate function of the 
state legislatures as long as the regulations are reasonable. Courts 
have, as a rule, decided against parents who failed to meet the require­
ments for home school personnel established by state legislation. The 
absence of requirements for home school instructors has traditionally 
been interpreted by the courts as the intent of the legislature to 
permit noncertified persons to conduct such instruction. In these 
instances courts have been inclined to examine the quality of instruc­
tion rather than the credentials of the instructors. 
Question number five sought to identify trends, if any, which are 
discernible from an analysis of state statutes and judicial decisions 
in the area of certification of teachers in home schools. Judging from 
legislation enacted in 1985, it is apparent that the trend is to permit 
home schooling without specifying qualifications for teachers. Legis­
lative bodies appear to be more concerned with the quality of instruc­
tion than with the certififcation of personnel who provide the instruc­
tion. The trend is to require that all nonpublic schools provide 
educational opportunities which are comparable to those offered in 
public schools. To accomplish this purpose, courts look at the quality 
of individual nonpublic schools and judge each one on its merit rather 
than to judge all nonpublic schools as a group. Another trend which is 
evident is for parents to be more imaginative in their challenges to 
statutes requiring certificates for teachers in home schools. Early 
judicial decisions were usually decided on the issue of religious 
freedom while more recent cases have challenged the laws on other 
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grounds. Parents who desire to provide home instruction are deter­
mined to find legal ways to provide it. 
Statutory requirements for certified teachers in home schools 
have been challenged on a variety of grounds. Question number six asked 
what these grounds have been. The objection offered most frequently by 
parents who oppose certification of teachers in home schools is that 
state regulation of instructors who teach in these schools violates the 
religious rights of parents. Since the Yoder decision, an increasing 
number of parents have sought exemptions from state regulation of home 
schools based on the principle of religious freedom set forth in the 
First Amendment to the Constitution. The laws have also been challenged 
on the grounds that they are violative of basic rights such as equal 
protection, due process, trial by jury, and the right to life, privacy, 
and family integrity. The language of the statutes has been challenged 
as being unconstitutionally vague, arbitrary, and capricious. Parents 
have contended that certification does not ensure competency. Argu­
ments have been advanced that, in many cases, noncertified teachers are 
able to offer instruction which is comparable to or superior to that 
offered by those teachers who have submitted themselves to the certifi­
cation process. Opponents of teacher certification have offered 
standardized testing as an alternative method of ensuring quality of 
instruction. 
The final question in the introductory chapter asked how states 
have regulated teachers in home schools other than by requiring certifi­
cation. Two states, Louisiana and Washington, require that home 
instruction programs be monitored by certified teachers. Statutes 
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enacted by the Arizona legislature require that home school teachers 
pass a proficiency examination, and Georgia and Tennessee have statutory 
requirements that such teachers have a high school education or the 
equivalent. Two other states, New Mexico and Virginia require a 
baccalaureate degree for persons offering home instruction. Eight 
states have enacted statutes which address the quality of the educa­
tional programs rather than teacher qualifications. These states are 
Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, New Jersey, Rhode Island, 
and South Carolina. Requirements that teachers in home schools be 
"competent" or "qualified" are found in the laws of Hawaii, New York, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and West Virginia. 
Conclusions 
In seeking answers to the questions posed in the first chapter, 
the researcher reviewed books, pamphlets, periodicals, dissertations, 
and ERIC documents and analyzed statutes and court rulings. The 
research revealed conflicting and contradictory court decisions, 
personal opinions and research findings. However, the following 
general conclusions can be made concerning the legal aspects of certi­
fication of teachers in home schools. 
1. Courts will generally uphold the statutory regulation of 
teachers in home schools as being a legitimate function of 
the state to provide an education for all students. 
2. If statutes regulating teachers in home schools are reason­
able and are not interpreted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner, the challenges to them will be overruled by the 
judiciary. 
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3. State statutes will fare better when challenged by parents 
if the language is specific rather than broad and general. 
4. Courts are becoming more willing to declare language of 
regulatory statutes requiring certification of home school 
teachers unconstitutionally vague if they contain terms such 
as "equivalent," "competent," and "qualified." 
5. The absence of statutes requiring home instructors to be 
certified will probably be interpreted as the intent of the 
legislature to permit noncertified persons to teach in such 
schools as long as they can provide the proper instruction. 
6. Instruction comparable to that available in public schools 
will be considered the minimum requirement for home instruc­
tion programs. 
7. The necessity of teachers being certified for the appropriate 
level of instruction will be required by the judiciary 
especially for older students who need more specialized 
courses. 
8. Attempts by parents to evade certification requirements by 
asserting a First Amendment freedom-of-religion claim will 
not be successful in the courts. 
9. When parents challenge certification requirements because 
they violate their "fundamental rights," parents must be 
able to specify which rights are violated by the require­
ments. 
10. Parents who contend that statutory requirements that home 
teachers possess a certificate violate their rights must be 
prepared to bear the burden of proving such a contention. 
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11. The fallibility of the teaching certificate is recognized 
by the courts. At the same time the judiciary will accept 
certification as an indicator of educational preparation 
and a probability of success in the classroom. 
12. Standardized testing as an alternative to certification to 
ensure competent instruction will be rejected in the court 
room. The rejection will be based on questions of validity 
of such tests and the timing of the testing. 
13. Courts will continue to differ in their opinions of the 
value of the socialization aspects of education which is 
usually absent in home schools. 
14. Lobbyists for home school groups will continue to petition 
state legislatures to relax standards for qualifications for 
home school instructors. 
15. Home school advocates will continue to assist parents who 
challenge requirements that teachers in home schools be 
certified. 
16. Parents will continue to be more imaginative in their 
challenges to home school regulations and will be more 
successful in their fights unless public school officials 
become more knowledgeable of the general statutes, prece­
dent setting court decisons, and procedural due process 
rights of parents. 
17. Local, state, and federal courts will continue to offer con­
flicting decisions until the United States Supreme Court 
hands down a decision on the subject of who can offer 
instruction in home schools. 
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Recommendations 
The purpose of this research was not to determine whether or not 
the certification of teachers in home schools is desirable or bene­
ficial. Instead, the purpose was to arrive at recommendations for 
public school officials who increasingly face the likelihood of having 
to deal with parents who remove children from public schools in favor of 
home instruction. The following guidelines were formulated through an 
analysis of pertinent literature, existing state statutes, and judicial 
decisions. 
Recommendations for School Officials 
1. It is incumbent upon public school officials to be thoroughly 
familiar with the statutory requirements for teachers in home 
schools in their state. They must recognize that the ques­
tion of home schooling is in a period of change. Conse­
quently, public school officials must be aware of any 
statutory changes. 
2. Public school officials must be familiar with court decisions 
on subject of home school personnel, especially decisions 
in their own states. They should be aware of judicial 
rulings in other states and look for trends which may develop 
on the subject. 
3. Before bringing suit against parents who provide home 
instruction, public school officials must be cognizant of 
the procedural due process rights of parents and must honor 
these rights. 
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4. Public school officials must be aware of relevant policies, 
rules, and regulations which have been adopted by state and 
local officials pursuant to statutory provisions for regula­
tion of personnel in home schools. 
5. It is the responsibility of public school officials to 
report suspected violations of all compulsory school atten­
dance laws, including those establishing criteria for 
personnel in home schools. They must also be thoroughly 
familiar with the schools being operated in homes including 
the program offered, schedule, and qualifications of the 
instructors. 
6. Parents who establish schools in their home should be noti­
fied of statutory requirements for personnel in home schools 
as well as other requirements for such schools. 
7. If public school officials challenge parents who offer 
instruction at home, they must be prepared to prove that the 
instruction is not comparable to that available in public 
school. 
8. State legislatures should be petitioned by public school 
administrators to eliminate all ambiguous language from com­
pulsory school attendance laws. The inclusion of such word­
ing opens the door for charges that statutes are unconsti­
tutionally vague. 
9. The enforcement of statutes related to home school personnel 
should be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner in order to 
preclude litigation based on arbitrary or capricious 
application of statutes. 
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10. State legislatures should be encouraged to enact legislation 
specifying requirements for teachers in all schools, both 
public and nonpublic. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
1. This research has been limited to the legal aspects of 
certification of teachers in home schools under existing 
statutes and judicial decisions arising from these statutes. 
Further research should be focused on administrative law in 
this area. Such a study would examine rules, regulations, 
and policies of state departments of education, state and 
local boards of education, and opinions of attorney generals. 
2. With the recent emphasis on effective teaching, there is a 
need for research into the correlation of teacher effective­
ness and teacher certification. Courts recognize the falli­
bility of teacher certification but accept it as the best 
available measure of competency. Research is needed to 
determine if it is the best measure and if not, what other 
measures of competency should be considered. 
3. Personnel is only one component of schooling. Other compo­
nents which comprise the total educational experience include 
methodology, curriculum, materials, and scheduling. Research 
is needed in these areas before decisions are made on the 
effectiveness of home schools. 
4. Research is needed to determine the success of students who 
are educated in home schools. Such a longitudinal study 
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study should evaluate the academic progress, economic 
success, ability to adapt in society, and other areas of 
life. 
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Alabama 
Sec. 16-384. Private School 
A. The term "private school" as used in this chapter, shall mean and 
only include such schools as hold a certificate issued by the state 
superintendent of education, showing that such school conforms to 
the following requirements: 
1. The instruction in such schools shall be by persons holding 
certificates issued by the state superintendent of education; 
2. Instruction shall be offered in the several branches of study 
required to be taught in the public schools of this state; 
3. The English language shall be used in giving instructions; 
4. A register of attendance shall be kept which clearly indicates 
every absence of each child from such school for a half day or 
more during each school day of the school year. 
B. The term church school, as used in this chapter, shall mean and 
only include such schools as offer instruction in grades K-12 or 
any combination thereof including the kindergarten, elementary, or 
secondary level and are operated as a ministry of a local church, 
group of churches, denomination, and/or association of churches on 
a nonprofit basis which do not receive any state or federal funding. 
(School Code 1927, Section 302; Code 1940, T. 52, Section 299.] 
Sec. 16-283. Ages of Children Required to Attend School 
Every child between the ages of seven and 16 years shall be 
required to attend a public school, private school, church school, or 
be instructed by a competent private tutor for the entire length of 
the school term in every scholastic year except that every child 
attending a church school as defined in 16-28-1 is exempt from the 
requirements of this section, provided such child complies with enroll­
ment and reporting procedure specified in Section 16-28-7, Code of 
Alabama 1975. Admission to public school shall be on an individual 
basis on the application of the parents, legal custodian or guardian of 
the child to the local board of education at the beginning of each 
school year, under such rules and regulations as the board may pre­
scribe. (School Code 1927, Section 301; Code 1940, T. 52, Section 297; 
Acts 1956, 2nd Ex. Sess., No. 117, p. 446, Section 3.) 
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Sec. 16-28-5. Private Tutor 
Instruction by a private tutor means and includes only instruc­
tion by a person who holds a certificate issued by the state superin­
tendent of education and who offers instruction in the several branches 
of study required to be taught in the public schools of this state 
• • • • 
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Alaska 
Sec. 14-30-010. When Attendance Compulsory 
A. Every child between seven and 16 years of age shall attend school 
at the public school in the district in which the child resides 
during each school term. Every parent, guardian or other person 
having the responsibility for or control of a child between seven 
and 16 years of age shall insure that the child is not absent 
from attendance. 
B. This section does not apply if a child 
1. is provided an academic education comparable to that offered 
by the public schools in the area, either by 
a. attendance at a private school in which the teachers are 
certificated according to AS 14-20-020; 
b. tutoring by personnel certificated according to AS 14-20-
020; or 
c. attendance at an educational program operated in compli­
ance with AS 14-45-100 - 14-45-140 by a religious or other 
private school; . . . 
2. is equally well-served by an educational experience approved 
by the school board as serving the child hs educational 
interests despite an absence from school, the request for 
excuse is made in writing by the child^s parents or guardian, 
and approved by the principal or administrator of the school 
that the child attends. 
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Arizona 
Sec. 15-802. Compulsory School Attendance: Exceptions: Violation: 
Classification 
A. Every person who has custody of a child between the ages of eight 
and sixteen years shall send the child to a school for the full 
time school is in session within the school district in which the 
child resides, except that is a school is operated on an extended 
school year basis each child shall regularly attend during school 
sessions which total not less than one hundred seventy-five days, 
or the equivalent as approved by the superintendent of public 
instruction, during the school year. 
B. A person is excused from the duty prescribed by subsection A of 
this section if it is shown to the satisfaction of the county 
school superintendent that: 
1. The child is instructed at home by a person passing the reading, 
grammar and mathematics proficiency examination as provided in 
section 15-533 in at least those subjects as reading, grammar, 
mathematics, social studies and science BEFORE OR WITHIN SIX 
MONTHS AFTER BEGINNING HOME INSTRUCTION and the child takes 
the nationally standardized NORM-REFERENCED achievement test 
AS PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 15-741 each year. . . . 
2. The child is attending a regularly organized private school. 
The PERSON WHO HAS CUSTODY of a child attending a private school 
satisfies the condition of this paragraph by filing an affi­
davit with the county school superintendent stating that the 
child 1s attending a school for the full-time that the schools 
of the school district are in session AND THE NAME AND ADDRESS 
OF THE SCHOOL THAT THE CHILD IS ATTENDING. FOR THE PURPOSES 
OF THIS PARAGRAPH, "PRIVATE SCHOOL" MEANS A NONPUBLIC INSTI­
TUTION OTHER THAN THE CHILD'S HOME WHERE INSTRUCTION IS 
IMPAIRED. 
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Arkansas 
Sec. 80-1503.4. Attendance at School or Home School Required for 
Children Aged Seven Through Sixteen - Exceptions 
Every parent, guardian or other person residing within the State 
of Arkansas having custody or charge of any child or children between 
the age of seven [71 through sixteen (16) years, both inclusive, shall 
enroll such child or children in a public, private or parochial school, 
or provide a home school for such child or children as described in 
this Act under such penalty for noncompliance as shall be set by Law. 
Provided, however, this Section shall not be applicable to any child 
who has received a high school diploma or Its equivalent as determined 
by the State Board of Education. 
Sec. 80-1503.5. Home School Defined 
For purposes of this Act, a home school shall be defined as a 
school primarily conducted by parents or legal guardians for their own 
children. 
Sec. 80-1503.6. Prerequisites to Home Schooling 
Parents or guardians desiring to provide a home school for their 
children must comply with the following requirements: 
1. Give written notice to the superintendent of their local 
school district by August 15 before the commencement of 
each school year of their intent to provide a home school 
for their chlld(ren). Such notice must include the name, 
date of birth, grade level and the name and address of the 
school last attended, if any, of each student involved; the 
location of the home school; the basic core curriculum to be 
offered; the proposed schedule of instruction; and, the 
qualifications of the parent/teacher(s). This information 
m a y  b e  u s e d  o n l y  f o r  s t a t i s t i c a l  p u r p o s e s  . . . .  
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Sec. 80-1503.9. Child Needing Special Education Services Enrolled in 
Public, Private or Parochial School - Exception 
Any student who has been identified pursuant to the provisions of 
Public Law 94-142, the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, and 
Act 102 of 1973, as amended, Ark. Stat. Ann. 80-2115, ex. seq., as 
needing special education services shall not be eligible to meet the 
requirements of compulsory attendance by participating in a home school 
program unless the parent/teacher of such child holds a valid certifi­
cation from the State of Arkansas to teach special education courses in 
a publ1c or private school. 
Any student participating In a home school program whose per­
formance on the tests required by this Act indicates the student may 
be 1n need of special education service shall be referred for evalua­
tion in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 94-142 and Act 102 and 
the regulations promulgated thereunder. If such student 1s Identified 
as needing special education service, the student shall be enrolled in 
a public, private or parochial school unless the parent/teacher of such 
student holds a valid certification from the State of Arkansas to 
teach special education in a public, private or parochial school and 
submits procedures for implementing an Individualized Education Plan 
ClEPi which includes specific goals and objectives. 
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California 
Sec. 48200. Children Between Ages of 6 and 16 Years 
Each- person between the ages of 6 and 16 years not exempted 
under the provisions of this chapter is subject to compulsory full-time 
education. Each person subject to compulsory full-time education and 
each person subject to compulsory continuation education not exempted 
under the provisions of Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 48400} of 
this part shall attend the public full-time day school or continuation 
school or classes for the full-time designated as the length of the 
school day by the governing board of the school district in which the 
residency of either the parent or legal guardian is located and each 
parent, guardian, or other person having control or charge of such 
pupil shall send the pupil to the public full-time day school or con­
tinuation school or classes for the full-time designated as the length 
of the school day by the governing board of the school district in 
which the residence of either the parent or legal guardian is located. 
Sec. 48222. Attendance in Private School 
Children who are being instructed in a private full-time day 
school by persons capable of teaching shall be exempted. 
Sec. 48224. Instruction by Tutor 
Children not attending a private, full-time, day school and who 
are being instructed in study and recitation for at least three hours 
a day for 175 days each calendar year by a private tutor or other 
person in the several branches of study required to be taught in the 
public schools of this state and 1n the English language shall be 
exempted. The tutor or other person shall hold a valid state creden­
tial for the grade taught. The instruction shall be offered between 
the hours of 8 o'clock a.m. and 4 o'clock p.m. 
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Colorado 
Sec. 22-33-104. Compulsory School Attendance 
1. Every child who attained the age of seven years and is 
under the age of sixteen years., except as provided by this 
section, shall attend public school for at least one hundred 
seventy-two days during each school year, or for the 
specified number of days in a pilot program which has been 
approved by the state board under section 22-50-103 {2). 
2. The provisions of subsection 01 of this section shall not 
apply to a child: . . . 
b. Mho attends, for the same number of days, an independent 
or parochial school which provides a basic academic 
education comparable to that provided 1n the public 
schools of the state: . . . 
i. Who is being instructed at home by a teacher certified 
pursuant to articles 60 and 61 of this title, or under 
an established system of home study approved by the 
state board. 
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Connecticut 
Sec. 10-184. Duties of Parents 
Each parent or other person having control of a child seven 
years of age and over and under 16 years of age must send such child to 
public school 1n the town In which the child resides unless the parent 
or other such person Is able to show that the child Is elsewhere 
receiving equivalent instruction in the studies taught in the public 
schools. 
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Florida 
Sec. 232.01. Regular School Attendance Required Between Ages of 
6 and 1& 
1. a. All children who have attained the age of 6 years or who 
will have attained the age of 6 years by February 1 of 
any school year or who are older than 6 years of age but 
who have not attained the age of 16 years, except as 
hereinafter provided, are required to attend school 
regularly during the entire school term. 
Sec. 232.02. Regular School Attendance 
Regular attendance is the actual attendance of a pupil during 
the school day as defined by law and regulations of the state board. 
Regular attendance within the intent of Sec. 232.01 may be achieved by 
attendance in at: . . . 
4. A home education program as defined in Sec. 228.041, and 
which is in compliance with Sec. 229.808, provided that at 
least one of the following conditions is met: 
a. The parent holds a valid regular Florida certificate to 
teach the subjects or grades in which instruction is 
given and complies with any other requirements prescribed 
by law or rules of the state board; or 
b. The parent does not hold a valid regular Florida cer­
tificate to teach and complies with the following 
requirements: 
0) Notifies the superintendent of schools of the county 
in which the parent resides of his intent to estab­
lish and maintain a home education program. The 
notice shall be in writing, signed by the parent, and 
shall include the names, addresses, and birthdates 
of all children who shall be enrolled as students in 
the home education program. The notice shall be 
filed in the superintendent's office within 30 days 
of the establishment of the home education program. 
A written notice of termination of the home educa­
tion program shall be filed in the superintendent's 
office within 30 days of said termination. 
(2) Maintains a portfolio of records and materials. The 
portfolio shall consist of a log, made contempo­
raneously with the instruction, which designates by 
title the reading materials used, and samples of any 
173 
writings, worksheets, workbooks, and creative 
materials used or developed by the student. The 
portfolio shall be preserved by the parent for two 
years and shall be made available for Inspection by 
the superintendent, or his agent, upon 15 days 
written notice. 
(3) Provides for an annual educational evaluation 1n 
which is documented the pupil's demonstration of 
educational progress at a level commensurate with 
his or her ability. A copy of the evaluation shall 
be filed annually with the district school board 
office in the county in which the pupil resides. 
The annual educational evaluation shall consist of 
one of the following: 
(al A teacher selected by the parent shall evaluate 
the pupil*s educational progress upon review of 
the portfolio and discussion with the pupil. 
Such teacher shall hold a valid regular Florida 
certificate to teach academic subjects at the 
elementary or secondary level. The teacher shall 
submit a written evaluation to the school 
superintendent; 
Cb) The pupil shall take any nationally normed 
student achievement test used by the district 
and administered by a certified teacher. Such 
test results shall be reported to the school 
superintendent; 
(c) The pupil shall take a state student assessment 
test. Such test results shall be reported to 
the school superintendent; 
Cd) The pupil shall be evaluated by an individual 
holding a valid, active license pursuant to the 
provisions of Sec. 490.003C3J or (7). Such 
results shall be reported to the school 
superintendent; or 
(e) The pupil shall be evaluated with any other valid 
measurement tool as mutually agreed upon by the 
school superintendent of the district in which 
the pupil resides and the pupil's parent or 
guardian. Such results shall be reported to the 
superintendent. 
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Georgia 
Sec. 20-2-690. Educational Entities Listed; Requirements for Private 
Schools and Home Study Programs 
a. This subpart recognizes the existence of public schools, 
private schools, and home study programs as educational 
e n t i t i e s .  . . .  
c. Parents or guardians may teach their children at home in a 
home study program which meets the following requirements: 
• • • 
3. Parents or guardians may teach only their own children in the home 
study program provided the teaching parent or guardian possesses 
at least a high school diploma or the equivalent GED certificate, 
but the parents or guardians may employ a tutor who holds at 
least a baccalaureate college degree to teach such children; . . . 
Sec. 20-2-690.1. Mandatory Education for Children Between Ages 7 and 
16 
a. Every parent, guardian, or other person residing within this 
state having control or charge of any child or children 
between their seventh and sixteenth birthdays shall enroll and 
send such child or children to a public school, a private 
school, or a home study program that meets the requirements 
for a public school, a private school, or a home study program; 
and such child shall be responsible for enrolling in and 
attending a public school, a private school, or a home study 
program that meets the requirements for a public school, a 
private school, or a home study program under such penalty for 
noncompliance with this subsection as is provided 1n Chapter II 
of Title 15, unless the child's failure to enroll and attend 
1s caused by the child's parent, guardian, or other person, 1n 
which case the parent, guardian, or other person alone shall 
be responsible; provided, however, that tests and physical exams 
for military service and the National Guard and such other 
approved absences shall be excused absences. . . . 
c. Local school superintendents in the case of private schools or 
home study programs and visiting teachers and attendance 
officers in the case of public schools shall have authority and 
it shall be their duty to file proceedings in court to enforce 
this subpart. 
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Hawaii 
Sec. 298-9. Attendance Compulsory; Exceptions 
Unless excluded from school or excepted from attendance, all 
children who will have arrived at the age of at least six years, and 
who will not have arrived at the age of eighteen years, on or before 
December 31 of any school year, shall attend either a public or private 
school for and during such school year, and any parent, guardian, and 
another person having the responsibility for or care of a child whose 
attendance at school is obligatory shall send the child to some such 
school. Such attendance shall not be compulsory in the following 
c a s e s :  . . .  
2. Where a competent person Is employed as a tutor 1n the 
family wherein the child resides and proper Instruction is 
t h e r e b y  i m p a r t e d  a s  a p p r o v e d  b y  t h e  s u p e r i n t e n d e n t  . . . .  
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Idaho 
Sec. 33-202. School Attendance Compulsory 
The parent or guardian of any child resident in this state who 
has attained the age of seven (7) years at the time of the commencement 
of school 1n his district, but not the age of sixteen (16) years, shall 
cause the child to be instructed in subjects commonly and usually 
taught in the public schools of the state of Idaho. Unless the child 
is otherwise comparably instructed, as may be determined by the board of 
trustees of the school district in which the child resides, the parent 
or guardian shall cause the child to attend a public, private or 
parochial school during a period in each year equal to that in which 
the public schools are in session; there to conform to the attendance 
policies and regulations established by the board of trustees, or other 
governing body, operating the school attended. 
Sec. 33-1201. Certificate Required 
Every person who is employed to serve in any elementary or 
secondary school in the capacity of teacher, supervisor, administrator, 
education specialist, school nurse or school librarian shall be 
requried to have and to hold a certificate Issued under authority of 
the state board of education, valid for the service being rendered; 
except that the state board of education may authorize endorsement for 
use in Idaho, for not more than five (5) years, certificates valid 1n 
other states when the qualifications therefore are not lower than those 
required for an Idaho certificate. 
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Indiana 
Sec. 20-8.1-3-17 (28-5321). Compulsory Attendance 
Subject to the specific exceptions under this chapter each 
child shall attend either a public school which the child is entitled 
to attend under IC 20-8.1-6.1 or some other school which is taught in 
the English language. A child is bound by the requirements of this 
chapter from the earlier of the date on which he officially enrolls in 
a school or he reaches the age of seven (7), until the date on which 
he reaches the age of sixteen 061. A child less than seven (7} years 
of age who is withdrawn from school is not subject to the requirements 
of this chapter until he is re-enrolled or reaches age seven (7). 
Sec. 20-8.1-3-34 (28-5338). Compulsory Attendance for Full Term 
It is unlawful for a parent to fail, neglect or refuse to send 
his child to a public school for the full term as required under this 
chapter unless the child is being provided with instruction equivalent 
t o  t h a t  g i v e n  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  s c h o o l s  . . . .  
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Iowa 
Sec. 299.1. Attendance Requirement 
Any person having control of any child over seven and under 
sixteen years of age, in proper physical and mental condition to attend 
school, shall cause said child to attend some public or private school 
for at least 120 days in each school year, commencing with the first 
week of school after the first day of September, unless the board of 
school directors shall determine upon a later date, which date shall 
not be later than the first Monday in December. 
The board may, by resolution, require attendance for the entire 
time when the schools are in session in any school year. 
In lieu of such attendance such child may attend upon equivalent 
instruction by a certified teacher elsewhere than at school. 
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Kansas 
Sec. 72-1111. Compulsory School Attendance; Exceptions 
Subject to the other provisions of this section, every parent 
or person acting as parent in the state of Kansas, who has control over 
or charge of any child who has reached the age of seven years and is 
under the age of 16 years, shall require such child to attend continu­
ously each school year 0) a public school for the duration of the 
school term provided for in K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 72-1106, and amendments 
thereto, or (2) a private, denominational or parochial school taught 
by a competent Instructor for a period of time which is substantially 
equivalent to the period of time public school is maintained in the 
school district in which the private, denominational or parochial school 
is located. 
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Kentucky 
Sec. 159.010. Parent or Custodian to Send Child to School-Age Limits 
for Compulsory Attendance. Written Permission for 
Withdrawal Before Eighteenth Birthday. 
1. Except as aprovided in KRS 159.030, each parent, guardian or other 
person residing in the state and having in custody or charge any 
child between the ages of six (6) and sixteen (16] shall send the 
child to a regular public day school for the full term that the 
public school of the district 1n which the child resides is in 
session, or to the public school that the board of education of 
the district makes provision for the child to attend. A child's 
age Is between six (6) and sixteen (16) when the child has reached 
his sixth birthday and has not passed his sixteenth birthday. 
Sec. 159.030. Exemptions from Compulsory Attendance 
1. The board of education of the district in which the child resides 
shall exempt from the requirement of attendance upon a regular 
public day school every child of compulsory school age: . . . 
b. Who is enrolled and in regular attendance in a private, 
parochial, or church regular day school. It shall be the duty 
of each private, parochial or church regular day school to 
notify the local board of education of those students 1n 
attendance at the school. If a school declines, for any 
reason, to notify the local board of education of those 
students in attendance, it shall so notify each student's 
parent or legal guardian in writing, and 1t shall then be the 
duty of the parent or legal guardian to give proper notice to 
the local board of education; or . . . 
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Louisiana 
Title 17, Sec. 221. Age of Compulsory Attendance; Duty of Parents 
Every parent, tutor, or other person residing within the state 
of Louisiana, having control or charge of any child between the ages of 
seven and fifteen, both inclusive, i.e., from the seventh to the six­
teenth birthday, shall send such child to a public or private day 
school provided that any child below the age of seven who legally 
enrolls in school shall also be subject to the provisions of this Sub­
part shall also assure the attendance of such child 1n regularly 
assigned classes during regular school hours established by the school 
b o a r d .  . . .  
Title 17, Sec. 236. Definition of a School 
. . . Solely for purposes of compulsory attendance in a non­
public school, a child who participates in a home study program 
approved by the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education shall be 
considered in attendance at a day school; a home study program shall 
be approved if it offers a sustained curriculum of a quality at least 
equal to that offered by public schools at the same grade level. 
Title 17, Sec. 236.1. Approval of Home Study Programs 
C. 1. After the 1984-1985 school year, a renewal application for 
participation in a home study program shall be approved if the 
parent submits to the board satisfactory evidence that the pro­
gram has in fact offered a sustained curriculum of quality at 
least equal to that offered by public schools at the same 
g r a d e  1 e v e l .  . . .  
3. A statement from a teacher certified to teach at the child's 
grade level that the teacher has examined the program being 
offered and that in his professional opinion, the child is 
being taught in accordance with a sustained curriculum of 
quality at least equal to that offered by public schools at 
the same grade level or, in the case of children with mental 
or physical disabilities, at least equal to that offered by -
public schools to children with similar disabilities. Any such 
teacher evaluation provided for 1n this Subsection shall be 
subject to review and approval of the State Board of Education. 
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Maine 
Title 20-At Sec. 5001. Compulsory Attendance 
The following provisions apply to compulsory attendance. 
1. Requirement. Persons 7 years of age or older and under 17 
years shall attend a public school during its regular 
annual session. . . . 
2. Equivalent instruction 1s as follows: 
1. A child shall be excused from attending a public day 
school if he obtains equivalent Instruction In a 
private school or in any other manner arranged for by 
the school committee dr the board of directors and if 
the equivalent instruction is approved by the 
commissioner; . . . 
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Maryland 
Sec. 7-301 Compulsory Attendance 
Who must attend.—Each child who resides In this State and 1s 
6 years old or older and under 16 shall attend a public school regu­
larly during the entire school year unless the child Is otherwise 
receiving regular, thorough instruction during the school year In the 
studies usually taught In the public schools to children of the same 
age. 
Sec. 13A-10.01. Home Instruction: General Regulations 
B. Requirements. The home instructional programs shall: 
01 Include regular, thorough and comparable instruction of 
those subjects usually taught in public schools to 
children of the same age; . . . 
Sec. 13A-10.02. Teacher Qualification 
A. The teacher of the home Instructional program 1s that individual 
providing regular, daily instruction to the child. 
B. Each teacher shall qualify according to one of the following 
requirements: 
CU Meet full certification requirements of the State 
Department of Education for the subject concerned; . . . 
(2) Be a graduate of an accredited.col lege, with sufficient 
academic background 1n the subjects and areas being taught 
to the child and in the judgment of the local superinten­
dent of schools, have sufficient academic training to 
ensure competency in the subjects specified. 
C. Waiver. Upon application to the local superintend of schools 
by the parents or guardian, the requirements for teachers may 
be waived 1f justified by reason of the person*s excellence in 
previous teaching or occupational experience, special prepara­
tion, or other acceptable qualifications. The application for 
a waiver shall be made in writing and shall include documenta­
tion to support the request. 
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Massachusetts 
Chapter 76, Sec. 1. School Attendance Regulated 
Every child between the minimum and maximum ages established for 
school attendance by the board of education, except a child between 
fourteen and sixteen who meets the requirements for the completion of 
the sixth grade of the public school as established by said board and 
who holds a permit for employment in private domestic service or 
service on a farm, under section eighty-six of chapter one hundred and 
forty-nine, and 1s regularly employed thereunder for at least six hours 
per day, or a child between fourteen and sixteen who meets said require­
ments and has the written permission of the superintendent of schools 
of the town where he resides to engage in non-wage-earning employment 
at home, or a child over fourteen who holds a permit for employment 1n 
a cooperating employment, as provided in said section eighty-six, shall, 
subject to section fifteen, attend a public day school in said town, or 
some other day school approved by the school committee, during the 
number of days required by the board of education in each school year, 
unless the child attends school in another town, for said number of 
days, under sections six to twelve, inclusive, or attends an experi­
mental school project established under an experimental school plan, 
as provided in section one G of chapter fifteen, but such attendance 
shall not be required of a child whose physical or mental condition is 
such as to render attendance inexpedient or Impracticable subject to 
the provisions of section three of chapter seventy-one B or of a child 
granted an employment permit by the superintendent of schools when such 
superintendent determines that the welfare of such child will be 
better served through the granting of such permit, or of a child who is 
being otherwise instructed in a manner approved in advance by the 
superintendent or the school committee. 
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Michigan 
Sec. 15.41561. Compulsory Education. Sec. 1561 
Except as approvided in subsections (2} and C3), every parent, 
guardian, or other person in this state having control and charge of 
a child from the age of 6 to the child's sixteenth birthday, shall 
send that child to the public schools during the entire school year 
• • • 
Children not required to attend school. 
A child shall not be required to attend the public schools 1n 
the following cases: 
( a j  A  c h i l d  w h o  i s  a t t e n d i n g  r e g u l a r l y  a n d  i s  b e i n g  t a u g h t  1 n  a  
state approved nonpublic school, which teaches subjects 
comparable to those taught in the public schools to children 
of corresponding age and grade, as determined by the course 
of study for the public schools of the district within 
which the nonpublic school is located . . . 
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Minnesota 
Sec. 120.10. Compulsory Attendance 
Subdivision 1. Ages and term. Every child between seven and 
16 years of age shall attend a public school, or a private school, 
during the entire time that the school 1s in session during any school 
year. No child shall be required to attend a public school more than 
200 days or their equivalent, during any school year. 
Subd. 2. School. A school, to satisfy the requirements of 
compulsory attendance, must be one: (1) 1n which all the common 
branches are taught in the English language, from textbooks written 1n 
the English language, and taught by teachers whose qualifications are 
essentially equivalent to the minimum statndards for public school 
teachers of the same grades or subjects and (2) which is 1n session 
each school year for at least 175 days or their equivalent; provided 
that in a program of instruction for children of limited English pro­
ficiency, instruction and textbooks may be 1n the primary language of 
the children of limited English proficiency enrolled therein. Any 
other language may be taught as provided in section 126.07. As used in 
this subdivision, the terms "children of limited English proficiency" 
and "primary language" shall have the meanings ascribed to them 1n 
section 126.262. 
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Mississippi 
Sec. 37-13-91. Compulsory School Attendance 
1. This section shall be referred to as the "Mississippi Compulsory 
School Attendance Law." 
2. The following terms as used in this section are defined as follows: 
i. "Nonpublic school" for the purposes of this section shall mean 
an Institution for the teaching of children, consisting of a 
physical plant, whether owned or leased, Including a home, 
instructional staff members and students, and which is in 
session each year. This definition shall Include, but not be 
limited to, Private, church, parochial and home Instruction 
programs. . . . 
3. A parent, guardian or custodian of a compulsory-school-age child 
in this state shall cause such child to enroll in and attend a 
public school or legitimate nonpublic school for the period of 
time that such child is of compulsory school age, except under the 
following circumstances: . . . 
c. When a compulsory-school-age child is being educated 1n a 
legitimate home instruction program. . . . 
9. Notwithstanding any provision or Implication herein to the contrary, 
1t is not the intention of this section to impair the primary 
right and the obligation of the parent or parents, or person or 
persons in loco parentis to a child, to choose the proper education 
and training for such child, and nothing in this section shall 
ever be construed to grant, by implication or otherwise, to the 
State of Mississippi, any of its officers, agencies or subdivi­
sions any right or authority to control, manage, supervise or make 
any suggestion as to the control, management or supervision of any 
private or parochial school or institution for the education or 
training of children, of any kind whatsoever that is not a public 
school according to the laws of this state; and this section shall 
never be construed so as to grant, by Implication or otherwise, any 
right or authority to any state agency or other entity to control, 
manage, supervise, provide for or affect the operation, management, 
program, curriculum, admissions policy or discipline of any such 
school or home instruction program. 
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Missouri 
Sec. 167.031. School Attendance Compulsory, Who May be Excused 
" . . .  E v e r y  p a r e n t ,  g u a r d i a n  o r  o t h e r  p e r s o n  i n  t h i s  s t a t e  
having charge, control or custody of a child between the ages of seven 
and sixteen years shall cause the child to attend regularly some day 
school, public, private, parochial or parish, not less than the entire 
school term of the school which the child attends or shall provide the 
child at home with regular dally Instructions during the usual school 
hours which shall, in the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, 
be at least substantially equivalent to the instruction given children 
of like age 1n the day schools in the locality in which the child 
resides . . . ." 
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Montana 
Sec. 20-5-102. Compulsory Enrollment and Excuses 
1. Except as aprovlded 1n subsection (2), any parent, guardian, or 
other person who is responsible for the care of any child who is 
7 years of age or older prior to the first day of school in any 
school fiscal year shall cause the child to be Instructed In the 
program prescribed by the board of public education pursuant to 
20-7-111 until the later of the following dates: 
a. the child's 16th birthday; 
b. the date of completion of the work of the 8th grade; . . . 
2. Such parent, guardian, or other person shall enroll the child in 
the school assigned by the trustees of the district within the 
first week of the school term or when he established residence in 
t h e  d i s t r i c t  u n l e s s  t h e  c h i l d  i s :  
a. enrolled in a school of another district or state under any of 
the tuition provisions of this title; 
b. provided with supervised correspondence study or supervised 
home study under the transportation provisions of this title; 
f. enrolled in a nonpublic or home school that complies with the 
provisions of 20-5-109. For the purposes of this subsection 
Cfl, a home school is the instruction by a parent of his child, 
stepchild, or ward in his residence and a nonpublic school 
includes a parochial, church, religious, or private school 
Sec. 20-5-109. Nonpublic School Requirements for Compulsory Enrollment 
Exemption 
To qualify its students for exemption from compulsory enrollment 
under 20-5-102, a nonpublic or home school shall: . . . 
4. provide an organized course of study that includes instruc­
tion in the subjects required of public schools as a basic 
instructional program pursuant to 20-7-111; and 
5. in the case of home schools, notify the county superintendent 
of schools of the student's attendance at the school. 
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Nevada 
Sec. 392.040. Child Between 7 and 17 Years of Age: Attendance 1n 
Public School 
1. Except as otherwise provided by law, each parent, guardian, or 
other person 1n the State of Nevada having control or charge of 
any child between the ages of 7 and 17 years shall send such child 
to a public school during all the time such public school is in 
session in the school district in which such child resides . . . 
Sec. 292.2. Compulsory Attendance Exceptions 
A child must be excused from compulsory attendance at public 
school when the request to the board of trustees of the county school 
district provides information that the child will receive equivalent 
instruction and be instructed: 
1. By a teacher, other than the parent, who possesses a teach­
ing certificate issued by the superintendent of public 
instruction for the grade level to be taught; 
2. By the parent, when the parent qualifies for a teaching 
certificate for the grade level to be taught; or 
3. By the parent, in consultation with a person who possesses a 
teaching certificate issued by the superintendent of public 
instruction for the grade level to be taught. "Consultation" 
means: 
a. Participation by the certificated person in the 
planning of the educational plan for the child; 
b. Participation by the certificated person in the develop­
ment or review of the subjects to be taught on each 
day of teaching; and 
c. Consultation with the parent about any learning 
problems which may occur. 
4. By the parent when the child 1s enrolled in an approved 
correspondence program. An "approved correspondence program" 
means a program provided by: 
a. A member of a national or regional accrediting associa­
tion recognized by the United States Secretary of 
Education, and that is accredited for elementary or 
secondary education. 
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b. A public school in Nevada offering correspondence study 
at the elementary or secondary level, or both; or 
c. A private correspondence school licensed by the state 
board of education under the provisions of chapter 394 
of NRS. 
Sec. 3. 
1. To constitute equivalent instruction, the instruction to be 
given a child outside the public schools must Include 
instruction in the courses of study prescribed by the state 
board of education pursuant to NRS 385.110. 
2. The minimum period of instruction which must be provided to 
the child on each day of instruction is the appropriate 
period specified in NAC 387.110. 
Sec. 4. 
In the case of a child receiving the equivalent instruction 
described in subsection 3 of section 2, at least 25 hours of consulta­
tion must take place during the instructional year between the parent 
and the person possessing a teaching certificate, who must maintain a 
log including the date and time of each consultation and time educa­
tional activities performed. . . . 
Sec. 6. 
1. The request to have a child excused from compulsory attendf 
ance at public school on the ground that the child will be 
given equivalent Instruction outside the school must include: 
• • • 
c. Evidence that: 
(1) The teacher, when he is other than the parent, has a 
teaching certificate issued by the superintendent 
of public Instruction for the grade level to be 
taught; 
C2) The parent qualifies for a teaching certificate for 
the grade level to be taught; 
(3) The consultant has a teaching certificate issued by 
the superintendent of public instruction for the 
grade level to be taught; 
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(4} The child 1s enrolled 1n an approved correspondence 
program; or 
(5) The parent has received a waiver under section 8 of 
this regulation. 
2. For grades 9 through 12, Inclusive, the consultant, teacher 
or parent must have a secondary certificate with an 
endorsement in at least one of the following: English, 
language arts, mathematics, social studies, or any of the 
physical or natural sciences. For grades 1 through 8, 
inclusive, the consultant, teacher or parent must have an 
endorsement in elementary education. 
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New Jersey 
Sec. 18A:38-25. Attendance Required of Children Between Six and 16; 
Exceptions 
Every parent, guardian or other person having custody and control 
of a child between the ages of six and 16 years shall cause such child 
regularly to attend the public schools of the district or a day school 
In which there is given instruction equivalent to that provided In 
the public schools for children of similar grades and attainments or 
to receive equivalent instruction elsewhere than at school. 
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New Mexico 
Sec. 22-1-2. Definitions as Used In the Public School Code 
U. "Home school" means the operation by a parent, guardian or other 
person having custody of a school-age person of a home study 
program which provides a basic academic educational program 
including but not limited to reading, language arts, mathematics, 
social studies and science." 
Sec. 22-1-2.1. Home School Requirements 
Any person operating or intending to operate a home school shall: 
C. Provide instruction by a person possessing at least a 
baccalaureate degree, which requirement may be waived by the 
state superintendent upon a determination that such waiver 
is in the child's best interest; . . . 
Y. Upon finding that a home school is not in compliance with 
law, the state board shall have authority to order that a 
student attend a public school or a private school. 
Sec. 22-12-2. Compulsory School Attendance - Responsibility 
A. Any qualified student and any person who because of his (or 
her) age 1s eligible to become a qualified student as 
defined by the Public School Finance Act until attaining the 
age of majority shall attend a public school, a private 
school, a home school or a state institution. 
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New York 
3204. Instruction Required 
1. Place of instruction. A minor required to attend upon 
instruction by the provisions of part one of this article may 
attend at a public school or elsewhere. The requirements of 
this section shall apply to such a minor, irrespective of the 
place of instruction. 
2. Quality and language of Instruction; textbooks. Instruction 
m a y  b e  g i v e n  o n l y  b y  a  c o m p e t e n t  t e a c h e r  . . . .  
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Ohio 
Sec. 3321.04. Compulsory Attendance 
Every parent of any child of compulsory school age who is not 
employed under an age and schooling certificate must send such child to 
a school or a special education program that conforms to the minimum 
standards prescribed by the state board of education, for the full time 
the school or program attended is in session, which shall not be for 
less than thirty-two weeks per school year. Such attendance must begin 
withtn the first week of the school term or program or within one week 
of the date on which the child begins to reside in the district or 
withtn one week after his withdrawal from employment 
A. The superintendent of schools of the city, exempted village, or 
county school district in which the child resides may excuse 
htm from attendance for any part of the remainder of the current 
school year upon satisfactory showing of either of the follow­
ing facts: . . . 
2. That he is being instructed at home by a person qualified to teach 
the branches in which instruction is required, and such additional 
branches, as the advancement and needs of the child may, in the 
opinion of such superintendent, require. In each such case the 
issuing superintendent shall file in his office, with a copy of the 
excuse, papers showing how the inability of the child to attend 
school or a special education program or the qualifications of the 
person instructing the child at home were determined. All such 
excuses shall become void and subject to recall upon the removal 
of the disability of the child or the cessation of proper home 
instruction; and thereupon the child or his parents may be pro­
ceeded against after due notice whether such excuse be recalled or 
not . . . 
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Oklahoma 
Title 70, Sec. 10-105. Neglect or Refusal to Compel Child to Attend 
School 
It shall be unlawful for a parent, guardian, custodian or other 
person having control of a child who is over the age of seven (7) 
years and under the age of eighteen (18) years, and who has not finished 
four (4} years of high school work, to neglect or refuse to cause or 
compel such child to attend and comply with the rules of some public, 
private or other school, unless other means of education are provided 
for the full term the schools of the district are in session; and 1t 
shall be unlawful for any child who is over the age of sixteen (16) 
years and under the age of eighteen (18) years, and who has not finished 
four (4). years of high school work, to neglect or refuse to attend and 
comply with the rules of some public, private or other school, or 
receive an education by other means for the full term the schools of 
t h e  d i s t r i c t  a r e  i n  s e s s i o n  . . .  
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Oregon 
Sec. 339.010. School Attendance Required; Age Limits 
Except as provided in ORS 339.030, all children between the ages 
of 7 and 18 years who have not completed the 12th grade are required to 
attend regularly a public full-time school of the school district in 
which the child resides. 
Sec. 339.020. Duty to Send Children to School 
Except as provided in ORS 339.030, every person having control 
of any child between the ages of 7 and 18 years who has not completed the 
12 grade is required to send such child to and maintain such child in 
regular attendance at a public full-time school during the entire school 
term. 
Sec. 339.030. Exemptions From Compulsory School Attendance 
In the following cases, children shall not be required to attend 
public full-time schools: . . . 
2. Children being taught in a private or parochial school in the 
courses of study usually taught in grades 1 through 12 in 
the public schools and in attendance for a period equivalent 
to that required of children attending public schools. 
6. Children being taught for a period equivalent to that 
required of children attending public schools by a parent or 
private teacher the courses of study usually taught in 
grades 1 through 12 in the public school. 
a. Before the children are taught by a parent or private 
teacher, the parent or teacher must receive written 
permission from the executive officer of the resident 
school district. The permission shall not extend beyond 
the end of the school year in which permission is 
granted. If permission is not granted, the person 
having legal custody of the children may appeal the 
decision to the school board of the resident district. 
b. Children being taught by a parent or private teacher 
must be examined in the work covered. Such examinations 
shall be prepared by the State Board of Education and 
provided to school districts upon request. If the 
executive officer of the administrative office deter­
mines after examination that the children are not being 
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taught properly, he shall order the person having control 
of the children to send them to school for the 
remainder of the school year . . . 
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Pennsylvania 
Sec. 1327. Compulsory School Attendance 
Every child of compulsory school age having a legal residence 1n 
this Commonwealth, as provided In this article, and every migratory 
child of compulsory school age, is required to attend a day school In 
which the subjects and activities prescribed by the standards of the 
State Board of Education are taught in the English language. . . . 
Such parent, guardian, or other person having control or charge 
of any child or children, fifteen to sixteen years of age, In accor­
dance with the provisions of this act, may send such child or children 
to a private trade school or private business school licensed by the 
Department of Public Instruction, or to a trade or business school, 
or department operated by a local school district or districts. Such 
modified program offered 1n a public school must meet the standards 
prescribed by the State Board of Education or the State Board for 
V o c a t i o n a l  E d u c a t i o n .  . . .  
Regular daily instruction in the English language, for the time 
herein required, by a properly qualified private tutor, shall be con­
sidered as complying with the provisions of this section, if such 
instruction is satisfactory to the proper district superintendent of 
schools. 
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Rhode Island 
Sec. 16-19-1. Attendance Required - Excuses for Nonattendance 
Every child who has completed seven (71 years of life and has 
not completed sixteen Cl6l years of life shall regularly attend some 
public day school during all the days and hours that the public schools 
are In session 1n the city or town wherein the child resides; and 
every person having under his control a child as above described in this 
section shall cause such child to attend school as required by the above 
stated provisions of this section, and for every neglect of such duty 
the person having control of such child shall be fined not exceeding 
fifty dollars C$50,001 for each day or part of a day that the child 
fails to attend school, and if the total of such days is more than 
thirty (30) school days during any school year, then such person shall 
upon conviction, be imprisoned not exceeding six (61 months or shall be 
fined not more than five hundred dollars ($5001 or both. Provided, that 
if the person so charged shall prove that the child has attended for 
the required period of time a private day school approved by the 
commissioner of education pursuant to Sec. 16-60-6 subsection (10), or 
a course of at-home instruction approved by the school corimittee of 
the town wherein the child resides . . . 
Sec. 16-19-2. Approval of Private Schools - Requirements - Review 
For the purposes of this chapter a private school, or at-home 
instruction, shall be approved, only when it complies with the follow­
ing requirements, namely: That the period of attendance of the pupils 
in such school or in such home instruction is substantially equal to 
that required by law in public schools; that registers are kept and 
returns to the school committee, the superintendent of schools, truant 
officers and the department of education in relation to the attendance 
of pupils, are made the same as by the public schools; that reading, 
writing, geography, arithmetic, the history of the United States, the 
history of Rhode Island, and the principles of American government 
shall be taught in the English language substantially to the same 
extent as such subjects are required to be taught in the public schools, 
and that the teaching of the English language and of other subjects 
indicated herein shall be thorough and efficient . . . 
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South Carolina 
Sec. 59-65-10. Responsibility of Parent or Guardian 
All parents or guardians shall cause their children or wards 
who are 1n the age group of seven to sixteen years, inclusive, to 
regularly'attend a public or private school of this State which has 
been approved by the State Board of Education or a member school of the 
South Carolina Independent Schools' Association or some similar organi­
zation, or a parochial or denominational school, or other programs 
which have been approved by the State Board of Education. 
Sec. 59-65-40. Instruction at Place Other than School 
Instruction during the school term at a place other than a 
school may be substituted for school attendance; provided, such instruc­
tion is approved by the State Board of Education as substantially 
equivalent to instruction given to children of like ages in the public 
or private schools where such children reside. 
2Q3 
South Dakota 
Sec. 13-27-1. Responsibility of Person Controlling Child - Ages of 
Compulsory Attendance—Entire School Term 
Every person having under his control a child of the age of 
seven years and not exceeding the age of sixteen years, shall annually 
cause such child to regularly attend some public or nonpublic elemen­
tary school for the entire term during which the public school in the 
district in which such person resides or the school to which such child 
is assigned to attend, is in session, until the child shall have com­
pleted the first eight grades, or shall have reached the age of 
sixteen years, unless excused as hereinafter provided. 
Any child under age seven enrolled 1n any elementary school 
shall be subject to the compulsory attendance statutes of this state. 
Sec. 13-27-3. Child Excused if Provided Competent Instruction-
Application - Restrictions - Testing - Visitation 
A child shall be excused from school attendance, pursuant to 
Sec. 13-27-2, because the child is otherwise provided with competent 
alternative instruction for an equivalent period of time, as in the 
public schools, in the basic skills of language arts and mathematics. 
The parent or guardian of the child shall identify in the application 
the place where the child shall be instructed and the individual or 
individuals who will instruct the child. The individuals are not 
required to be certified but the state superintendent of elementary 
and secondary education may investigate and determine if the Instruc­
tion is being provided by a competent, person. Failure to provide 
instruction by a competent person shall be grounds for the school 
board, upon thirty days notice, to revoke the excuse from school 
attendance. No Individual may instruct more than twenty-two children. 
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Tennessee 
Sec. 49-6-3001. School Age 
c. (1) Every parent, guardian or other person residing 
within the State of Tennessee, having control or charge 
of any child or children between the ages of seven 
C7) and sixteen (.161 years, both inclusive, shall 
cause such child or children to attend public or 
nonpublic school, and in event of failure to do so, 
shall be subject to the penalties hereinafter pro­
v i d e d .  . . .  
(8l "Non-public school" means a church related school, a 
private school, or a home school. A "church related 
school" is a school as defined in Tennessee Code 
Annotated, Section 49-50-801, or affiliated with 
Accelerated Christian Education, Inc. A "private 
s c h o o l "  i s  a  s c h o o l  a c c r e d i t e d  b y ,  o r  a  m e m b e r  o f ,  a n  
organization or association approved by the State 
Board of Education as an organization accrediting or 
setting academic requirements in schools, or which has 
been approved by the state, or is in the future 
approved by the Commissioner of Education in accord­
ance with rules promulgated by the State Board of 
Education. A "home school" is a school defined in 
Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 49-6-3050. 
Sec. 49.^6-3050. Home Schools 
a. A "home school" is a school conducted by parent(s) or legal 
guardian(s) for their own children. In the case of special 
needs courses, such as laboratory sciences, vocational 
education, special education, etc., premises approved by 
the local superintendent of education may be used. Public 
school facilities may be used by home school participants 
with the approval of the local superintendent, but this 
permissive authority shall not be construed to confer any 
right upon such participants to use public school facili­
ties. If approved, such use shall be in accordance with 
rules established by the local board of education. 
b. A parent-teacher conducting a home school must comply with 
the following requirements: 
(1) Notice to the local superintendent by August 1st 
before the commencement of each school year of his or 
her intent to conduct a "home school" and, for the 
205 
purpose of reporting only, submit the name, number, 
age, and grade level of children Involved, the loca­
tion of the school, the curriculum to be offered, and 
the proposed hours of instruction and the qualifica­
tions of the parent-teacher relative to (b) (4) or 
Cb) (7). Information contained in such reports may be 
used only for record keeping and other purposes for 
which similar information on public school students 
may be used in accordance with guidelines, rules, and 
regulations of the State Board of Education. 
Maintenance of attendance records, subject to inspec­
tion by the local superintendent, and submission of 
these records to the superintendent at the end of each 
school year. 
Instruction for at least four (4). hours per day for 
the same number of instructional days as are required 
by state law for pub'lfc schools. 
Possession of a high school diploma or GED by the 
parent-teacher conducting classes in grades K-8. 
Possession of at least a baccalaureate degree, awarded 
by a college or university accredited by an accrediting 
agency or association recognized by the State Board of 
Education, by a parent-teacher conducting classes in 
grades 9-12; provided, however, that a parent-teacher 
may request an exemption from this requirement from 
the State Department of Education on a year-to-year 
basis. 
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Utah 
Sec. 53-24-1. Minimum Time - Exceptions, Excuses and Exemptions 
Every parent, guardian or other person having control of any 
minor between six and eighteen years of age shall be required to send 
such minor to a public or regularly established private school during 
the regularly established school year of the district in which he 
r e s i d e s ;  p r o v i d e d :  . . .  
b. That in each year the parent, guardian or other person 
having control of any such minor may be excused by the 
board of education of the district from sending such minor 
to a public, regularly established private or part-time 
school or class for any of the following reasons: . . . 
(2]L That such minor is taught at home in the branches 
prescribed by law for the same length of time as 
children are required by law to be taught In the 
district schools; provided, that a minor legally 
excused to enter employment may be excused from 
attending a part-time school or class for the reason 
that such minor is taught at home the required number 
of hours. 
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Vermont 
Sec. 1121. Attendance by Children of School Age Required 
A person having the control of a child between the ages of seven 
and sixteen years shall cause the child to attend an approved public 
school or an approved or reporting private school for the full number 
of days for which that school is held, unless: 
1. the child is mentally or physically unable so to attend; 
or 
2. is being furnished with an approved program of home Instruc­
tion; or 
3. has completed the tenth grade; or 
4. is excused by the superintendent or a majority of the school 
directors as provided in this chapter. 
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Virginia 
Sec. 22.1-254. Ages of Children Required to Attend 
Every parent, guardian, or other person in the Commonwealth hav­
ing control or charge of any child who will have reached the fifth 
birthday on or before October 31 of the 1980-1981 school year and 
September 30 of any school year thereafter and who has not passed the 
seventeenth birthday shall, during the period of each year the public 
schools are in session and for the same number of days and hours per 
day as the public schools, send such child to a public school or to a 
private, denominational or parochial school or have such child taught 
by a tutor or teacher of qualifications prescribed by the Board of 
Education and approved by the division superintendent or provide for 
home instruction of such child as described in Sec. 22.1-254.1. 
Instruction in the home of a child or children by the parent, 
guardian or other person having control or charge of such child or 
children shall not be classified or defined as a private, denominational 
or parochial school. 
Sec. 22.1-254.1. Declaration of Policy; Requirements for Home Instruc­
tion of Children 
A. When the requirements of this section have been satisfied, instruc­
tion of children by their parents in their home is an acceptable 
alternative form of education under the policy of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia. Any parent of any child who will have reached the 
fifth birthday on or before September 30 of any school year and who 
has not passed the seventeenth birthday may elect to provide home 
Instruction in lieu of school attendance if he (i) holds a bacca­
laureate degree 1n any subject from an accredited institution of 
higher education; or (ii) is a teacher of qualifications pre­
scribed by the Board of Education; or (iii) has enrolled the child 
or children in a correspondence course approved by the Board of 
Education; or (iv) provides a program of study or curriculum which, 
in the judgment of the division superintendent, includes the 
standards of learning objectives adopted by the Board of Education 
for language arts and mathematics and provides evidence that the 
parent Is able to provide an adequate education for the child. 
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Washington 
Sec. 28A.02.201 . Private Schools - Scope of State Control - Generally 
1. All parents in this state of any child eight years of age and 
under eighteen years of age shall cause such child to attend 
the public school of the dtstrict tn which the child resides fo 
for the full time when such school may be in session unless: 
« • * 
b. The child Is receiving home-based instruction as provided 
t n  s u b s e c t i o n  ( 4 }  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n ;  o r  . . .  
4. For the purposes of this chapter, Instruction shall be home-
based if 1t consists of planned and supervised Instructional 
and related educational activities, including a curriculum and 
instruction in the basic skills of occupational education, 
science, mathematics, language, social studies, history, health, 
reading, writing, spelling, and the development of an apprecia­
tion of art and music, provided for a number of hours equiva­
lent to the total annual program hours per grade level estab­
lished for approved private schools under RCW 28A.02.201 and 
28A.02.240 and if such activities are: 
a. Provided by a parent who is instructing his or her child 
only and are supervised by a certificated person. A 
certificated person for purposes of this chapter shall be a 
person certified under chapter 28A.70 RCW. For purposes 
of this section, "supervised by a certificated person" 
means: The planning by the certificated person and the 
parent of objectives consistent with this subsection; a 
minimum each month of an average of one contact hour per 
week with the child being supervised by the certificated 
person; and evaluation of such child's progress by the 
certificated person. The number of children supervised by 
the certificated person shall not exceed thirty for pur­
poses of this subsection; or 
b. Provided by a parent who is Instructing his or her child 
only and who has either earned forty-five college level 
quarter credit hours or its equivalent 1n semester hours or 
has completed a course 1n home-based Instruction at a post-
secondary institution or a vocational-technical Institute; 
or 
c. Provided by a parent who is deemed sufficiently qualified 
to provide home-based instruction by the superintendent of 
the local school district in which the child resides. 
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5. The legislature recognizes that home-based Instruction 1s less 
structured and more experiential than the instruction normally 
provided 1n a classroom setting. Therefore, the provisions of 
subsection (41 of this section relating to the nature and 
quantity of Instructional and related educational activities 
shall be liberally construed. 
Sec. 28A.27. Compulsory School Attendance 
The state hereby recognizes that parents who are causing their 
children to receive home-based instruction under RCW 28A.27.010(4) shall 
be subject only to those minimum state laws and regulations which are 
necessary to insure that a sufficient basic educational opportunity Is 
provided to the children receiving such Instruction. Therefore, all 
decisions relating to philosophy or doctrine, selection of books, 
teaching materials, and curriculum, and methods, timing, and place In 
the provision or evaluation of home-based Instruction shall be the 
responsibility of the parent except for matters specifically referred 
to in this chapter. 
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West Virginia 
Sec. 18-8-1. Commencement and Termination of Compulsory School 
Attendance; Exemptions 
Compulsory school attendance shall begin with the seventh 
birthday and continue to the sixteenth birthday. 
Exemption from the foregoing requirements of compulsory public 
school attendance shall be made on behalf of any child for the follow' 
ing causes or conditions, each such cause or condition being subject 
to confirmation by the attendance authority of the county: . . . 
Exemption B. Instruction in Home or Other Approved Place 
Such instruction shall be in the home of such child or children 
or at some other place approved by the county board of education and for 
a time equal to the school term of the county. The instruction in such 
cases shall be conducted by a person or persons who, in the judgment of 
the county superintendent and county board of education, are qualified 
to give instruction in subjects required to be taught in the free 
elementary schools of the state. It shall be the duty of the person or 
persons giving the instruction, upon request of the county superinten­
dent, to furnish to the county board of education, such information and 
records as may be required from time to time with respect to attendance, 
instruction, and progress of pupils enrolled between the ages of seven 
and sixteen years receiving such instruction; . . . 
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Wisconsin 
Sec. 1.115.01. Home-Based Private Educational Program 
"Home-based private educational program" means a program of 
educational Instruction provided to a child by the child's parent or 
guardian or by a person designated by the parent or guardian. An 
instructional program provided to more than one family unit does not 
constitute a home-based private educational program. 
Sec. 3.118.15. 
1. a. Except as provided under pars, (b) to (d) and sub (4), 
unless the child is excused under sub. (3) or has 
graduated from high school, any person having under con­
trol a child who is between the ages of 6 and 18 years 
shall cause the child to attend school regularly during 
the full period and hours, religious holidays excepted, 
that the public or private school in which the child 
should be enrolled is in session until the end of the 
school term, quarter or semester of the school year 1n 
which the child becomes 18 years of age. 
Sec. 4.118.15. 
4. Instruction in a home-based private educational program that 
meets all of the criteria under Sec. 118.165 (1) may be 
submitted for attendance at a public or private school. 
Sec. 5.118.165. Private Schools 
1. An institution 1s a private school if its educational pro­
gram meets all of the following criteria: 
a. The primary purpose of the program is to provide private 
or religious-based education. 
b. The program is privately controlled. 
c. The program provides at least 875 hours of Instruction 
each school year. 
d. The program provides a sequentially progressive curricu­
lum of fundamental instruction in reading, language arts, 
mathematics, social studies, science and health. This 
subsection does not require the program to include in its 
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curriculum any concept, topic or practice 1n conflict 
with the program's religious doctrines or to exclude 
from its curriculum any concept, topic or practice con­
sistent with the program's religious doctrines. 
e. The program 1s not operated or instituted for the 
purpose of avoiding or circumventing the compulsory 
school attendance requirement under Sec. 118.15 (1] (ah 
f. The pupils in the institution's educational program, in 
the ordinary course of events, return annually to the 
homes of thefr parents or guardfans for not less than 
2 months of sumner vacation, or the institution is 
licensed as a child caring institution under Sec. 48.60 
01. 
2. An institution may request the state superintendent to 
approve the institution's educational program as a private 
school. The state superintendent shall base his or her 
approval solely on the criteria under sub. 01. 
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Wyoming 
Sec. 21-4-101. Definitions 
a. For the purposes of this article: . . . 
C3l "Private school" is any nonpublic, elementary 
or secondary school providing a basic academic 
educational program for children and may include 
parochial and church or reltgious schools and home-
based educational programs; . . . 
C5l A home-based educational program means a program 
of educational instruction provided to a child by 
the child*s parent or legal guardian or by a person 
designated by the parent or legal guardian. An 
instructional program provided to more than one CI) 
family unit does not constitute a home-based 
e d u c a t i o n a l  p r o g r a m ;  . . .  
Sec. 118.15. Compulsory School Attendance 
1. a. Except as provided under pars, (b) to (d) and sub. (4), 
unless the child is excused under sub. (3) or has 
graduated from high school, any person having under con­
trol a child who is between the ages of 6 and 18 years 
shall cause the child to attend school regularly during 
the full period and hours, religious holidays excepted 
that the public or private school 1n which the child 
should be enrolled is in session until the end of the 
school term, quarter or semester of the school year in 
which the child becomes 18 years of age. . . . 
d. Any child's parent or guardian, or the child if the 
parent or guardian is notified, may request the school 
board to provide the child with program or curriculum 
modifications including but not limited to: 
1. Modifications within the child's current academic 
program. 
2. A school work training or work study program. 
3. Enrollment in any alternative public school or pro­
gram located in the school district in which the 
child resides. 
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4. Enrollment in any nonsectarian private school or 
program, located in the school district in which the 
child resides, which complies with the requirements 
of 42 USC 2000d. Enrollment of a child under this 
subdivision shall be pursuant to a contractual 
agreement which provides for the payment of the 
child's tuition by the school district. 
5. Home-bound study, including nonsectarian correspon­
dence courses or other courses of study approved by 
the school board or nonsectarian tutoring provided 
by the school in which the child is enrolled. 
Sec. 118-15. Home Instruction 
4. Instruction in a home-based private educational program that 
meets all of the criteria under sec. 118-165 (1) may be 
substituted for attendance at a public or private school. 
Sec. 118.165. Private Schools 
1. An Institution is a private school if its educational program 
meets all of the following criteria: 
a. The primary purpose of the program is to provide private 
or religious-based education. 
b. The program is privately controlled. 
c. The program provides at least 875 hours of instruction 
each school year. 
d. The program provides a sequentially progressive curricu­
lum of fundamental instruction in reading, language 
arts, mathematics, social studies, science and health. 
This subsection does not require the program to include 
in its curriculum any concept, topic or practice 1n con­
flict with the program's religious doctrines or to 
exclude from its curriculum any concept, topic or 
practice consistent with the program's religious doc­
trines. 
e. The program is not operated or instituted for the purpose 
of avoiding or circumventing the compulsory school 
attendance requirement under sec. 118.15 (1) (a)» 
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f. The pupils in the institution's educational program, in 
the ordinary course of events, return annually to the 
homes of their parents or guardians for not less than 
2 months of summer vacation, or the institution is 
licensed as a child caring institution under sec. 48.60 
CU. 
